Crane requirement in North Dakota

2019Nelson , 2017 ND 152 , ¶ 4, 896 N.W.2d 923 . [¶5] North Dakota incorporates the Crane requirement through the definition of sexually dangerous individual, which requires "proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness [to] encompass[ ] proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case." In re J.M. , 2006 ND 96 , ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 518 .

2019Nelson , 2017 ND 152 , ¶ 4, 896 N.W.2d 923 . [¶5] North Dakota incorporates the Crane requirement through the definition of sexually dangerous individual, which requires "proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness [to] encompass[ ] proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case." In re J.M. , 2006 ND 96 , ¶ 10, 713 N.W.2d 518 .

2019North Dakota incorporates the Crane requirement through the definition of sexually dangerous individual, which requires “proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness [to] encompass[ ] proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case.” In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 10 , 713 N.W.2d 518 .

2019North Dakota incorporates the Crane requirement through the definition of sexually dangerous individual, which requires “proof of a nexus between the requisite disorder and dangerousness [to] encompass[ ] proof that the disorder involves serious difficulty in controlling behavior and suffices to distinguish a dangerous sexual offender whose disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist in the ordinary criminal case.” In re J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 10 , 713 N.W.2d 518 .

2023In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 11 , 876 N.W.2d 25 . “[C]ontinuing commitment solely on the basis of inadequate participation in treatment, without an explanation of how the person committed meets the statutory and constitutional requirements, reverses the burden from the State to the committed individual.” Id. [¶12] In Interest of Nelson, this Court reversed a district court finding that an individual had serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 2017 ND 152, ¶¶ 7-10 .

2023In re Johnson, 2016 ND 29, ¶ 11 , 876 N.W.2d 25 . “[C]ontinuing commitment solely on the basis of inadequate participation in treatment, without an explanation of how the person committed meets the statutory and constitutional requirements, reverses the burden from the State to the committed individual.” Id. [¶12] In Interest of Nelson, this Court reversed a district court finding that an individual had serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 2017 ND 152, ¶¶ 7-10 .

2019Nelson , at ¶ 4. [¶4] The North Dakota statute "incorporates the Crane requirement in its definition of sexually dangerous individual." Kulink , 2018 ND 260 , ¶ 5, 920 N.W.2d 446 .

2019Nelson , at ¶ 4. [¶4] The North Dakota statute "incorporates the Crane requirement in its definition of sexually dangerous individual." Kulink , 2018 ND 260 , ¶ 5, 920 N.W.2d 446 .

2012We have reiterated on prior occasions that the Crane requirement is “necessary to prevent civil commitment from becoming a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, which are functions of criminal law and not civil commitment.” Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶ 12 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (majority citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002)).

2012We have reiterated on prior occasions that the Crane requirement is “necessary to prevent civil commitment from becoming a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence, which are functions of criminal law and not civil commitment.” Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶ 12 , 711 N.W.2d 587 (majority citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 , 122 S.Ct. 867 , 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002)).

2009Thus, “we have construed the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to require that there must be a nexus between the [individual’s] disorder and dangerousness, proof of which encompasses evidence showing the individual has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior, which suffices to distinguish a sexually dangerous individual from other dangerous persons.” G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, ¶ 7 , 758 N.W.2d 719 . [¶ 7] Vantreece argues the testimony of Dr. Gilbertson establishes Vantreece could control his conduct and the testimony of Dr. Coombs did not address the Crane requirement that Vantre

2009Thus, “we have construed the definition of a sexually dangerous individual to require that there must be a nexus between the [individual’s] disorder and dangerousness, proof of which encompasses evidence showing the individual has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior, which suffices to distinguish a sexually dangerous individual from other dangerous persons.” G.R.H., 2008 ND 222, ¶ 7 , 758 N.W.2d 719 . [¶ 7] Vantreece argues the testimony of Dr. Gilbertson establishes Vantreece could control his conduct and the testimony of Dr. Coombs did not address the Crane requirement that Vantre

2019Although findings of fact should be stated to afford a clear understanding of the court's decision, findings are adequate if this Court can discern from them the factual basis for the trial court's determination." O'Hara v. Schneider , 2017 ND 53 , ¶ 16, 890 N.W.2d 831 . [¶8] Here, the findings for element three and the Crane requirement are not sufficient for this Court to understand the basis of the district court's order.

2019Although findings of fact should be stated to afford a clear understanding of the court's decision, findings are adequate if this Court can discern from them the factual basis for the trial court's determination." O'Hara v. Schneider , 2017 ND 53 , ¶ 16, 890 N.W.2d 831 . [¶8] Here, the findings for element three and the Crane requirement are not sufficient for this Court to understand the basis of the district court's order.

2019In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 8 , 861 N.W.2d 484 (quoting In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 8 , 756 N.W.2d 771 ). [¶6] Here, the findings for element three and the Crane requirement are insufficient for this Court to understand the basis of the district court’s order.

2019In re Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 8 , 861 N.W.2d 484 (quoting In re R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶ 8 , 756 N.W.2d 771 ). [¶6] Here, the findings for element three and the Crane requirement are insufficient for this Court to understand the basis of the district court’s order.