16 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2020However, this Court pointed out that the physical contact requirement “broadly” includes “indirect physical contact, such as where a rock is thrown or an object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs.” Id. at 347 . 2017Accordingly, because it is clear that this Court implicitly concluded in Wills and Berry that the language at issue in those cases—and also at issue in the instant case—includes a “physical contact requirement,” which encompasses both direct and indirect physical contact and implicates the substantial physical nexus test, we will apply those standards in this case.9 Moreover, given this Court’s previous interpretations of the policy language at issue in this case, we conclude that defendant is incorrect that the language in its policy “only provides for a recovery where the insured is actually | 2 | 7 |
Thornton v. Allstate Insurancegreen1 sentence2019See, e.g., Thornton v Allstate Ins Co, 425 Mich 643, 659-660 (1986) (interpreting “injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle” in MCL 500.3105(1) as “provid[ing] coverage only where the causal connection between the injury and the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle is more than incidental, fortuitous, or ‘but for.’ The involvement of the car in the injury should be ‘directly related to its character as a motor vehicle.’ ”) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. Methnergreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Said v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 152 Mich App 240 ; 393 NW2d 598 (1986) (swerving to avoid a hit-and-run vehicle does not satisfy the physical contact requirement); see also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Methner, 127 Mich App 683 ; 339 NW2d 234 (1983). 1996See, e.g., Said v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 152 Mich App 240 ; 393 NW2d 598 (1986) (swerving to avoid a hit-and-run vehicle does not satisfy the physical contact requirement); see also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Methner, 127 Mich App 683 ; 339 NW2d 234 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Said v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'ngreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Said v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 152 Mich App 240 ; 393 NW2d 598 (1986) (swerving to avoid a hit-and-run vehicle does not satisfy the physical contact requirement); see also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Methner, 127 Mich App 683 ; 339 NW2d 234 (1983). 1996See, e.g., Said v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 152 Mich App 240 ; 393 NW2d 598 (1986) (swerving to avoid a hit-and-run vehicle does not satisfy the physical contact requirement); see also Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Methner, 127 Mich App 683 ; 339 NW2d 234 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
In re the Arbitration between Smithgreen2 sentences1978See Smith v Great American Insurance Co, 29 NY2d 116 ; 272 NE2d 528 (1971), Government Employees Insurance Co v Goldschlager, 44 App Div 2d 715; 355 NYS2d 9 (1974). 1978See Smith v Great American Insurance Co, 29 NY2d 116 ; 272 NE2d 528 (1971), Government Employees Insurance Co v Goldschlager, 44 App Div 2d 715; 355 NYS2d 9 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kersten v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2017Wills, 222 Mich App at 114-118 . -9- object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, “[a] ‘substantial physical nexus’ between the unidentified vehicle and the object causing the injury to the insured has been found where the object in question was a piece of, or projected by, the unidentified vehicle, but not where the object originates from an occupant of an unidentified vehicle.” Wills, 222 Mich App at 115 , citing Berry, 219 2017Wills, 222 Mich App at 114-118 . -9- object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, “[a] ‘substantial physical nexus’ between the unidentified vehicle and the object causing the injury to the insured has been found where the object in question was a piece of, or projected by, the unidentified vehicle, but not where the object originates from an occupant of an unidentified vehicle.” Wills, 222 Mich App at 115 , citing Berry, 219 | 4 | 1981–2017 |
Lord v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2017Again, indirect physical contact is sufficient under the policy language as long as a substantial physical nexus exists, Berry, 219 Mich App at 347 , and this Court has found that the physical contact requirement is met in cases where the contact is transmitted through an intermediate vehicle, see Lord v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 22 Mich App 669, 671-672 ; 177 NW2d -11- 653 (1970).11 Similarly, here, there is no indication that the substantial physical nexus was destroyed by the other motorcycles involved in the incident, especially given the fact that the accident clearly was caused by the metal ob 2017Again, indirect physical contact is sufficient under the policy language as long as a substantial physical nexus exists, Berry, 219 Mich App at 347 , and this Court has found that the physical contact requirement is met in cases where the contact is transmitted through an intermediate vehicle, see Lord v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 22 Mich App 669, 671-672 ; 177 NW2d -11- 653 (1970).11 Similarly, here, there is no indication that the substantial physical nexus was destroyed by the other motorcycles involved in the incident, especially given the fact that the accident clearly was caused by the metal ob | 3 | 1981–2017 |
Wills v. State Farm Insurance
green
2 sentences2016The policy in Berry required “physical contact,” which, as noted, we interpreted as providing coverage where there was either direct or indirect contact: [T]his Court has construed the physical contact requirement broadly to include indirect physical contact, such as where a rock is thrown or an object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Id. (emphasis added).] Our focus on the presence of a “substantial physical nexus” continued in Wills v State Farm Ins 2016The policy in Berry required “physical contact,” which, as noted, we interpreted as providing coverage where there was either direct or indirect contact: [T]his Court has construed the physical contact requirement broadly to include indirect physical contact, such as where a rock is thrown or an object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Id. (emphasis added).] Our focus on the presence of a “substantial physical nexus” continued in Wills v State Farm Ins | 3 | 2016–2017 |
Hill v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences2010Id. 1997Also, while we agree with the trial court that the physical contact requirement prevents fraudulent “phantom” vehicle claims under uninsured motorist policies, Berry, supra at 347 , we also believe that it ensures a “substantial nexus *119 between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck.” Hill, supra at 394 . | 3 | 1996–2010 |
Adams v. Zajac
green
2 sentences2017Wills, 222 Mich App at 114-118 . -9- object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, “[a] ‘substantial physical nexus’ between the unidentified vehicle and the object causing the injury to the insured has been found where the object in question was a piece of, or projected by, the unidentified vehicle, but not where the object originates from an occupant of an unidentified vehicle.” Wills, 222 Mich App at 115 , citing Berry, 219 2017Wills, 222 Mich App at 114-118 . -9- object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. [Citations omitted.] Therefore, “[a] ‘substantial physical nexus’ between the unidentified vehicle and the object causing the injury to the insured has been found where the object in question was a piece of, or projected by, the unidentified vehicle, but not where the object originates from an occupant of an unidentified vehicle.” Wills, 222 Mich App at 115 , citing Berry, 219 | 2 | 2017–2017 |
McJIMPSON v. AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY
green
2 sentences2017Moreover, contrary to defendant’s suggestion that McJimpson supports its position, in McJimpson, 315 Mich App at 360-361 , we in fact reaffirmed these previous decisions, recognizing the distinction between policies requiring direct physical contact and those containing a broader physical contact requirement which can be satisfied by direct or indirect contact. 2017Moreover, contrary to defendant’s suggestion that McJimpson supports its position, in McJimpson, 315 Mich App at 360-361 , we in fact reaffirmed these previous decisions, recognizing the distinction between policies requiring direct physical contact and those containing a broader physical contact requirement which can be satisfied by direct or indirect contact. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Celina Mutual Insurance v. Citizens Insurance
green
2 sentences2017By giving plain meaning to the “directly results” language of MCL 500.3106(1)(b) as it is related to the physical-contact requirement, a claimant is entitled to PIP benefits under the parked vehicle provision when contact with the property in some fashion causes the injury. 21 Celina Mut Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315 ; 355 NW2d 916 (1984). 22 Id. at 317-318 . 23 Adanalic v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 309 Mich App 173 ; 870 NW2d 731 (2015). 8 Specifically, while the claimant “was pulling the pallet with a belt,” “[t]he ramp connecting the trailer and the [truck] collapsed, which caused the 2017By giving plain meaning to the “directly results” language of MCL 500.3106(1)(b) as it is related to the physical-contact requirement, a claimant is entitled to PIP benefits under the parked vehicle provision when contact with the property in some fashion causes the injury. 21 Celina Mut Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315 ; 355 NW2d 916 (1984). 22 Id. at 317-318 . 23 Adanalic v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 309 Mich App 173 ; 870 NW2d 731 (2015). 8 Specifically, while the claimant “was pulling the pallet with a belt,” “[t]he ramp connecting the trailer and the [truck] collapsed, which caused the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ritchie v. Federal Insurance
green
2 sentences2017It only requires that the injuries directly result from physical contact with the property.” 25 Therefore, reasoned the panel, “the statute is satisfied . . . where [the claimant’s] physical contact with the pallet caused him to fall to the ground, directly resulting in his injuries.” 26 In sum, these cases were sustained because the property directly contributed to the injury. 27 24 Id. at 182 (quotation marks omitted). 25 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 26 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 27 In Ritchie v Federal Ins Co, 132 Mich App 372 ; 347 NW2d 478 (1984), the Court of Appeals sustained a cl 2017It only requires that the injuries directly result from physical contact with the property.” 25 Therefore, reasoned the panel, “the statute is satisfied . . . where [the claimant’s] physical contact with the pallet caused him to fall to the ground, directly resulting in his injuries.” 26 In sum, these cases were sustained because the property directly contributed to the injury. 27 24 Id. at 182 (quotation marks omitted). 25 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 26 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 27 In Ritchie v Federal Ins Co, 132 Mich App 372 ; 347 NW2d 478 (1984), the Court of Appeals sustained a cl | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Adanalic v. Harco National Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2017By giving plain meaning to the “directly results” language of MCL 500.3106(1)(b) as it is related to the physical-contact requirement, a claimant is entitled to PIP benefits under the parked vehicle provision when contact with the property in some fashion causes the injury. 21 Celina Mut Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315 ; 355 NW2d 916 (1984). 22 Id. at 317-318 . 23 Adanalic v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 309 Mich App 173 ; 870 NW2d 731 (2015). 8 Specifically, while the claimant “was pulling the pallet with a belt,” “[t]he ramp connecting the trailer and the [truck] collapsed, which caused the 2017By giving plain meaning to the “directly results” language of MCL 500.3106(1)(b) as it is related to the physical-contact requirement, a claimant is entitled to PIP benefits under the parked vehicle provision when contact with the property in some fashion causes the injury. 21 Celina Mut Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315 ; 355 NW2d 916 (1984). 22 Id. at 317-318 . 23 Adanalic v Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 309 Mich App 173 ; 870 NW2d 731 (2015). 8 Specifically, while the claimant “was pulling the pallet with a belt,” “[t]he ramp connecting the trailer and the [truck] collapsed, which caused the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kreager v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1996Kreager, supra; Hill, supra. In this case, defendant argues that an insufficient nexus existed between a hit-and-run vehicle and the metal piece lying in the road. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Government Employees Insurance v. Goldschlager
neutral
2 sentences1978See Smith v Great American Insurance Co, 29 NY2d 116 ; 272 NE2d 528 (1971), Government Employees Insurance Co v Goldschlager, 44 App Div 2d 715; 355 NYS2d 9 (1974). 1978See Smith v Great American Insurance Co, 29 NY2d 116 ; 272 NE2d 528 (1971), Government Employees Insurance Co v Goldschlager, 44 App Div 2d 715; 355 NYS2d 9 (1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Blankenbaker v. Great Central Insurance Company
green
2 sentences1978In Blankenbaker v Great Central Insurance Co, 151 Ind App 693; 281 NE2d 496 (1972), plaintiff struck a tire and rim on the highway. 1978In Blankenbaker v Great Central Insurance Co, 151 Ind App 693; 281 NE2d 496 (1972), plaintiff struck a tire and rim on the highway. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.