common-law fraud claim in New York

2025Dist. , 213 AD3d 959, 960 ). "'If the court considers evidentiary material, the criterion then becomes whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one'" ( Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly , 191 AD3d 760 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 ; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 ). "'The required elements of a common-law fraud claim are a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other

2024"The required elements of a common-law fraud claim are a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury" ( Asamblea De Iglesias Christianas, Inc. v DeVito , 210 AD3d 843, 845 [internal quotation marks omitted].

2022Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 31 NY3d 569, 578-579 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018The required elements of a common-law fraud claim are "a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was{**31 NY3d at 579} false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury" ( Pasternack v Laboratory Corp. of Am.

2025The two anti-fraud statutes dispense with the common-law fraud requirement of justifiable reliance ( see Matter of People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC , 137 AD3d at 417 ["fraud under section 63 (12) may be established without proof of . . . reliance"]; see also Credit Suisse , 31 NY3d at 632 [the Martin Act similarly dispenses, among other things, with any requirement that the Attorney General prove justifiable reliance on the part of investors]).

2025The two anti-fraud statutes dispense with the common-law fraud requirement of justifiable reliance ( see Matter of People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC , 137 AD3d at 417 ["fraud under section 63 (12) may be established without proof of . . . reliance"]; see also Credit Suisse , 31 NY3d at 632 [the Martin Act similarly dispenses, among other things, with any requirement that the Attorney General prove justifiable reliance on the part of investors]).

2025The two anti-fraud statutes dispense with the common-law fraud requirement of justifiable reliance ( see Matter of People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC , 137 AD3d at 417 ["fraud under section 63 (12) may be established without proof of . . . reliance"]; see also Credit Suisse , 31 NY3d at 632 [the Martin Act similarly dispenses, among other things, with any requirement that the Attorney General prove justifiable reliance on the part of investors]).

2025The two anti-fraud statutes dispense with the common-law fraud requirement of justifiable reliance ( see Matter of People v Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC , 137 AD3d at 417 ["fraud under section 63 (12) may be established without proof of . . . reliance"]; see also Credit Suisse , 31 NY3d at 632 [the Martin Act similarly dispenses, among other things, with any requirement that the Attorney General prove justifiable reliance on the part of investors]).

2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law" (in

2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law" (in

2025On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and all factual allegations must be accepted as true; "[w]hether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss" ( EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co. , 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]; see also 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v Jennifer Realty Co. , 98 NY2d 144, 151-152 [2002] ["Dismissal under CPLR 3211 (a) (1) is warranted only if the documentary evidence submitted conclusively establishes a defense to the asserted claims as a matter of law" (in

2025Because intent "is an invisible operation of the mind," direct evidence is often lacking and circumstantial evidence of intent suffices ( People v Rodriguez , 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025Because intent "is an invisible operation of the mind," direct evidence is often lacking and circumstantial evidence of intent suffices ( People v Rodriguez , 17 NY3d 486, 489 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2025Dist. , 213 AD3d 959, 960 ). "'If the court considers evidentiary material, the criterion then becomes whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one'" ( Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly , 191 AD3d 760 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 ; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 ). "'The required elements of a common-law fraud claim are a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other

2025My colleagues' elimination of any requirement that a judgment under section 63(12) be supported by proof of some public interest in the matter, combined with the absence of key elements of a common-law fraud claim (i.e., scienter, reliance and damages), will inevitably make the use of the statute so selective and arbitrary as to create serious doubts as to its constitutionality, as applied, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which "prohibits government officials from wielding their powers selectively to punish or suppress speech" ( National Rifle Assn. of Am. v Vullo

2025My colleagues' elimination of any requirement that a judgment under section 63(12) be supported by proof of some public interest in the matter, combined with the absence of key elements of a common-law fraud claim (i.e., scienter, reliance and damages), will inevitably make the use of the statute so selective and arbitrary as to create serious doubts as to its constitutionality, as applied, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which "prohibits government officials from wielding their powers selectively to punish or suppress speech" ( National Rifle Assn. of Am. v Vullo

2025Dist. , 213 AD3d 959, 960 ). "'If the court considers evidentiary material, the criterion then becomes whether the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has stated one'" ( Cordell Marble Falls, LLC v Kelly , 191 AD3d 760 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Sokol v Leader , 74 AD3d 1180, 1181-1182 ; see Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 ). "'The required elements of a common-law fraud claim are a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other

2024"Damages for a cause of action sounding in fraud are limited to the actual pecuniary loss sustained as the direct result of the wrong or what is known as the out-of-pocket rule" ( Kramer v Meridian Capital Group, LLC , 201 AD3d 909, 911 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2023II, LLC , 469 SW3d 143, 153 [Tex Sup 2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2023II, LLC , 469 SW3d 143, 153 [Tex Sup 2015] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2018Holdings , 27 NY3d 817, 827 [2016] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).

2013(See Greentech Research LLC v Wissman, 104 AD3d 540 , 540 [1st Dept 2013] [“The court properly dismissed the fraud claim for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by CPLR 3016 (b) and for failure to plead loss causa tion” (emphasis added)], citing Laub v Faessel, 297 AD2d 28, 31 [1st Dept 2002].) In Laub , the First Department explicitly set forth the following standard in a fraud case: “To establish causation, plaintiff must show both that defendant’s misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question (transaction causation) and that the misrepresent

2013(See Greentech Research LLC v Wissman, 104 AD3d 540 , 540 [1st Dept 2013] [“The court properly dismissed the fraud claim for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by CPLR 3016 (b) and for failure to plead loss causa tion” (emphasis added)], citing Laub v Faessel, 297 AD2d 28, 31 [1st Dept 2002].) In Laub , the First Department explicitly set forth the following standard in a fraud case: “To establish causation, plaintiff must show both that defendant’s misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question (transaction causation) and that the misrepresent

2013(See Greentech Research LLC v Wissman, 104 AD3d 540 , 540 [1st Dept 2013] [“The court properly dismissed the fraud claim for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by CPLR 3016 (b) and for failure to plead loss causa tion” (emphasis added)], citing Laub v Faessel, 297 AD2d 28, 31 [1st Dept 2002].) In Laub , the First Department explicitly set forth the following standard in a fraud case: “To establish causation, plaintiff must show both that defendant’s misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question (transaction causation) and that the misrepresent

2013(See Greentech Research LLC v Wissman, 104 AD3d 540 , 540 [1st Dept 2013] [“The court properly dismissed the fraud claim for failure to plead fraud with the particularity required by CPLR 3016 (b) and for failure to plead loss causa tion” (emphasis added)], citing Laub v Faessel, 297 AD2d 28, 31 [1st Dept 2002].) In Laub , the First Department explicitly set forth the following standard in a fraud case: “To establish causation, plaintiff must show both that defendant’s misrepresentation induced plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question (transaction causation) and that the misrepresent

2008The common-law fraud claim should not have been dismissed, since “out-of-pocket” nonspeculative losses were alleged by claims of specific lost sales (see Bernstein v Kelso & Co., 231 AD2d 314, 322 [1997]).

2007This Court then stated that although CPC Inti, v McKesson Corp. “does not foreclose a cause of action for common-law fraud, private plaintiffs will not be permitted through artful pleading to press any claim based on the sort of wrong given over to the Attorney-General under the Martin Act” ( 213 AD2d at 200 [citations omitted]). 1 This Court viewed the common-law fraud claim as an example of such impermissible “artful pleading” because there was no evidence of reliance by the allegedly defrauded shareholder or intent to defraud by the sponsor (id. at 200-201).