physical contact requirement in Louisiana

2003In Brock v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 580 So.2d 474 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991), this Court discussed the concept of a "chain of events" being required to show that the physical contact requirement is met in an uninsured motorist claim where there is not a direct impact between the insured's vehicle and an uninsured vehicle.

2003This Court stated: In order to recover under an uninsured motorist insurance policy for damages allegedly caused by a hit and run motorist, a plaintiff must prove that there was physical contact between the *424 hit and run vehicle and the vehicle of the insured or between a hit and run driver and an intermediate vehicle which began a sequence or chain of events eventually resulting in a collision involving the insured vehicle and an intermediate vehicle. 580 So.2d at 476 .

1995In Kellams v. Oliver, 595 So.2d 331 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 596 So.2d 556 (La.1992), two judges of the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court decision that found the physical contact requirement in an uninsured motorist insurance contract was not against public policy.

1995In Kellams v. Oliver, 595 So.2d 331 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 596 So.2d 556 (La.1992), two judges of the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court decision that found the physical contact requirement in an uninsured motorist insurance contract was not against public policy.

1993As stated in Thibodeaux, 602 So.2d at 1079 : The physical contact requirement has two bases: (1) it prevents, as much as possible, false or fraudulent claims; and (2) it allows recovery under circumstances in which the insured otherwise could not carry the burden of proof.

1992In rejecting plaintiffs' arguments that the physical contact requirement was met by the contact between the uninsured vehicle's cargo, the sugarcane, and the plaintiffs' vehicle, we stated: In support of their position, plaintiffs rely on Ray v. DeMaggio, 313 So.2d 251 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975) and Springer v. Government Employees Ins.

1992The court noted that the purpose of the physical contact rule was to prevent fraudulent claims in which the insured claimed that the one-car accident was caused by a phantom vehicle, and recognized that the actual contact requirement has been somewhat relaxed by the jurisprudence, citing Ray v. DeMaggio, 313 So.2d 251 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975), and Springer v. Government Employees Insurance Company , as we did in Chapman .

1992Co., Inc., 311 So.2d 36 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 313 So.2d 598 (1975).

1992Co., Inc., 311 So.2d 36 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 313 So.2d 598 (1975).

1986Id. at 924 .

1977Co., 249 So.2d 429 (1971) said in discussing the physical contact rule "the only reason for such a requirement is to prove that the accident actually did occur as the claimant may say it did.

1975The Collins case followed Roloff v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 191 So.2d 901 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1966), which was likewise criticized in a comment at LXII T.L.R. 365.

1975Collins was specifically and effectively criticized in Webb v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 227 Pa.Super, 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974), where it was held that the physical contact requirement was void and unenforceable because it was contrary to the Pennsylvania UM statute and where that statute was similar to our own R.S. 22:1406.