Travelers defendant in New York

2007Thus, here, the Hospital should be required to affirmatively prove standing, upon Travelers' objection, as part of its prima facie case ( see TPZ Corp. v Dabbs, 25 AD3d 787, 789 [2d Dept 2006] [holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment in an action to collect on a promissory note because "it failed to present competent proof of its standing as an assignee of the note" and defendant challenged "(t)he validity of the assignment of the note to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's standing to prosecute (the) action" in its answer]; Rockland Lease Funding Corp. v Waste Mgt. of N

2007Thus, here, the Hospital should be required to affirmatively prove standing, upon Travelers’ objection, as part of its prima facie case (see TPZ Corp. v Dabbs, 25 AD3d 787, 789 [2d Dept 2006] [holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment in an action to collect on a promissory note because “it failed to present competent proof of its standing as an assignee of the note” and defendant challenged “(t)he validity of the assignment of the note to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s standing to prosecute (the) action” in its answer]; Rockland Lease Funding Corp. v Waste Mgt. of N.

2005Although Travelers met its initial burden of establishing its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]), Leistner and Hill raised a triable issue of fact in opposition to the motion by submitting evidence that Travelers may not have sent its notice of disclaimer “as soon as is reasonably possible” (Hartford Ins.

2002Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to the Travelers defendants (see, Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 ).

2019Under the circumstances of this case, we further modify the order by granting the motions of Campany and the Travelers defendants insofar as they sought in camera review of those documents, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for an in camera review and for the redaction of any opinions contained in those documents ( see Donohue v Fokas , 112 AD3d 665, 667 [2d Dept 2013]; Ural , 97 AD3d at 566-567; see generally Rickard , 164 AD3d at 1592).

2019CPLR 5701 (a) (2) (v) provides that, with limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, an appeal may be taken to this Court as of right from an order where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it "affects a substantial right." An order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right of Campany and the Travelers defendants, and the order is thus appealable as of right ( see Surgical Design Corp. v Correa , 21 AD3d 409, 410 [2d Dept 2005]; Bristol v Evans , 210 AD2d 850, 850-851 [3d Dept 1994]; cf. Marriott Intl. v Lonny's Ha

2019Under the circumstances of this case, we further modify the order by granting the motions of Campany and the Travelers defendants insofar as they sought in camera review of those documents, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court for an in camera review and for the redaction of any opinions contained in those documents ( see Donohue v Fokas , 112 AD3d 665, 667 [2d Dept 2013]; Ural , 97 AD3d at 566-567; see generally Rickard , 164 AD3d at 1592).

2019CPLR 5701 (a) (2) (v) provides that, with limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, an appeal may be taken to this Court as of right from an order where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it "affects a substantial right." An order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right of Campany and the Travelers defendants, and the order is thus appealable as of right ( see Surgical Design Corp. v Correa , 21 AD3d 409, 410 [2d Dept 2005]; Bristol v Evans , 210 AD2d 850, 850-851 [3d Dept 1994]; cf. Marriott Intl. v Lonny's Ha

2019CPLR 5701 (a) (2) (v) provides that, with limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, an appeal may be taken to this Court as of right from an order where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it "affects a substantial right." An order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right of Campany and the Travelers defendants, and the order is thus appealable as of right ( see Surgical Design Corp. v Correa , 21 AD3d 409, 410 [2d Dept 2005]; Bristol v Evans , 210 AD2d 850, 850-851 [3d Dept 1994]; cf. Marriott Intl. v Lonny's Ha

2019Co. , 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]).

2019CPLR 5701 (a) (2) (v) provides that, with limited exceptions, which are not applicable here, an appeal may be taken to this Court as of right from an order where the motion it decided was made upon notice and it "affects a substantial right." An order granting a protective order and precluding discovery of numerous documents affects a substantial right of Campany and the Travelers defendants, and the order is thus appealable as of right ( see Surgical Design Corp. v Correa , 21 AD3d 409, 410 [2d Dept 2005]; Bristol v Evans , 210 AD2d 850, 850-851 [3d Dept 1994]; cf. Marriott Intl. v Lonny's Ha

2019CPLR 3101 " establishes three categories of protected materials . . . : privileged matter, absolutely immune from discovery (CPLR 3101 [b]); attorney's work product, also absolutely immune (CPLR 3101 [c]); and trial preparation materials [CPLR 3101 (d) (2)], which are subject to disclosure only on a showing of substantial need and undue hardship' " ( Forman v Henkin , 30 NY3d 656, 661-662 [2018]).

2011“The determination to grant or deny a request for a severance pursuant to CPLR 603 is a matter of judicial discretion which should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the party seeking the severance” (Naylor v Knoll Farms of Suffolk County, Inc., 31 AD3d 726, 727 [2006]).

2010At this procedural point in the litigation, we afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true and give plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010]).

2010Since plaintiffs have neither alleged nor submitted any facts indicating that the other Travelers defendants exercised such a level of dominion and control over Charter Oak, there is no basis upon which to predicate liability against them (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 708 [2006]; Lipton v Unumprovident Corp., 10 AD3d 703, 705 [2004]; Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 AD2d 454, 456 [1983]).

2010At this procedural point in the litigation, we afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true and give plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010]).

2010Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163 [1980]; see Daniels v Zelco, Inc., 159 AD2d 538, 540 [1990]).

2010Since plaintiffs have neither alleged nor submitted any facts indicating that the other Travelers defendants exercised such a level of dominion and control over Charter Oak, there is no basis upon which to predicate liability against them (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 708 [2006]; Lipton v Unumprovident Corp., 10 AD3d 703, 705 [2004]; Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 AD2d 454, 456 [1983]).

2010Co., 11 AD3d 108, 111 [2004]).

2010Since plaintiffs have neither alleged nor submitted any facts indicating that the other Travelers defendants exercised such a level of dominion and control over Charter Oak, there is no basis upon which to predicate liability against them (see Mitchell v TAM Equities, Inc., 27 AD3d 703, 708 [2006]; Lipton v Unumprovident Corp., 10 AD3d 703, 705 [2004]; Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 AD2d 454, 456 [1983]).

2010We also agree with the Travelers defendants that any claims under the policy by New Prospect, the landlord and owner of the premises, must be dismissed because New Prospect is not named to any extent under SUS’s businessowners’ property coverage (see Insurance Corp. of N.Y. v Cohoes Realty Assoc., L.P., 50 AD3d 1228, 1229-1230 [2008]; Gap, Inc. v Fireman’s Fund Ins.

2010We also agree with the Travelers defendants that any claims under the policy by New Prospect, the landlord and owner of the premises, must be dismissed because New Prospect is not named to any extent under SUS’s businessowners’ property coverage (see Insurance Corp. of N.Y. v Cohoes Realty Assoc., L.P., 50 AD3d 1228, 1229-1230 [2008]; Gap, Inc. v Fireman’s Fund Ins.

2010Tool Corp., 51 NY2d 152, 163 [1980]; see Daniels v Zelco, Inc., 159 AD2d 538, 540 [1990]).

2010At this procedural point in the litigation, we afford the complaint a liberal construction, accept the facts alleged therein as true and give plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference (see Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010]; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; Lazic v Currier, 69 AD3d 1213, 1213-1214 [2010]).

2008The Appellate *568 Term referred to "the steep increase in fraudulent no-fault benefits claims arising . . . from provider claims where the services or supplies were . . . never rendered" ( 9 Misc 3d at 78 ); the Appellate Division said that "the fraud and abuse that plagues the no-fault insurance system is a serious problem with widespread consequences" ( 42 AD3d 277, 285-286 [2d Dept 2007]).

2006School Dist. [Booth Architects], 85 NY2d 995, 997 [1995]; Marillo v Shearson Hayden Stone, 159 AD2d 1012 [1990]).