twelfth clause in California

1972In Estate of Cox (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 168 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 55 ], the decedents, who were husband and wife, executed handwritten wills in 1953, shortly before taking a trip.

1972In Estate of Cox (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 168 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 55 ], the decedents, who were husband and wife, executed handwritten wills in 1953, shortly before taking a trip.

1932Rep. 183 , 17 Pac. 535 ].) In the twelfth defense it is again asserted that the San Joaquin River is navigable and that the United States *613 is an indispensable party to this suit.

1916The appellant cites the case of Anderson v. Quick, 163 Cal. 658 , [ 126 Pac. 871 ], and insists that it, in effect, holds that the contractor, in case of total destruction, cannot, under the twelfth clause, recover any installment then due and unpaid unless he has reconstructed the building to a point where such installment will again be earned.

1916The appellant cites the case of Anderson v. Quick, 163 Cal. 658 , [ 126 Pac. 871 ], and insists that it, in effect, holds that the contractor, in case of total destruction, cannot, under the twelfth clause, recover any installment then due and unpaid unless he has reconstructed the building to a point where such installment will again be earned.

1915The case differs materially from Hettinger v. Thiele 15 Cal. App. 1 , [ 113 Pac. 121 ], where, under a contract containing the same twelfth clause, the contractor was held entitled to seventy-five per cent of the work done by him up to the time of the destruction.

1915The case differs materially from Hettinger v. Thiele 15 Cal. App. 1 , [ 113 Pac. 121 ], where, under a contract containing the same twelfth clause, the contractor was held entitled to seventy-five per cent of the work done by him up to the time of the destruction.

1910In fact, as was said in Appeal of Balliet, 14 Pa. 451 , “the distinction between a specific and a. pecuniary legacy and a specific and a demonstrative legacy is sometimes very nice.” For an illustration let us turn to a modern Bhode Island case: “The legacy, in the twelfth clause, of two hundred and thirty shares in the Ashland Cotton Company, although not described by the testatrix as ‘my’ two hundred and thirty shares, seems to us: to be a specific legacy.

1889(People v. Langton, 67 Cal. 427 .) It is claimed that the twelfth instruction was erroneous, because it required both accident and misfortune to constitute a defense.

1881(People v. Gibson, 17 Cal. 283 ; People v. Woody, 45 id. 280.) The twelfth instruction was, that “ Every man is presumed to intend what his acts indicate his intentions to have been, and if the defendant fired a loaded pistol at the deceased and killed him, the law presumes that the defendant intended to kill the deceased; and unless the defendant can satisfactorily show that his intention was other than his act indicated, the law will not hold him guiltless.” It is claimed that the above instruction was erroneous, “because it is not predicated upon any logical dedueible theory of any portion