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14 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2021Our supreme court has explained that the courts should take a somewhat “flexible approach” in applying rule 34.6, in an effort to avoid denying “review on the merits, even though the appellee has not established any prejudice from a slight relaxation of the rule.” Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002). 2021While complete omission of issues under Rule 34.6(c) is fatal to those issues, the supreme court has “adopted a more flexible approach in certain cases . . . when a rigid application of Rule 34.6 would result in denying review on the merits, even though the appellee has not established any prejudice from a slight relaxation of the rule.” Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002).1 Husband stated the following in his notice of appeal: 3. | 4 | 10 |
Schafer v. Connergreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Jacobellis v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Bence v. Breiergreen2 sentences1977The court attempted to distinguish Levy and Arnett on the grounds that there are no overriding military considerations which would justify the relaxation of the test for vagueness as there were in Levy , and because the statute in Arnett prescribed “an admittedly general standard ‘in order to give myriad different federal employees performing widely disparate tasks a common standard of job protection.’ ” 501 F.2d at 1190. 1977The court in Bence distinguished these two cases because “[d]ue process demands that each challenged rule be examined in its context to determine whether in fact further specificity would be feasible or practicable” and because in Bence there were no “concretiz-ing warnings (or limiting interpretation provided by an administrative manual)” to save a catch-all provision from a charge of vagueness. 501 F.2d at 1189, n. 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mason v. Our Lady Star of the Sea Catholic Church
green
1 sentence2019Although recognizing the supreme court’s instruction in Bennett to take a “more flexible approach when ‘the appellee has not established any prejudice from a slight relaxation of the rule,’” id. at 819 (quoting Bennett, 96 S.W.3d at 229 ), the Mason court noted the obvious difference between a case like Bennett in which the issue statement, though late, was filed well before the appellee’s brief was due, and the 21 situation before it: “In contrast, Mason did not seek leave to file her statement of the issues until almost nine months after it was due” and four months after the appellees had fi | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Thompson v. City of Louisville
green
2 sentences1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 1998The Supreme Court recognized that same proposition in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) : That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 , 80 S.Ct. 624 , 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)7 “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 [ 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1686 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 (1960)] (Warren, C.J., dissenting). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Griffith v. State
neutral
1 sentence1911Griffith v. State, 37 Ark. 324 ; Unis v. Charlton, 12 Grat. [Va.] 484; Kimball v. Davis, 19 Wend. [N. Y.] 437; [Brown v. Kimball] 25 Wend. [N. Y.] 259, supra. While the enforcement of the rule in case of the death of the witness, subsequent to his examination, may work an occasional hardship, by depriving the party of the opportunity of proving the contradictory statements, a relaxation of the rule in such cases would offer a temptation to perjury and the fabrication of testimony, which, in criminal cases especially, would be almost irresistible. * * * The fact that one party has lost the powe | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.