statutory and regulatory framework in New York

2017Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the heinous nature of the murder for hire that petitioner committed by stabbing the victim 17 times while the victim’s six-year-old daughter was sleeping in a nearby room, the Board “was not required to give equal weight to or specifically discuss each factor it considered in making the determination” (Matter of Mullins v New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 AD3d 1141 , 1142 [2016]; see Matter of Santos v Evans, 81 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2011]).

2017Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the heinous nature of the murder for hire that petitioner committed by stabbing the victim 17 times while the victim’s six-year-old daughter was sleeping in a nearby room, the Board “was not required to give equal weight to or specifically discuss each factor it considered in making the determination” (Matter of Mullins v New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 AD3d 1141 , 1142 [2016]; see Matter of Santos v Evans, 81 AD3d 1059, 1060 [2011]).

2010Exhaustion is also not required where only an issue of law is involved (see Apex Air Frgt. v O’Cleireacain, 210 AD2d 7 [1994], Iv denied 86 NY2d 712 [1995]), or where the issue involved “is purely the construction of the relevant statutory and regulatory framework” (Matter of Herberg v Perales, 180 AD2d 166, 169 [1992]; see also Mc-Kechnie v Ortiz, 132 AD2d 472, 473 [1987], affd 72 NY2d 969 [1988]).

1992What is really involved here is purely the construction of the relevant statutory and regulatory framework, and the exhaustion of administrative remedies is not mandated (McKechnie v Ortiz, 132 AD2d 472 ; Byer v City of New York, 50 AD2d 771 ).

2026When viewed as a whole, we find that the statutory and regulatory framework provides "meaningful limitation[s]" on an inspector's discretion and ensures that "the search is limited in scope to that necessary to meet the interest that legitimized the search in the first place" ( People v Quackenbush , 88 NY2d at 542 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see New York v Burger , 482 US at 703 ).

2026When viewed as a whole, we find that the statutory and regulatory framework provides "meaningful limitation[s]" on an inspector's discretion and ensures that "the search is limited in scope to that necessary to meet the interest that legitimized the search in the first place" ( People v Quackenbush , 88 NY2d at 542 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see New York v Burger , 482 US at 703 ).

2017Transactional reporting requirements imposed in a regulated industry that sufficiently describe and limit the information to be provided and are reasonably related to the regulatory authority of the agency to which the information is provided do not trigger constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures (see California Bankers Assn. v Shultz, 416 US 21, 67 [1974]).

2017Rather, the Board considered and applied the relevant statutory and regulatory factors, including the serious nature of petitioner’s crimes, his criminal history, his substance abuse history and risk of future drug abuse, his prison disciplinary record, his program accomplishments, his postrelease plans and the inconsistent sentencing minutes (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]; 9 NYCRR 8002.3; Matter of Mays v Stanford, 150 AD3d 1521, 1522 [2017]; Matter of Betancourt v Stanford, 148 AD3d 1497, 1497-1498 [2017]).

2017Rather, the Board considered and applied the relevant statutory and regulatory factors, including the serious nature of petitioner’s crimes, his criminal history, his substance abuse history and risk of future drug abuse, his prison disciplinary record, his program accomplishments, his postrelease plans and the inconsistent sentencing minutes (see Executive Law § 259-i [2] [c] [A]; 9 NYCRR 8002.3; Matter of Mays v Stanford, 150 AD3d 1521, 1522 [2017]; Matter of Betancourt v Stanford, 148 AD3d 1497, 1497-1498 [2017]).

2011(See CPLR 7801; Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Young Men’s Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 375 [1975].) However, the exhaustion rule is “subject to important qualifications,” and is not applicable, for example, when “an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury.” (Watergate II Apts., 46 NY2d at 57 [citations omitted].) Nor is exhaustion required where “only an issue of law

2011(See CPLR 7801; Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Young Men’s Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 375 [1975].) However, the exhaustion rule is “subject to important qualifications,” and is not applicable, for example, when “an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury.” (Watergate II Apts., 46 NY2d at 57 [citations omitted].) Nor is exhaustion required where “only an issue of law

2011(See CPLR 7801; Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Young Men’s Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 375 [1975].) However, the exhaustion rule is “subject to important qualifications,” and is not applicable, for example, when “an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury.” (Watergate II Apts., 46 NY2d at 57 [citations omitted].) Nor is exhaustion required where “only an issue of law

2011(See CPLR 7801; Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52, 57 [1978]; Young Men’s Christian Assn. v Rochester Pure Waters Dist., 37 NY2d 371, 375 [1975].) However, the exhaustion rule is “subject to important qualifications,” and is not applicable, for example, when “an agency’s action is challenged as either unconstitutional or wholly beyond its grant of power, or when resort to an administrative remedy would be futile or when its pursuit would cause irreparable injury.” (Watergate II Apts., 46 NY2d at 57 [citations omitted].) Nor is exhaustion required where “only an issue of law

2010Exhaustion is also not required where only an issue of law is involved (see Apex Air Frgt. v O’Cleireacain, 210 AD2d 7 [1994], Iv denied 86 NY2d 712 [1995]), or where the issue involved “is purely the construction of the relevant statutory and regulatory framework” (Matter of Herberg v Perales, 180 AD2d 166, 169 [1992]; see also Mc-Kechnie v Ortiz, 132 AD2d 472, 473 [1987], affd 72 NY2d 969 [1988]).

2010State Dept. of Health, 192 AD2d 945, 947 [1993], Iv denied 82 NY2d 654 [1993] [an administrative proceeding would be futile when the challenge is to the methodology the agency uses rather than the way in which the methodology was applied in a particular case]; Matter of Herberg v Perales, 180 AD2d at 169 ; Konstantinov v Daines, 2009 NY Slip Op 30973[U] , *7 [2009] [“the issues of whether respondents are required to provide petitioner with preinvestigative personal care services, and whether the ALJ is required to determine the personal care services at the fair hearing, are issues of law that

2010State Dept. of Health, 192 AD2d 945, 947 [1993], Iv denied 82 NY2d 654 [1993] [an administrative proceeding would be futile when the challenge is to the methodology the agency uses rather than the way in which the methodology was applied in a particular case]; Matter of Herberg v Perales, 180 AD2d at 169 ; Konstantinov v Daines, 2009 NY Slip Op 30973[U] , *7 [2009] [“the issues of whether respondents are required to provide petitioner with preinvestigative personal care services, and whether the ALJ is required to determine the personal care services at the fair hearing, are issues of law that

2010Exhaustion is also not required where only an issue of law is involved (see Apex Air Frgt. v O’Cleireacain, 210 AD2d 7 [1994], Iv denied 86 NY2d 712 [1995]), or where the issue involved “is purely the construction of the relevant statutory and regulatory framework” (Matter of Herberg v Perales, 180 AD2d 166, 169 [1992]; see also Mc-Kechnie v Ortiz, 132 AD2d 472, 473 [1987], affd 72 NY2d 969 [1988]).

2006However, the 30-day period may be extended where the insurer makes a request for additional information within 15 business days of its receipt of the claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 27 AD3d 96, 100 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 434 [2004]; New York & Presbyt.

2006However, the 30-day period may be extended where the insurer makes a request for additional information within 15 business days of its receipt of the claim (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 [b]; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 27 AD3d 96, 100 [2005]; Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432, 434 [2004]; New York & Presbyt.

2005However, until the Legislature or Court of Appeals provides otherwise, we are persuaded that the current statutory and regulatory framework should be interpreted as limiting compensation to law guardians appointed pursuant to the Law Guardian Program in a contested custody proceeding to pay ment by the state (see Lips v Lips, supra at 717 ; see also Family Ct Act § 248 [“The costs of law guardians . . . shall be payable by the state of New York”]; Matter of Lynda A.H. v Diane T.O., 243 AD2d 24, 27-28 [4th Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 811 [1998] [holding that Family Court “had no authority to

2005To foster the goal of quality and independent representation for children in the vital position of law guardian (see Matter of Carballeira v Shumway, 273 AD2d 753, 755 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 764 [2000]), attorneys who seek to serve in such capacity must apply, be screened by a court, undergo training and meet various criteria (see generally 22 NYCRR part 835), and they are governed by the pertinent standards regarding compensation (see Judiciary Law § 35 [3]; 22 NYCRR 835.5).

2005In a contested custody case, children generally “should be represented by counsel of their own choosing or by law guardians” (Family Ct Act § 241; see Lips v Lips, 284 AD2d 716, 716 [2001]). 1 Children rarely have the financial means to seek counsel of their own choosing so most law guardians are appointed from the Law Guardian Program, which is governed by a statutory and regulatory framework (see Family Ct Act art 2, part 4; 22 NYCRR part 835).

2005However, until the Legislature or Court of Appeals provides otherwise, we are persuaded that the current statutory and regulatory framework should be interpreted as limiting compensation to law guardians appointed pursuant to the Law Guardian Program in a contested custody proceeding to pay ment by the state (see Lips v Lips, supra at 717 ; see also Family Ct Act § 248 [“The costs of law guardians . . . shall be payable by the state of New York”]; Matter of Lynda A.H. v Diane T.O., 243 AD2d 24, 27-28 [4th Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 811 [1998] [holding that Family Court “had no authority to

2001Thus, the statutory and regulatory framework unequivocally supports our conclusion that the CSSA guidelines must be applied whenever child support obligations are calculated, even in residential or foster care reimbursement contexts (accord, Matter of Joshua W., 94 Md App 486, 499-501, 617 A2d 1154, 1161 [relying on Federal laws and legislative intent to determine that Maryland’s child support guidelines were to be used “in all child support cases, including those * * * involving government financed child care and no custodial parent”]; In the Interest of K.G., 551 NW2d 554, 557 [ND]).

2001Thus, the statutory and regulatory framework unequivocally supports our conclusion that the CSSA guidelines must be applied whenever child support obligations are calculated, even in residential or foster care reimbursement contexts (accord, Matter of Joshua W., 94 Md App 486, 499-501, 617 A2d 1154, 1161 [relying on Federal laws and legislative intent to determine that Maryland’s child support guidelines were to be used “in all child support cases, including those * * * involving government financed child care and no custodial parent”]; In the Interest of K.G., 551 NW2d 554, 557 [ND]).