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16 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 2006–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences2024However, out of concern that the "problematic sweep of the statute" had continued to invite its misapplication to meritorious claims, this court in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I), and Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 206-207 (2019) (Blanchard II), substantially augmented the Duracraft framework, requiring that the factual allegations supporting challenged claims be parsed, so as to allow portions of such claims to be dismissed, and inserting an 4 additional multifactor test to evaluate the subjective motivation of th 2024However, out of concern that the "problematic sweep of the statute" had continued to invite its misapplication to meritorious claims, this court in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I), and Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 206-207 (2019) (Blanchard II), substantially augmented the Duracraft framework, requiring that the factual allegations supporting challenged claims be parsed, so as to allow portions of such claims to be dismissed, and inserting an 4 additional multifactor test to evaluate the subjective motivation of th | 6 | 11 |
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp.green2 sentences2018"If the nonmoving party cannot make this showing, it may then attempt to meet its burden under the augmented Duracraft framework as set out in Blanchard by showing that its claim was not 'brought primarily to chill,' see Blanchard , 477 Mass. at 159 , quoting Duracraft , 427 Mass. at 161 , the special movant's legitimate petitioning activities but rather 'to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants' alleged ... [legally transgressive] acts.' See Blanchard , supra at 160 ." 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC , 477 Mass. 162 , 168 (2017). 2017The goal of this framework was to ‘“distinguish meritless from meritorious claims, as was intended by the Legislature.” Id. at 168 . *159 While the Duracraft framework limited the reach of the statute and mitigated the problem, subsequent experience has shown that it did not eliminate it. | 3 | 7 |
477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLCgreen2 sentences2018"If the nonmoving party cannot make this showing, it may then attempt to meet its burden under the augmented Duracraft framework as set out in Blanchard by showing that its claim was not 'brought primarily to chill,' see Blanchard , 477 Mass. at 159 , quoting Duracraft , 427 Mass. at 161 , the special movant's legitimate petitioning activities but rather 'to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendants' alleged ... [legally transgressive] acts.' See Blanchard , supra at 160 ." 477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC , 477 Mass. 162 , 168 (2017). 2017See, e.g., Harrison , 477 Mass. at 171 (proceeding to stage two of Duracraft analysis only in regard to defendants' petitioning activity). 2. | 2 | 5 |
Reichenbach v. Haydockgreen2 sentences2024Compare Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 149-151 (content of statements, and manner in which they were issued, established "plausible nexus" between statements and government proceeding, so as to constitute petitioning activity), with Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242 , 250- 252 (2007) (party's "self-serving characterization" of website did not alter court's analysis of whether statements on website constituted petitioning activity where "[t]here is nothing in the record to refute" conclusion that website had been created to generate business). 39 proceed de novo"), with Reichenbach, 92 Mass. 2024Compare Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 149-151 (content of statements, and manner in which they were issued, established "plausible nexus" between statements and government proceeding, so as to constitute petitioning activity), with Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242 , 250- 252 (2007) (party's "self-serving characterization" of website did not alter court's analysis of whether statements on website constituted petitioning activity where "[t]here is nothing in the record to refute" conclusion that website had been created to generate business). 39 proceed de novo"), with Reichenbach, 92 Mass. | 2 | 3 |
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences2024However, out of concern that the "problematic sweep of the statute" had continued to invite its misapplication to meritorious claims, this court in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I), and Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 206-207 (2019) (Blanchard II), substantially augmented the Duracraft framework, requiring that the factual allegations supporting challenged claims be parsed, so as to allow portions of such claims to be dismissed, and inserting an 4 additional multifactor test to evaluate the subjective motivation of th 2024However, out of concern that the "problematic sweep of the statute" had continued to invite its misapplication to meritorious claims, this court in Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 155, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I), and Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 483 Mass. 200, 206-207 (2019) (Blanchard II), substantially augmented the Duracraft framework, requiring that the factual allegations supporting challenged claims be parsed, so as to allow portions of such claims to be dismissed, and inserting an 4 additional multifactor test to evaluate the subjective motivation of th | 2 | 2 |
Sahli v. Bull HN Information Systems, Inc.green2 sentences2024See Sahli, 437 Mass. at 700-701 . 2024See Sahli, 437 Mass. at 700-701 . | 1 | 1 |
Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmanngreen2 sentences2024Compare Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 149-151 (content of statements, and manner in which they were issued, established "plausible nexus" between statements and government proceeding, so as to constitute petitioning activity), with Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242 , 250- 252 (2007) (party's "self-serving characterization" of website did not alter court's analysis of whether statements on website constituted petitioning activity where "[t]here is nothing in the record to refute" conclusion that website had been created to generate business). 39 proceed de novo"), with Reichenbach, 92 Mass. 2024Compare Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 149-151 (content of statements, and manner in which they were issued, established "plausible nexus" between statements and government proceeding, so as to constitute petitioning activity), with Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 448 Mass. 242 , 250- 252 (2007) (party's "self-serving characterization" of website did not alter court's analysis of whether statements on website constituted petitioning activity where "[t]here is nothing in the record to refute" conclusion that website had been created to generate business). 39 proceed de novo"), with Reichenbach, 92 Mass. | 1 | 1 |
Fustolo v. Hollandergreen1 sentence2023To prevail on a special motion to dismiss under § 59H, the special movants (here, the RBP parties) "must make a threshold showing through pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it 'are "based on" the petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning 18 activities.'" Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 865 (2010), quoting Duracraft, 427 Mass. at 167-168 . | 1 | 1 |
McLarnon v. Jokischgreen2 sentences2017We address the defendants' alleged conduct under the Duracraft framework, "review[ing] the judge's decision to grant the special motion to dismiss to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion or error of law." McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 348 (2000). a. 2017We address the defendants' alleged conduct under the Duracraft framework, "review[ing] the judge's decision to grant the special motion to dismiss to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion or error of law." McLarnon v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343, 348 (2000). a. | 1 | 1 |
Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlingreen2 sentences2017"The special motion procedure employs a two-stage framework." Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 484 (2017). 2017"The special motion procedure employs a two-stage framework." Cardno ChemRisk, LLC v. Foytlin, 476 Mass. 479, 484 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sandholm v. Kuecker
green
2 sentences2019As the Duracraft framework was augmented in Blanchard I, an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss may be defeated if the nonmoving party (here, the abutters) establishes, such that the motion judge can conclude with fair assurance, that the "primary motivating goal" in bringing the challenged claim was "not to interfere with and burden [the] defendant['s] . . . petition rights, but to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendant['s] alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.'" Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 160, quoting Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 57 . 2019As the Duracraft framework was augmented in Blanchard I, an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss may be defeated if the nonmoving party (here, the abutters) establishes, such that the motion judge can conclude with fair assurance, that the "primary motivating goal" in bringing the challenged claim was "not to interfere with and burden [the] defendant['s] . . . petition rights, but to seek damages for the personal harm to [it] from [the] defendant['s] alleged . . . [legally transgressive] acts.'" Blanchard I, 477 Mass. at 160, quoting Sandholm v. Kuecker, 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 57 . | 3 | 2017–2019 |
JONATHAN NYBERG & another v. R. BRUCE WHELTLE & another.
green
2 sentences2023The Duracraft framework is used to evaluate the motion, see Nyberg, supra, and requires that "[a]t the first stage, a special movant must demonstrate that the nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its own petitioning activities." Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I). 2023The Duracraft framework is used to evaluate the motion, see Nyberg, supra, and requires that "[a]t the first stage, a special movant must demonstrate that the nonmoving party's claims are solely based on its own petitioning activities." Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141, 159 (2017) (Blanchard I). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Office One, Inc. v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2017At the first stage, the moving party has the burden to demonstrate "that the claims against it are, in fact, 'based on' its petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to its petitioning activities." Office One, Inc . v. Lopez , 437 Mass. 113 , 122, 769 N.E.2d 749 (2002), citing Duracraft , 427 Mass. at 167 -168 , 691 N.E.2d 935 . 2017At the first stage, the moving party has the burden to demonstrate "that the claims against it are, in fact, 'based on' its petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to its petitioning activities." Office One, Inc . v. Lopez , 437 Mass. 113 , 122, 769 N.E.2d 749 (2002), citing Duracraft , 427 Mass. at 167 -168 , 691 N.E.2d 935 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2017Because the first stage of the Duracraft analysis is, like the analysis of an ordinary motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), directed to examining the allegations of the complaint, our review is "fresh and independent," i.e., *797 de novo. 14 Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc ., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97 , 103, 46 N.E.3d 79 (2016), S . 2017Because the first stage of the Duracraft analysis is, like the analysis of an ordinary motion to dismiss under Mass.R.Civ.P. 12(b), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), directed to examining the allegations of the complaint, our review is "fresh and independent," i.e., *797 de novo. 14 Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc ., 89 Mass. App. Ct. 97 , 103, 46 N.E.3d 79 (2016), S . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Baker v. Parsons
green
2 sentences2006See § 59H; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. at 552-554 . 6 We affirm the judge’s denial of Wood’s special motion to dismiss, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings. 2006See § 59H; Baker v. Parsons, 434 Mass. at 552-554 . 6 We affirm the judge’s denial of Wood’s special motion to dismiss, and remand the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.