common-law fraud claim in Texas

2026Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he jury’s finding of fraud can only be maintained if INA made an affirmative misrepresentation or a material omission of a fact about the investment product.”); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (listing the elements of a common-law fraud claim); Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190 (holding that “the implied certification theory can be a basis for liability” under the False Claims Act where the failure to disclose noncompliance with “material” requirements makes representations “mi

2026Nguyen alleged: “Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that they would form a partnership and evenly share the profits from shrimping with the Lucky Nikki.” “Defendants had no intention of entering into a partnership with Plaintiff and knew as much when they made the aforementioned representation to Plaintiff.” A common-law fraud claim requires “a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury.” Formosa Plastics

2024II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (stating that a common-law fraud claim requires a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury); Strobach v. WesTex Community Credit Union, 621 S.W.3d 856 , 879 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (stating that “constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive

2021See Zorrilla v. Aypco Const. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (noting that the elements of a common-law fraud claim are: (1) the defendant made a representation to the plaintiff; (2) the representation was material; (3) the representation was false; (4) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew the representation was false or made the representation recklessly, as a positive assertion, and without knowledge of its truth; (5) the defendant made the representation with the intent that the plaintiff act on it; (6) the plaintiff relied on the representation; and (7) th

2008The elements of a common-law fraud claim are: (1) a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the other party; (5) the party acted in reliance upon the representation; and (6) the party suffered injury." Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507, 524 (Tex. 1998).

2008Common-law Fraud The elements of a common-law fraud claim are: "1) a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false; (3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion; (4) the representation was made with the intention that it be acted upon by the other party; (5) the party acted in reliance upon the representation; and (6) the party suffered injury." Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 524 (Tex. 1998).

2022Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471 , 496 (Tex. 2019) (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018)); see also Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983).

2000See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g).

2005Gaines and Southwest Guaranty contended in the summary judgment motion that Kelly could produce no evidence to support the following elements of his fraud claim: (1) that Gaines or Southwest Guaranty made any representations or omissions of material facts; (2) that Kelly relied on any alleged representations; (3) that Gaines or Southwest Guaranty committed any intentional act; (4) that Kelly suffered any damages because of any alleged misrepresentations; and (5) that Kelly suffered "any damages at all." To prove a common-law fraud claim, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that a *412 material represe

2005Gaines and Southwest Guaranty contended in the summary judgment motion that Kelly could produce no evidence to support the following elements of his fraud claim: (1) that Gaines or Southwest Guaranty made any representations or omissions of material facts; (2) that Kelly relied on any alleged representations; (3) that Gaines or Southwest Guaranty committed any intentional act; (4) that Kelly suffered any damages because of any alleged misrepresentations; and (5) that Kelly suffered “any damages at all.” To prove a common-law fraud claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that a material representati

2025Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018); see Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798, 800 (Tex. 2001) (stating fraudulent inducement, by its nature, presupposes that party has been induced to enter contract; as a result, there can be no fraudulent inducement claim when there is no contract).

2024Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018); W.

2026Nguyen alleged: “Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that they would form a partnership and evenly share the profits from shrimping with the Lucky Nikki.” “Defendants had no intention of entering into a partnership with Plaintiff and knew as much when they made the aforementioned representation to Plaintiff.” A common-law fraud claim requires “a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury.” Formosa Plastics

2015However, we do not agree that the court of appeals was required to consider her evidence-sufficiency challenges to the breach-of-contract findings to uphold the fraud judgment. *153 A common-law fraud claim requires “ ‘a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when .made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended- to- be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury.’ ” Formosa, Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1998) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Meadows, 877 S.W

2026Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he jury’s finding of fraud can only be maintained if INA made an affirmative misrepresentation or a material omission of a fact about the investment product.”); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (listing the elements of a common-law fraud claim); Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190 (holding that “the implied certification theory can be a basis for liability” under the False Claims Act where the failure to disclose noncompliance with “material” requirements makes representations “mi

2000See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex.1998); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983).

2025Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 614 (Tex. 2018); see Haase v. Glazner, 62 S.W.3d 795, 798, 800 (Tex. 2001) (stating fraudulent inducement, by its nature, presupposes that party has been induced to enter contract; as a result, there can be no fraudulent inducement claim when there is no contract).

2009These kinds of damages are not part of the benefit of any alleged bargain between the parties." Haase v. Glazner , 62 S.W.3d 795, 799-800 (Tex. 2001).

2023JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018); Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac.

2022Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d 471 , 496 (Tex. 2019) (quoting JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Orca Assets G.P., L.L.C., 546 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2018)); see also Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1983).

2006Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.2001) (stating that justifiable reliance is an essential element in a common-law fraud claim).

2006Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.2001) (stating that justifiable reliance is an essential element in a common-law fraud claim).

2000See DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 688 ; Trenholm, 646 S.W.2d at 930 (listing elements of fraud claim); see also DiGrazia v. Atlantic Mut.

2000See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g).

2000See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g).

2000See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex.1998); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983).

2000See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983); Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 415 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (op. on reh’g).

2000See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex.1998); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 688 (Tex.1990) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1048 , 111 S.Ct. 755 , 112 L.Ed.2d 775 (1991); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983).

2026Co. of N. Am. v. Morris, 981 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he jury’s finding of fraud can only be maintained if INA made an affirmative misrepresentation or a material omission of a fact about the investment product.”); Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998) (listing the elements of a common-law fraud claim); Escobar, 579 U.S. at 190 (holding that “the implied certification theory can be a basis for liability” under the False Claims Act where the failure to disclose noncompliance with “material” requirements makes representations “mi

2024“A party to a contract has a cause of action for tortious interference against any third person who wrongly induces another contracting party to breach the contract.” Swank v. Sverdlin, 121 S.W.3d 785, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 1995).

2024II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (stating that a common-law fraud claim requires a material misrepresentation, which was false, and which was either known to be false when made or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, which was intended to be acted upon, which was relied upon, and which caused injury); Strobach v. WesTex Community Credit Union, 621 S.W.3d 856 , 879 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied) (stating that “constructive fraud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive

2024“A party to a contract has a cause of action for tortious interference against any third person who wrongly induces another contracting party to breach the contract.” Swank v. Sverdlin, 121 S.W.3d 785, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Tex. 1995).

2023See Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 281-82 (rejecting appellee’s argument that its entire counterclaim was exempt under the TCPA’s common-law-fraud exemption merely because one of its many alleged causes of action was a common-law-fraud claim); KB Home Lone Star Inc., 629 S.W.3d at 657 (rejecting appellees’ contention that because their lawsuit included an exempt DTPA claim, “the TCPA [could] not be used to dismiss any other pleading, claim, document, or filing within the[ir] lawsuit”).

2023See Baylor Scott & White, 633 S.W.3d at 281-82 (rejecting appellee’s argument that its entire counterclaim was exempt under the TCPA’s common-law-fraud exemption merely because one of its many alleged causes of action was a common-law-fraud claim); KB Home Lone Star Inc., 629 S.W.3d at 657 (rejecting appellees’ contention that because their lawsuit included an exempt DTPA claim, “the TCPA [could] not be used to dismiss any other pleading, claim, document, or filing within the[ir] lawsuit”).

2021See Zorrilla v. Aypco Const. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 153 (Tex. 2015) (noting that the elements of a common-law fraud claim are: (1) the defendant made a representation to the plaintiff; (2) the representation was material; (3) the representation was false; (4) when the defendant made the representation, the defendant knew the representation was false or made the representation recklessly, as a positive assertion, and without knowledge of its truth; (5) the defendant made the representation with the intent that the plaintiff act on it; (6) the plaintiff relied on the representation; and (7) th

2018Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 217 (Tex. 2011).

2016Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Tex. 1992); accord Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac.

2013See Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56 , 60–61, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957) (extending the term of an oil and gas lease based on the lessor’s misconduct).

2013See Kothmann v. Boley, 158 Tex. 56 , 60–61, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1957) (extending the term of an oil and gas lease based on the lessor’s misconduct).

2009See Little, 148 S.W.3d at 381 (defendant who conclusively negates at least one of essential elements of plaintiff’s cause of action is entitled to summary judgment).