Pennsylvania constitutional standard in Pennsylvania

1991As a result, the Pennsylvania constitutional standard essentially reflects the federal standard announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

1991As a result, the Pennsylvania constitutional standard essentially reflects the federal standard announced in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

2026“In sharp contrast,” Shivers submits, “Bishop involved a Pennsylvania constitutional claim of first impression in this Commonwealth that would have obligated the lower court to decide the issue, with the defendant perhaps prevailing.” Id.6 Pennsylvania takes “a stricter approach to waiver than pertains in many other jurisdictions[.]” Bishop, 217 A.3d at 840 n.6.

2023In so doing, the CO/DO relies on an analogy to this Court’s decision in Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017), in which we enforced the Pennsylvania constitutional requirement that the Commonwealth’s legislative powers rest exclusively in the General Assembly.

2015The majority erroneously asserts that the Williams Court concluded that, “Megan’s Law II registration, counselling, and notification requirements did not violate due process.” Majority Memorandum, 7 (citing Williams, supra at 986 ).

2014The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 743 A.2d 460 (Pa.Super.1999).

2011Subsequent to Kastigar , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 541 Pa. 500 , 664 A.2d 957 (1995), considered whether Pennsylvania’s “use and derivative use” immunity statute, as codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, 1 is con sistent with the Pennsylvania constitutional privilege at Article 1, Section 9, against compelled self-incrimination.

2011Subsequent to Kastigar , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Swinehart, 541 Pa. 500 , 664 A.2d 957 (1995), considered whether Pennsylvania’s “use and derivative use” immunity statute, as codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947, 1 is con sistent with the Pennsylvania constitutional privilege at Article 1, Section 9, against compelled self-incrimination.

2006In that case, we upheld this prohibition on appeals against a Pennsylvania constitutional challenge premised upon Article V, Section 9, which provides a right of appeal "to a court of record from a court not of record" and "from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court." In succinctly rejecting the claim, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberts, noted that, "[a]n arbitration panel is neither a court nor an administrative agency." 259 A.2d at 440 .

2006In that case, we upheld this prohibition on appeals against a Pennsylvania constitutional challenge premised upon Article V, Section 9, which provides a right of appeal “to a court of record from a court not of record” and “from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court.” In succinctly rejecting the claim, the Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberts, noted that, “[a]n arbitration panel is neither a court nor an administrative agency.” 259 A.2d at 440 .

2005E.g., Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 , 855 & n. 19 (2003); Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33, 41-42 (2002); Pierce, swpra.

2005E.g., Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 , 855 & n. 19 (2003); Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588 , 819 A.2d 33, 41-42 (2002); Pierce, swpra.

2005Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1076 . “[T]he test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa.2004) (collecting cases, including Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa.153, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (1987), which held that the Pennsylvania constitutional standard for assessing ineffectiveness claims is the same as Strickland , including the standard for prejudice).

2005Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1076 . “[T]he test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa.2004) (collecting cases, including Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa.153, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (1987), which held that the Pennsylvania constitutional standard for assessing ineffectiveness claims is the same as Strickland , including the standard for prejudice).

2005Bethea, 828 A.2d at 1076 . “[T]he test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and federal Constitutions: it is the performance and prejudice test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).” Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa.2004) (collecting cases, including Commonwealth v. (Charles) Pierce, 515 Pa.153, 527 A.2d 973, 976-77 (1987), which held that the Pennsylvania constitutional standard for assessing ineffectiveness claims is the same as Strickland , including the standard for prejudice).

2004In this regard, Sprague v. Walter, 518 Pa. 425 , 543 A.2d 1078 (1988) is essential as that case recognizes that, in the defamation arena, there are interests other than free and unfettered speech interests which are implicated in a Pennsylvania constitutional analysis—such as the interest in one’s good reputation.

2004In this regard, Sprague v. Walter, 518 Pa. 425 , 543 A.2d 1078 (1988) is essential as that case recognizes that, in the defamation arena, there are interests other than free and unfettered speech interests which are implicated in a Pennsylvania constitutional analysis—such as the interest in one’s good reputation.

1997As set forth by Justice Ginsberg in concurrence in Ohio v. Robinette, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996): From their unique vantage point, Ohio’s courts observed that traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal activity.

1997As set forth by Justice Ginsberg in concurrence in Ohio v. Robinette, — U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996): From their unique vantage point, Ohio’s courts observed that traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband searches, characterized as consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal activity.