12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
ILLINOIS NAT'L INSURANCE CO. v. Palmergreen2 sentences2017For instance, in Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 116 Ill. 1991Plaintiff' suggests that several decisions of the Illinois courts have eroded strict adherence to the physical contact rule, citing the following language: “there is a direct causal connection between the hit- and-run vehicle and the plaintiff’s vehicle, which connection carries through to the plaintiff’s vehicle by a continuous and contemporaneously transmitted force from the hit-and-run vehicle.” See Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Palmer (1983), 116 Ill. | 6 | 6 |
Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurancegreen2 sentences2017Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (2007). 2017Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (2007). | 3 | 3 |
Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co.green2 sentences1990(Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 350, 353 , 487 N.E.2d 943 ; Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111 , 317 N.E.2d 550 .) Plaintiff argues, however, that the legislature impliedly disavowed the physical-contact rule enunciated in these decisions by amending the statute in 1984 to require “physical contact” for property damage claims under section 143a(2) while omitting a physical-contact requirement for bodily injury claims under 143a(l). 1990(Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 350, 353 , 487 N.E.2d 943 ; Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111 , 317 N.E.2d 550 .) Plaintiff argues, however, that the legislature impliedly disavowed the physical-contact rule enunciated in these decisions by amending the statute in 1984 to require “physical contact” for property damage claims under section 143a(2) while omitting a physical-contact requirement for bodily injury claims under 143a(l). | 2 | 3 |
Stenstrom Petroleum Services Group Inc. v. Meschgreen1 sentence2021“It is well settled that ‘[a] reviewing court is entitled to have issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and cohesive arguments presented [citation], and it is not a repository into which an appellant may foist the burden of argument and research.’ ” Stenstrom Petroleum Services Group, Inc. v. Mesch, 375 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeunegreen1 sentence1991App. 3d 1067, 1069 (where physical contact existed when the insured’s vehicle was struck by a lug nut flying off the hit-and-run vehicle); see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 54 (allowing recovery when the hit-and-run driver collided with a third vehicle which in turn collided with plaintiff’s vehicle); Country Cos. v. Bourbon (1984), 122 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1990(Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 350, 353 , 487 N.E.2d 943 ; Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111 , 317 N.E.2d 550 .) Plaintiff argues, however, that the legislature impliedly disavowed the physical-contact rule enunciated in these decisions by amending the statute in 1984 to require “physical contact” for property damage claims under section 143a(2) while omitting a physical-contact requirement for bodily injury claims under 143a(l). 1990(Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 350, 353 , 487 N.E.2d 943 ; Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 109, 111 , 317 N.E.2d 550 .) Plaintiff argues, however, that the legislature impliedly disavowed the physical-contact rule enunciated in these decisions by amending the statute in 1984 to require “physical contact” for property damage claims under section 143a(2) while omitting a physical-contact requirement for bodily injury claims under 143a(l). | 4 | 1986–1990 |
Kannel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence1999Kannel, 222 Ill. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Scanlan v. Maryland Casualty Insurance
green
2 sentences1991Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755a).) Following Lemke, the Scanlan court stated that “the absence in section 143a(l) of ‘physical contact’ language as that in section 143a(2)(i) does not indicate a legislative intention to alter the physical-contact rule set forth in the supreme court decisions.” (Scanlan, 203 Ill. 1991App. 3d at 344 .) We went on to reason “that if the legislature wished to express its disapproval of the physical-contact requirement in hit-and-run occurrences in bodily injury cases expressed in the supreme court decisions, it could have done so within section 143a(l), the provision which mandates uninsured motorist policies covering damages from bodily injury.” Scanlan, 203 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Country Companies v. Bourbon
green
1 sentence1991App. 3d 1067, 1069 (where physical contact existed when the insured’s vehicle was struck by a lug nut flying off the hit-and-run vehicle); see also Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. LeJeune (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 54 (allowing recovery when the hit-and-run driver collided with a third vehicle which in turn collided with plaintiff’s vehicle); Country Cos. v. Bourbon (1984), 122 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Curtis v. Birch
green
1 sentence1986App. 3d 127 , 448 N.E.2d 591 .) The purpose underlying the physical contact requirement is to prevent fraudulent claims. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.