Matthews rule in Texas

2014Specifically, the Le-noirs contend that Matthews did not make the following assertions in the trial court that they are making on appeal: (1) the Lenoirs conceded that Matthews was first served with an expert report on Jahuary 3, 2013, (2) there is no evidence Matthews requested the attorney general to represent her, (3) the attorney general does not automatically become a public servant’s attorney, (4) the September expert report served on the attorney general did not constitute timely service of an expert report on Matthews, and (5) that “the Le-noirs’ evidence of due diligence does not aris

2014Specifically, the Lenoirs contend that Matthews did not make the following assertions in the trial court that they are making on appeal: (1) the Lenoirs conceded that Matthews was first served with an expert report on 7 January 3, 2013, (2) there is no evidence Matthews requested the attorney general to represent her, (3) the attorney general does not automatically become a public servant’s attorney, (4) the September expert report served on the attorney general did not constitute timely service of an expert report on Matthews, and (5) that “the Lenoirs’ evidence of due diligence does not aris

2023LAB. § 401.011(12)(A). –7– the premises.8 However, the first of its cases, U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Deering Management Group, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D.

2023LAB. § 401.011(12)(A). –7– the premises.8 However, the first of its cases, U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Deering Management Group, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D.

2022See Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d at 721; Lucio, 551 S.W.3d at 898 .

2022In Perez, the defendant’s excuse for failing to timely answer the plaintiff’s petition was based upon its belief that the petition received was a “duplicate” of an existing “third party action,” which 1 Matthews’s motion indicated that he “assumed that his attorney . . . had received a copy of these documents.” However, Matthews did not contend at the hearing or in his affidavit that he failed to answer because he believed his attorney had answered or would answer on his behalf. 5 it claimed was already “being ‘resolved on a semi-informal basis.’” Id. at 79 .

2022This Court reasoned that even accepting this belief in earnest, the defendant showed “no indication of settlement” in the related action or “other excuse for [its] failure to answer as required.” Id.

2015In English v. State, we distinguished Matthews by holding that the rule of that case would apply only to situations involving judicial error and would not apply when a trial court had erroneously granted a new trial as a result of clerical error. 592 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim.

2015In English v. State, we distinguished Matthews by holding that the rule of that case would apply only to situations involving judicial error and would not apply when a trial court had erroneously granted a new trial as a result of clerical error. 592 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim.

2015Noting that a trial court has seventy-five days in which to rule on a motion for new trial, we held that a trial court may rescind its order granting or denying a motion for new trial, as long as the rescinding order was made within that seventy-five-day window.11 Part of our reason for disagreeing with Matthews was that the Matthews rule “creates a split between criminal and civil jurisprudence without a good reason for doing so.”12 In holding that a trial court could rescind an order granting a new trial, and in articulating the outer boundary for doing so (seventy-five days), we relied heav

2015Noting that a trial court has seventy-five days in which to rule on a motion for new trial, we held that a trial court may rescind its order granting or denying a motion for new trial, as long as the rescinding order was made within that seventy-five-day window.11 Part of our reason for disagreeing with Matthews was that the Matthews rule “creates a split between criminal and civil jurisprudence without a good reason for doing so.”12 In holding that a trial court could rescind an order granting a new trial, and in articulating the outer boundary for doing so (seventy-five days), we relied heav

1998We noted that much of the language in those statutory provisions had been carried over into our current rules of appellate procedure, but we explained that "nothing in this language even purports to address the trial court's authority or lack of authority to rescind an order granting a new trial." Id. at 519 n. 4. [3] We stated that Moore, English, and Alexander all failed to give any further rationale for the Matthews rule.

1998We noted that much of the language in those statutory provisions had been carried over into our current rules of appellate procedure, but we explained that "nothing in this language even purports to address the trial court's authority or lack of authority to rescind an order granting a new trial." Id. at 519 n. 4. [3] We stated that Moore, English, and Alexander all failed to give any further rationale for the Matthews rule.

1998We again made statements upholding the validity of the Matthews doctrine in Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

1998We again made statements upholding the validity of the Matthews doctrine in Moore v. State, 749 S.W.2d 54 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).

1986Mary’s University of San Antonio, 531 S.W.2d 589 (Tex.1975); Tex. R.Civ.P. 166-A. Frost and Gauntt complain that the trial court erred in granting Matthews’s motion for summary judgment which terminated the lease because there are disputed issues of material fact and because Matthews is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1950Cameron County v. Fox, Tex. Com.App., 2 S.W.2d 433 .