physical contact requirement in West Virginia

9 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

Case	Followed	Cited
STATE FARM AUTO. INS. CO. v. Normangreen wva · 1994 · cited in 2 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1997–2022 2 sentences 1997This Court concluded “that the insertion of a physical contact requirement in the uninsured motorist statute was a matter of legislative choice.” Id., 191 W.Va. at 507 , 446 S.E.2d at 729. 1997This Court concluded “that the insertion of a physical contact requirement in the uninsured motorist statute was a matter of legislative choice.” Id., 191 W.Va. at 507 , 446 S.E.2d at 729.	2	2
Girgis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen ohio · 1996 · cited in 2 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1997–1999 2 sentences 1999Emphasizing our firm commitment to the underlying objective of the “physical contact” requirement — the prevention of 688 fraud or collusion — we adopted the rationale articulated in Girgis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 302 , 662 N.E.2d 280 (1996), and determined that: absolute enforcement of the physical contact requirement is contrary to public policy. 1997*Co., 75 Ohio St.3d 302, 305 , 662 N.E.2d 280, 282 (1996). 2 We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that absolute enforcement of the physical contact requirement is contrary to public policy.	1	2
Lieving v. Hadleygreen wva · 1992 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002 2 sentences 2002VIII, § 4. [16] We note that the only statement contained in footnote 4 of Lieving with which we wholeheartedly agree is the final sentence which provides that "if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion." 188 W.Va. at 201, n. 4 , 423 S.E.2d at 604 n. 4. [17] This Court routinely indicates the continuing vitality of legal principles through its citation of and reliance on per curiam decisions in its signed opinions. [18] Appellant argues that her case presents equally strong arguments for applicat 2002VIII, § 4. [16] We note that the only statement contained in footnote 4 of Lieving with which we wholeheartedly agree is the final sentence which provides that "if rules of law or accepted ways of doing things are to be changed, then this Court will do so in a signed opinion, not a per curiam opinion." 188 W.Va. at 201, n. 4 , 423 S.E.2d at 604 n. 4. [17] This Court routinely indicates the continuing vitality of legal principles through its citation of and reliance on per curiam decisions in its signed opinions. [18] Appellant argues that her case presents equally strong arguments for applicat	1	1
City of Fairmont v. RETAIL, WHOLESALE, ETC.green wva · 1981 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1988–1988 1 sentence 1988Store Union, AFL-CIO, 166 W.Va. 1, 3-4 , 283 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1980), it was stated that "[w]e have traditionally maintained that upon receiving certified questions we retain some flexibility in determining how and to what extent they will be answered.” (Citations omitted). 3 .The uninsured motorist provisions of the policy read, in part: 764 "We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: (1) sustained by a covered person; and (2) caused by an accident. ***** “‘Uninsured motor vehicl	1	1
Maurine Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companygreen ca8 · 1979 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985). 1987*Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985).	1	1
Lee v. Comergreen wva · 1976 · cited in 1 West Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987 2 sentences 1987However, determining if an accident actually occurred as a plaintiff says it did is part of the normal business of our courts. "[O]ur juries and trial courts have constantly performed the function of distinguishing the frivolous from the substantial, the fraudulent from the meritorious." Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585, 593 , 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1976). 1987However, determining if an accident actually occurred as a plaintiff says it did is part of the normal business of our courts. "[O]ur juries and trial courts have constantly performed the function of distinguishing the frivolous from the substantial, the fraudulent from the meritorious." Lee v. Comer, 159 W.Va. 585, 593 , 224 S.E.2d 721, 725 (1976).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Hamric v. Doe green wva · 1997 2 sentences 2002After recognizing that "absolute enforcement of the physical contact requirement is contrary to public policy," we determined in Hamric that "the physical contact requirement should not bar recovery when there is sufficient independent third-party evidence to conclusively establish that the sequence of events leading to an injury was initially set in motion by an unknown hit-and-run driver or vehicle." 201 W.Va. at 620 , 499 S.E.2d at 624 . 2002After recognizing that "absolute enforcement of the physical contact requirement is contrary to public policy," we determined in Hamric that "the physical contact requirement should not bar recovery when there is sufficient independent third-party evidence to conclusively establish that the sequence of events leading to an injury was initially set in motion by an unknown hit-and-run driver or vehicle." 201 W.Va. at 620 , 499 S.E.2d at 624 .	3	1999–2004
Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. v. Brewer green miss · 1987 2 sentences 1994The Mississippi court proceeded to adopt the indirect physical contact doctrine, deciding that "[a]n object propelled by one vehicle into another is sufficient to satisfy the physical contact requirement for recovery under the uninsured motorist provision for a hit-and-run driver." Id. at 371 . 1994The Mississippi court proceeded to adopt the indirect physical contact doctrine, deciding that “[a]n object propelled' by one vehicle into another is sufficient to satisfy the physical contact requirement for recovery under the uninsured motorist provision for a hit- and-run driver.” Id. at 371 .	2	1994–1994
Stringer v. Bufkin green miss · 1985 2 sentences 1994Such reasoning is consistent with the express purposes of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act to be remedial in nature and liberally construed to accomplish its purpose." Id. at 372, citing Stringer v. Bufkin, 465 So.2d 331 (Miss.1985). 1994Such reasoning is consistent with the express purposes of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act to be remedial in nature and liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.” Id. at 372, citing Stringer v. Bufkin, 465 So.2d 331 (Miss.1985).	2	1994–1994
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Guest green gactapp · 1992 2 sentences 1994State Farm also relies on a more recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Guest, 203 Ga.App. 711 , 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992). 1994State Farm also relies on a more recent decision by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Guest, 203 Ga.App. 711 , 417 S.E.2d 419 (1992).	2	1994–1994
Yutkin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. green illappct · 1986 2 sentences 1994The court then added that the law of Illinois gives "no indication that the courts or legislature are willing to extend the physical contact requirement to permit an insured, whose vehicle hits debris strewn in the roadway with no evidence of the source of the debris, to successfully claim they were damaged by the negligence of a hit-and-run driver." Id. 1994The court then added that the law of Illinois gives “no indication that the courts or legislature are willing to extend the physical contact requirement to permit an insured, whose vehicle hits debris strewn in the roadway with no evidence of the source of the debris, to successfully claim they were damaged by the negligence of a hit-and-run driver.” Id.	2	1994–1994
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co. green wva · 1979 2 sentences 2002Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective question in the same area of the law in their overruling decisions. 163 W.Va. at 332-33 , 256 S.E.2d at 880-81 , syl. pt. 5, in part. [7] In finding that the Bradley factors militated against a retroactive application of Hamric , we discussed how Hamric involved substantive law; it involved substantial public policy issues arising from statutory interpretations that were a clear departure from previously established law; and the fact that other jurisdictions had applied similar 2002Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective question in the same area of the law in their overruling decisions. 163 W.Va. at 332-33 , 256 S.E.2d at 880-81 , syl. pt. 5, in part. [7] In finding that the Bradley factors militated against a retroactive application of Hamric , we discussed how Hamric involved substantive law; it involved substantial public policy issues arising from statutory interpretations that were a clear departure from previously established law; and the fact that other jurisdictions had applied similar	1	2002–2002
Dalton v. Doe green wva · 2001 2 sentences 2002Dalton, 208 W.Va. at 323 , 540 S.E.2d at 540 . [8] Some of the instances when the high court routinely uses per curiam decisions include original jurisdiction cases, dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question, moot cases, and certain mandamus cases. 2002Dalton, 208 W.Va. at 323 , 540 S.E.2d at 540 . [8] Some of the instances when the high court routinely uses per curiam decisions include original jurisdiction cases, dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question, moot cases, and certain mandamus cases.	1	2002–2002
Perkins v. Doe green wva · 1987 2 sentences 1997This Court previously acknowledged that the purpose of the physical contact requirement is the prevention of fraud or collusion. 620 Perkins, 177 W.Va. at 87 n. 4, 350 S.E.2d at 714 n. 4. 1997This Court previously acknowledged that the purpose of the physical contact requirement is the prevention of fraud or collusion. 620 Perkins, 177 W.Va. at 87 n. 4, 350 S.E.2d at 714 n. 4.	1	1997–1997
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Norman green wva · 1994 1 sentence 1997This Court concluded “that the insertion of a physical contact requirement in the uninsured motorist statute was a matter of legislative choice.” Id., 191 W.Va. at 507 , 446 S.E.2d at 729.	1	1997–1997
Ark Kee Lee and Oliva Lee v. Marlene C. Wheeler green cadc · 1987 2 sentences 1988E.g., Lee v. Wheeler, 258 U.S.App.D.C. 184 , 810 F.2d 303 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Union Fire Ins. 1988E.g., Lee v. Wheeler, 258 U.S.App.D.C. 184 , 810 F.2d 303 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Union Fire Ins.	1	1988–1988
City of Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, & Department Store Union green wva · 1980 1 sentence 1988Store Union, AFL-CIO, 166 W.Va. 1, 3-4 , 283 S.E.2d 589, 590 (1980), it was stated that "[w]e have traditionally maintained that upon receiving certified questions we retain some flexibility in determining how and to what extent they will be answered.” (Citations omitted). 3 .The uninsured motorist provisions of the policy read, in part: 764 "We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: (1) sustained by a covered person; and (2) caused by an accident. ***** “‘Uninsured motor vehicl	1	1988–1988
Haas v. Freeman green kan · 1985 2 sentences 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985). 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985).	1	1987–1987
Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. green wvsd · 1973 2 sentences 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985). 1987*Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985).	1	1987–1987
Wert v. Burke green illappct · 1964 2 sentences 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985). 1987Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 714 Co., 360 F.Supp. 929 (S.D.W.Va.1973); see Hughes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 604 F.2d 573 (8th Cir.1979) (applying North Dakota law); Wert v. Burke, 47 Ill.App.2d 453 , 197 N.E.2d 717 (1964); Haas v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 677 , 693 P.2d 1199 (1985).	1	1987–1987

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WV § W. Va. Code § 33-6-31 (8)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 16 (1978–2016) MI 16 (1978–2020) IL 12 (1986–2021) CA 10 (1967–2013) AZ 9 (1975–2006) KY 9 (1977–2005) WV 9 (1987–2022) WI 8 (1983–2007) LA 8 (1975–2003) PA 7 (1974–2021) TX 6 (1993–2008) IA 5 (1979–2012) AR 4 (1978–2007) ID 4 (1985–2011) NY 4 (1986–2007) CT 4 (1992–2018) NC 3 (2008–2017) SC 3 (1985–2010) MN 3 (1978–1989) MS 2 (1987–2002) TN 2 (1968–1983) NE 2 (1976–1989) MT 2 (1985–2011) VA 2 (1993–2015) SD 2 (1978–2012) DE 2 (1977–1978) MD 2 (1989–2007)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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