element of official immunity in Texas

2022Although in situations involving high-speed chases, law-enforcement pursuits, or emergency-response driving by law enforcement officers, courts employ a particularized need/risk analysis when evaluating good faith,11 the public-safety concerns underlying the 11 See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994) (holding law enforcement officer establishes good faith in law-enforcement-pursuit case by showing reasonably prudent officer could have believed it necessary to continue pursuit, balancing need for immediate law enforcement intervention against risk of harm to public);

2015“This test of good faith does not inquire into ‘what a reasonable person would have done,’ but into ‘what a reasonable [person] could have believed.’” Id. (quoting Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457, 465 (Tex. 2002)); see Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656–57. 12 Officer Cash presented his own affidavit detailing the steps he took to investigate whether a protective order existed.

2008Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 -27 ; Texas State Technical College v. Cressman , 172 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Waco 2005, pet. denied), Titus Regional Medical Center v. Tetta , 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

2008Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426-27 ; Texas State Technical College v. Cressman, 172 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Waco 2005, pet. denied), Titus Regional Medical Center v. Tetta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

2008Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 -27 ; Texas State Technical College v. Cressman , 172 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Waco 2005, pet. denied), Titus Regional Medical Center v. Tetta , 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

2008Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426-27 ; Texas State Technical College v. Cressman, 172 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex.App.–Waco 2005, pet. denied), Titus Regional Medical Center v. Tetta, 180 S.W.3d 271, 276 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

2023Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith 40 as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).

2022Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).

2022Although in situations involving high-speed chases, law-enforcement pursuits, or emergency-response driving by law enforcement officers, courts employ a particularized need/risk analysis when evaluating good faith,11 the public-safety concerns underlying the 11 See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. 1994) (holding law enforcement officer establishes good faith in law-enforcement-pursuit case by showing reasonably prudent officer could have believed it necessary to continue pursuit, balancing need for immediate law enforcement intervention against risk of harm to public);

2014“The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of an official’s motivation.” Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 426 (Tex. 2004) (citing Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467 n.1).

2023Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith 40 as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).

2022Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).

2011"The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of an official’s motivation.” Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 164 (Tex.2004).

2011“The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of an official’s motivation.” Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture , 145 S.W.3d 150, 164 (Tex. 2004).

2009“The fact that a specific act that forms the basis of the suit may have been wrongly or negligently 8 The plaintiffs do not challenge this elem ent of Quintanilla’s official im m unity defense. 18 performed does not take it outside of the scope of authority.” Koerselman, 875 S.W.2d at 350 ; see Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 658 n.9 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987) and rejecting the argument that “an officer necessarily operates outside the scope of the officer’s authority when acting unlawfully.”).

2009"The fact that a specific act that forms the basis of the suit may have been wrongly or negligently performed does not take it outside of the scope of authority." Koerselman , 875 S.W.2d at 350 ; see Chambers , 883 S.W.2d at 658 n.9 (citing Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987) and rejecting the argument that "an officer necessarily operates outside the scope of the officer's authority when acting unlawfully.").

2023Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith 40 as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).

2022Telthorster, 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Martinez, 526 S.W.3d at 563 (“[O]nly those who are plainly incompetent or knowingly violate the law lack the good faith necessary to be shielded by official immunity.”); see also Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426 (“The standard of good faith as an element of official immunity is not a test of carelessness or negligence, or a measure of a[] [governmental employee’s] motivation.”).