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16 Ohio opinions name it 1 courts 1995–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Santanagreen2 sentences2018See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42–43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976). {¶23} In State v. Howard, 75 Ohio App.3d 760, 774-775 , 600 N.E.2d 809 (1991), this Court rejected an argument that the exigent circumstances, or the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement, applied to an entry by law enforcement into a residence of a third party to execute an arrest warrant upon a nonresident. 2018See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42–43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976). {¶23} In State v. Howard, 75 Ohio App.3d 760, 774-775 , 600 N.E.2d 809 (1991), this Court rejected an argument that the exigent circumstances, or the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement, applied to an entry by law enforcement into a residence of a third party to execute an arrest warrant upon a nonresident. | 2 | 7 |
State v. Howardgreen2 sentences2018See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42–43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976). {¶23} In State v. Howard, 75 Ohio App.3d 760, 774-775 , 600 N.E.2d 809 (1991), this Court rejected an argument that the exigent circumstances, or the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement, applied to an entry by law enforcement into a residence of a third party to execute an arrest warrant upon a nonresident. 2018See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 42–43, 96 S.Ct. 2406 (1976). {¶23} In State v. Howard, 75 Ohio App.3d 760, 774-775 , 600 N.E.2d 809 (1991), this Court rejected an argument that the exigent circumstances, or the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement, applied to an entry by law enforcement into a residence of a third party to execute an arrest warrant upon a nonresident. | 2 | 2 |
City of Middletown v. Flinchumgreen2 sentences2015We relied on Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 , in which the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), extended the hot pursuit exception to the search warrant requirement to misdemeanor offenses, stating, “we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime. 2015We relied on Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 , in which the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), extended the hot pursuit exception to the search warrant requirement to misdemeanor offenses, stating, “we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime. | 1 | 4 |
Middletown v. Flinchumgreen2 sentences2015We relied on Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 , in which the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), extended the hot pursuit exception to the search warrant requirement to misdemeanor offenses, stating, “we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime. 2013The U.S. Supreme Court held that the police, who had probable cause to arrest the defendant, could not be thwarted in that effort by the defendant’s retreat into her house. {¶ 18} In Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 , the Supreme Court of Ohio, relying on Santana, extended the hot pursuit exception to the search warrant requirement to misdemeanor offenses, stating, “we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Grubbgreen2 sentences2000Wendel at 6 . 5 A similar scenario was addressed in State v. Grubb (1993), 82 Ohio App.3d 187 , 191-192 , where Ohio State University police officers observed the defendant commit a traffic violation outside of the jurisdiction of the university police officers. 1999See, e.g. , State v. Smigelski (June 9, 1995), Lucas App. No. L-94-183, unreported, at 8-10, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 2434 (suggesting that the violation in Hollen occurred within the police officer's proper jurisdiction, thereby triggering the hot pursuit doctrine); Grubb , 82 Ohio App.3d at 192 (noting that Hollen "involved application of a `hot pursuit' doctrine, which is not present here"). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stubergreen2 sentences2008See Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 44 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 (“a suspect may not avoid arrest simply by outrunning pursuing officers and finding refuge in her home”); State v. Stuber, 150 Ohio App.3d 200 , 2002-Ohio-6309 , 779 N.E.2d 1090, at ¶ 12 (deputies were engaged in hot pursuit of the suspect when the suspect fled from his driveway into his house upon sight of the deputies). 2008See Middletown v. Flinchum, 95 Ohio St.3d 43, 44 , 2002-Ohio-1625 , 765 N.E.2d 330 (“a suspect may not avoid arrest simply by outrunning pursuing officers and finding refuge in her home”); State v. Stuber, 150 Ohio App.3d 200 , 2002-Ohio-6309 , 779 N.E.2d 1090, at ¶ 12 (deputies were engaged in hot pursuit of the suspect when the suspect fled from his driveway into his house upon sight of the deputies). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Welsh v. Wisconsin
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 753 . 2007Exigent Circumstances {¶ 15} In Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984), 466 U.S. 740 , 753 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 , the United States Supreme Court indicated that the gravity of the underlying offense must be considered in deciding whether an exigency exists. | 2 | 2007–2022 |
Kentucky v. King
green
2 sentences2022Clermont No. CA2017-01-008, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 18 , quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011), paragraph one of the syllabus. 2022Clermont No. CA2017-01-008, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 18 , quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011), paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hensgen
green
1 sentence2022Clermont No. CA2017-01-008, 2017-Ohio-8793, ¶ 18 , quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 , 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011), paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Francisco Sangineto-Miranda, (87-5667) Luray Betts, (87-5668) Enrique Vargas, (87-5711) & Benjamin Nelson, (87-5712)
green
1 sentence2018Id. at ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald , 916 F.2d 766 , 769 (2d Cir. 1990). " '[A] warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is justified if the government demonstrates: "(1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon become aware the police are on their trail, so that the destruction of evidence would be in order." ' " Id. at ¶ 21, quoting United States v. Lewis , 231 F.3d 238 , 241 (6th Cir. 2000), quoting United States v. Sangineto-Miranda , 859 F.2d 1501 , 1512 (6th Cir. 1988). {¶ 26} | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Errol MacDonald
green
1 sentence2018Id. at ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald , 916 F.2d 766 , 769 (2d Cir. 1990). " '[A] warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is justified if the government demonstrates: "(1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon become aware the police are on their trail, so that the destruction of evidence would be in order." ' " Id. at ¶ 21, quoting United States v. Lewis , 231 F.3d 238 , 241 (6th Cir. 2000), quoting United States v. Sangineto-Miranda , 859 F.2d 1501 , 1512 (6th Cir. 1988). {¶ 26} | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Walter Lewis
green
1 sentence2018Id. at ¶ 21, citing United States v. MacDonald , 916 F.2d 766 , 769 (2d Cir. 1990). " '[A] warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is justified if the government demonstrates: "(1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon become aware the police are on their trail, so that the destruction of evidence would be in order." ' " Id. at ¶ 21, quoting United States v. Lewis , 231 F.3d 238 , 241 (6th Cir. 2000), quoting United States v. Sangineto-Miranda , 859 F.2d 1501 , 1512 (6th Cir. 1988). {¶ 26} | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lam
green
1 sentence2013The basic fact remains that appellant fled from police who were in hot pursuit of him and who had identified themselves as police officers.” Id. at 45.2 2 The court did not rely on the flight itself as an additional basis or offense justifying the pursuit. [Cite as State v. Lam, 2013-Ohio-505 .] {¶ 19} As in Jeffrey Lam’s case, the offense for which the police sought to arrest the defendant in Flinchum was a minor misdemeanor (reckless operation). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Claytor
green
2 sentences2012State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627 , 620 N.E.2d 906 (4th Dist.1993). {¶17} The hot pursuit exception provides that “a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place * * * by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1976). 2012State v. Claytor, 85 Ohio App.3d 623, 627 , 620 N.E.2d 906 (4th Dist.1993). {¶17} The hot pursuit exception provides that “a suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place * * * by the expedient of escaping to a private place.” United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 , 96 S.Ct. 2406 , 49 L.Ed. 2d 300 (1976). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Barker
green
1 sentence1999Third, appellant argues that his arrest was unlawful since the officers failed to specifically inform him that he was under arrest pursuant to State v. Barker (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 135 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.