relaxation rule in Pennsylvania

1990However, as we said in Commonwealth v. Nowalk, 160 Pa.Super. 88, 91 , 50 A.2d 115, 116 (1946), “[n]o fixed time or distance from the event can be established____ Each case must depend on its own circumstances.” Additionally, our Supreme Court commented that a relaxation of the rule, that the statement be sufficiently contemporaneous with the event where the child-declarant is the victim of a sexual assault, “recognizes both the likelihood of a young child’s inability to comprehend the purpose of the assault and the possibility of the child’s hesitancy to discuss the matter for fear of incurrin

1990Each case must depend on its own circumstances." Additionally, our Supreme Court commented that a relaxation of the rule, that the statement be sufficiently contemporaneous with the event where the child-declarant is the victim of a sexual assault, "recognizes both the likelihood of a young child's inability to comprehend the purpose of the assault and the possibility of the child's hesitancy to discuss the matter for fear of incurring punishment." Pronkoskie at 142 n. 9, 383 A.2d at 863 n. 9, citing Annotation, 83 A.L.R.2d 1361 . *594 Examining all attendant circumstances, we believe it would

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, “and because ‘imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality’ and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh’g denied

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, “and because ‘imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality’ and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh’g denied

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, “and because ‘imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality’ and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh’g denied

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, “and because ‘imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality’ and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh’g denied

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, "and because `imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality' and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree." Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh'g denied

2000It has been determined by our court that to properly perform the statutory-requirements noted above, “and because ‘imposition of the death penalty is irrevocable in its finality’ and warrants, therefore, the relaxation of our waiver rules, Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 437-41 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978), our court shall review, in death penalty cases, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction of murder of the first degree.” Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 , 942 n. 3 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970 , 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), reh’g denied

1990However, as we said in Commonwealth v. Nowalk, 160 Pa.Super. 88, 91 , 50 A.2d 115, 116 (1946), “[n]o fixed time or distance from the event can be established____ Each case must depend on its own circumstances.” Additionally, our Supreme Court commented that a relaxation of the rule, that the statement be sufficiently contemporaneous with the event where the child-declarant is the victim of a sexual assault, “recognizes both the likelihood of a young child’s inability to comprehend the purpose of the assault and the possibility of the child’s hesitancy to discuss the matter for fear of incurrin

1990Each case must depend on its own circumstances." Additionally, our Supreme Court commented that a relaxation of the rule, that the statement be sufficiently contemporaneous with the event where the child-declarant is the victim of a sexual assault, "recognizes both the likelihood of a young child's inability to comprehend the purpose of the assault and the possibility of the child's hesitancy to discuss the matter for fear of incurring punishment." Pronkoskie at 142 n. 9, 383 A.2d at 863 n. 9, citing Annotation, 83 A.L.R.2d 1361 . *594 Examining all attendant circumstances, we believe it would

1988Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 298, 522 A.2d at 592 .

1988Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 298, 522 A.2d at 592 .

1985Under this relaxation, it [was] held that where the female was an idiot, or had been rendered insensible by the use of drugs or intoxicating drinks, and, in one case, where she was under the age of ten years, she was incapable of consenting, and the law implied force." Commonwealth v. Stephens, supra, 143 Pa. at 399, 17 A.2d at 921 .

1985Under this relaxation, it [was] held that where the female was an idiot, or had been rendered insensible by the use of drugs or intoxicating drinks, and, in one case, where she was under the age of ten years, she was incapable of consenting, and the law implied force.” Commonwealth v. Stephens, supra, 143 Pa. at 399, 17 A.2d at 921 .

1984Under this relaxation, it has been held that where the female was an idiot, or had been rendered insensible by the use of drugs or intoxicating drinks, and, in one case, where she was under the age of ten years, she was incapable of consenting, and the law implied force. — Rex [Reg.] v. Ryan, 2 Cox’s C.C. 115; Commonwealth v. Fields, 4 Leigh, Va., 648; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 ; Regina v. Camplin, 1 Car. & Kir. 746; Bishop’s Cr.Law, § 343”.

1984Under this relaxation, it has been held that where the female was an idiot, or had been rendered insensible by the use of drugs or intoxicating drinks, and, in one case, where she was under the age of ten years, she was incapable of consenting, and the law implied force. — Rex [Reg.] v. Ryan, 2 Cox's C.C. 115; Commonwealth v. Fields, 4 Leigh, Va., 648; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 ; Regina v. Camplin, 1 Car. & Kir. 746; Bishop's Cr.Law. § 343".

1975See Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315 , 108 A. 2d 780 (1954); Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa. 555 , 167 A. 333 (1933); Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 547, 556 , 142 A. 2d 473, 477 (1958) (WATKINS, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Fox, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 , 124 A. 2d 628 (1956).

1975See Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315 , 108 A. 2d 780 (1954); Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa. 555 , 167 A. 333 (1933); Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 547, 556 , 142 A. 2d 473, 477 (1958) (WATKINS, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Fox, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 292 , 124 A. 2d 628 (1956).

1958The fact that we have carefully examined the record in this case and briefly commented on the errors raised concerning Judge Lansberry's charge should not be interpreted as a relaxation of the rule set forth in Gross v. Clapper, 369 Pa. 348 , 85 A. 2d 618 (1952), where the Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion, “However, plaintiff failed to make any objections to the charge and did not take any exceptions thereto, either specific or general.

1958The fact that we have carefully examined the record in this case and briefly commented on the errors raised concerning Judge Lansberry's charge should not be interpreted as a relaxation of the rule set forth in Gross v. Clapper, 369 Pa. 348 , 85 A. 2d 618 (1952), where the Supreme Court held in a per curiam opinion, “However, plaintiff failed to make any objections to the charge and did not take any exceptions thereto, either specific or general.

1957The fact that the particular parent who is the defendant is protected by insurance against legal liability should not enable the minor child to maintain the action if he could not otherwise have maintained it: Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515 , 237 N.W. 188 ; Norfolk S.R.

1957The fact that the particular parent who is the defendant is protected by insurance against legal liability should not enable the minor child to maintain the action if he could not otherwise have maintained it: Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515 , 237 N.W. 188 ; Norfolk S. R.

1957The fact that the particular parent who is the defendant is protected by insurance against legal liability should not enable the minor child to maintain the action if he could not otherwise have maintained it: Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515 , 237 N.W. 188 ; Norfolk S.R.

1957The fact that the particular parent who is the defendant is protected by insurance against legal liability should not enable the minor child to maintain the action if he could not otherwise have maintained it: Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515 , 237 N.W. 188 ; Norfolk S. R.

1954It is said that under the equitable doctrine enforcement rests in the sound discretion of the chancellor: Idem., §23; Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Pa. 136 ; Nesmith v. Drum, 8 W. & S. 9 .

1954It is said that under the equitable doctrine enforcement rests in the sound discretion of the chancellor: Idem., §23; Pierce v. McKeehan, 3 Pa. 136 ; Nesmith v. Drum, 8 W. & S. 9 .