res gestae exception in Georgia

2004More specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the wife's statement under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. "[A] trial judge's determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous." Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 , 290 S.E.2d 71 (1982).

2004More specifically, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the wife's statement under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule. "[A] trial judge's determination that evidence offered as part of the res gestae is sufficiently informative and reliable as to warrant being considered by the jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is clearly erroneous." Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 228 , 290 S.E.2d 71 (1982).

2012“Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement. . . (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement . . . and (iii) whether the declarant was influenced by others prior to making the statement.” Thomas, supra at 544 (2).

2012“Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement . . . (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement . . . and (iii) whether the declarant was influenced by others prior to making the statement.” Thomas, supra at 544 (2).

1994Although the victim's statements to defendant about her having had sexual relations with black men and having had children by these men would otherwise be admissible as part of the res gestae, it is well settled that the "Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, including the res gestae rule." Veal v. State, *736 191 Ga. App. 445, 447 (4) ( 382 SE2d 131 ); Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 281 ( 246 SE2d 363 ).

1994Although the victim's statements to defendant about her having had sexual relations with black men and having had children by these men would otherwise be admissible as part of the res gestae, it is well settled that the "Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, including the res gestae rule." Veal v. State, *736 191 Ga. App. 445, 447 (4) ( 382 SE2d 131 ); Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 281 ( 246 SE2d 363 ).

2011The trial court denied the motions, but the court stated that if the State failed to “tie these events together, both in a proximity of time” and also by showing a relationship between the incident with the families and the incident with the victims, including the allegation of gang activity, “the prejudicial effect may be such that it might require further instructions to the jury about what to disregard or to even more serious curative measures.” “The determination of admissibility under the res gestae exception rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not di

2011The trial court denied the motions, but the court stated that if the State failed to “tie these events together, both in a proximity of time” and also by showing a relationship between the incident with the families and the incident with the victims, including the allegation of gang activity, “the prejudicial effect may be such that it might require further instructions to the jury about what to disregard or to even more serious curative measures.” “The determination of admissibility under the res gestae exception rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not di

1994Although the victim's statements to defendant about her having had sexual relations with black men and having had children by these men would otherwise be admissible as part of the res gestae, it is well settled that the "Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, including the res gestae rule." Veal v. State, *736 191 Ga. App. 445, 447 (4) ( 382 SE2d 131 ); Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 281 ( 246 SE2d 363 ).

1994Although the victim's statements to defendant about her having had sexual relations with black men and having had children by these men would otherwise be admissible as part of the res gestae, it is well settled that the "Rape Shield Statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, including the res gestae rule." Veal v. State, *736 191 Ga. App. 445, 447 (4) ( 382 SE2d 131 ); Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. App. 277, 281 ( 246 SE2d 363 ).

2007While the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule clearly did not support the trial court’s decision to admit certain testimony by Officer Brown, in which he related statements made to him by witness Mims during his investigation of the crime regarding comments she claimed she overheard appellant make during the attack on the victim, see OCGA § 24-3-3; compare Cox v. State, 274 Ga. 204 (3) ( 553 SE2d 152 ) (2001), no reversible error was committed by the admission of Officer Brown’s hearsay testimony because it was cumulative of Mims’ admissible testimony regarding the same comments.

2007While the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule clearly did not support the trial court’s decision to admit certain testimony by Officer Brown, in which he related statements made to him by witness Mims during his investigation of the crime regarding comments she claimed she overheard appellant make during the attack on the victim, see OCGA § 24-3-3; compare Cox v. State, 274 Ga. 204 (3) ( 553 SE2d 152 ) (2001), no reversible error was committed by the admission of Officer Brown’s hearsay testimony because it was cumulative of Mims’ admissible testimony regarding the same comments.

1986In Wallace v. State, 151 Ga. App. 171, 173 ( 259 SE2d 172 ) (1979), we held that it is not “error to admit the statement of a child made to her mother shortly after an assault occurs when it is the child’s first opportunity to report the offense outside the presence of the perpetrator.” Notwithstanding the fact that several hours may possibly have elapsed in the present case between the time the offense occurred and the time the victim made the statements to her mother, the child clearly had no previous opportunity to report the offense. “[A] trial judge’s determination that evidence offered a

1986In Wallace v. State, 151 Ga. App. 171, 173 ( 259 SE2d 172 ) (1979), we held that it is not “error to admit the statement of a child made to her mother shortly after an assault occurs when it is the child’s first opportunity to report the offense outside the presence of the perpetrator.” Notwithstanding the fact that several hours may possibly have elapsed in the present case between the time the offense occurred and the time the victim made the statements to her mother, the child clearly had no previous opportunity to report the offense. “[A] trial judge’s determination that evidence offered a

2009“Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement. . . (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement. . . and (iii) whether the declarant was influenced by others prior to making the statement. ...” (Citations omitted.) Key v. State, 289 Ga. App. 317, 320-321 (1) (b) ( 657 SE2d 273 ) (2008).

2009“Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement. . . (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement. . . and (iii) whether the declarant was influenced by others prior to making the statement. ...” (Citations omitted.) Key v. State, 289 Ga. App. 317, 320-321 (1) (b) ( 657 SE2d 273 ) (2008).

2008Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement (see, e.g., Wdbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (1) ( 448 SE2d 37 ) (1994) (victim’s statement made over three hours after incident was inadmissible as res gestae because it “was created hours after the occurrence and [bore] no mark of ‘spontaneity’ or other such state of mind undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought”) (citation omitted)); (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement (see, e.g., Walthour v. State, 269 Ga. 396, 397 (2) ( 497 SE2d 79

2008Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement (see, e.g., Wdbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (1) ( 448 SE2d 37 ) (1994) (victim’s statement made over three hours after incident was inadmissible as res gestae because it “was created hours after the occurrence and [bore] no mark of ‘spontaneity’ or other such state of mind undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought”) (citation omitted)); (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement (see, e.g., Walthour v. State, 269 Ga. 396, 397 (2) ( 497 SE2d 79

2001Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga.App. 424, 426 , 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga.App. 463, 465-466 (3), 469 S.E.2d 763 (1996); Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga.App. 459, 460 , 436 S.E.2d 513 (1993).

2001Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga.App. 424, 426 , 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga.App. 463, 465-466 (3), 469 S.E.2d 763 (1996); Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga.App. 459, 460 , 436 S.E.2d 513 (1993).

2017See Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 735 (1) (a) ( 442 SE2d 883 ) 10 Although Snow and Williams were decided under the predecessor statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, subsection (b) of that statute was maintained without change in OCGA § 24-4-412 (b).

2017See Logan v. State, 212 Ga. App. 734, 735 (1) (a) ( 442 SE2d 883 ) 10 Although Snow and Williams were decided under the predecessor statute, OCGA § 24-2-3, subsection (b) of that statute was maintained without change in OCGA § 24-4-412 (b).

2017See Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 651-652 (4), (5) ( 492 SE2d 564 ) (1997) (no error in court’s exclusion of evidence as to how the victim had intercourse with “someone other than” the defendant and as to how her hymen had become perforated); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 54, 55-56 (1) ( 570 SE2d 362 ) (2002) (trial court properly excluded evidence as to victims’ past sexual behavior when they testified that they had not had sex with the defendant at any time before the attack at issue).10 It is also well-settled that the Rape Shield Statute “supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, includi

2017See Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 651-652 (4), (5) ( 492 SE2d 564 ) (1997) (no error in court’s exclusion of evidence as to how the victim had intercourse with “someone other than” the defendant and as to how her hymen had become perforated); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 54, 55-56 (1) ( 570 SE2d 362 ) (2002) (trial court properly excluded evidence as to victims’ past sexual behavior when they testified that they had not had sex with the defendant at any time before the attack at issue).10 It is also well-settled that the Rape Shield Statute “supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, includi

2017See Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 651-652 (4), (5) ( 492 SE2d 564 ) (1997) (no error in court’s exclusion of evidence as to how the victim had intercourse with “someone other than” the defendant and as to how her hymen had become perforated); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 54, 55-56 (1) ( 570 SE2d 362 ) (2002) (trial court properly excluded evidence as to victims’ past sexual behavior when they testified that they had not had sex with the defendant at any time before the attack at issue).10 It is also well-settled that the Rape Shield Statute “supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, includi

2017See Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 651-652 (4), (5) ( 492 SE2d 564 ) (1997) (no error in court’s exclusion of evidence as to how the victim had intercourse with “someone other than” the defendant and as to how her hymen had become perforated); Williams v. State, 257 Ga. App. 54, 55-56 (1) ( 570 SE2d 362 ) (2002) (trial court properly excluded evidence as to victims’ past sexual behavior when they testified that they had not had sex with the defendant at any time before the attack at issue).10 It is also well-settled that the Rape Shield Statute “supersedes all evidentiary exceptions, includi

2014In such a case, the hearsay is cumulative and without material effect on the verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 319 Ga. App. 888, 890 (1) ( 739 SE2d 4 ) (2013).

2014In such a case, the hearsay is cumulative and without material effect on the verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 319 Ga. App. 888, 890 (1) ( 739 SE2d 4 ) (2013).

2013See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1); Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 855-856 (3) ( 670 SE2d 506 ) (2008); Brewer v. State, 224 Ga. App. 656, 659 (7) ( 481 SE2d 608 ) (1997).

2013See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1); Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 855-856 (3) ( 670 SE2d 506 ) (2008); Brewer v. State, 224 Ga. App. 656, 659 (7) ( 481 SE2d 608 ) (1997).

2013Moreover, notwithstanding the admissibility of the statements under the co-conspirator exception, the statements were alternatively admissible under the res gestae exception set forth in the former provisions of OCGA § 24-3-3. 3 See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1).

2013Moreover, notwithstanding the admissibility of the statements under the co-conspirator exception, the statements were alternatively admissible under the res gestae exception set forth in the former provisions of OCGA § 24-3-3. 3 See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1).

2013See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1); Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 855-856 (3) ( 670 SE2d 506 ) (2008); Brewer v. State, 224 Ga. App. 656, 659 (7) ( 481 SE2d 608 ) (1997).

2013See Toney, supra, 304 Ga. App. at 27-28 (1); Jones v. State, 294 Ga. App. 854, 855-856 (3) ( 670 SE2d 506 ) (2008); Brewer v. State, 224 Ga. App. 656, 659 (7) ( 481 SE2d 608 ) (1997).

2012Thomas, supra at 544 (2); see also Gilbert v. State, 241 Ga.App. 57, 60 (3) ( 526 SE2d 88 ) (1999) (trial court did not clearly err in admitting eyewitness’s description of robbers’ car made 30 minutes after robbery when the description was “relevant” and made “without premeditation”).

2012Thomas, supra at 544 (2); see also Gilbert v. State, 241 Ga.App. 57, 60 (3) ( 526 SE2d 88 ) (1999) (trial court did not clearly err in admitting eyewitness’s description of robbers’ car made 30 minutes after robbery when the description was “relevant” and made “without premeditation”).

2008Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement (see, e.g., Wdbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (1) ( 448 SE2d 37 ) (1994) (victim’s statement made over three hours after incident was inadmissible as res gestae because it “was created hours after the occurrence and [bore] no mark of ‘spontaneity’ or other such state of mind undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought”) (citation omitted)); (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement (see, e.g., Walthour v. State, 269 Ga. 396, 397 (2) ( 497 SE2d 79

2008Whether the res gestae exception should apply depends on factors including (i) the timing of the statement (see, e.g., Wdbourne v. State, 214 Ga. App. 371, 373 (1) ( 448 SE2d 37 ) (1994) (victim’s statement made over three hours after incident was inadmissible as res gestae because it “was created hours after the occurrence and [bore] no mark of ‘spontaneity’ or other such state of mind undeniably free of conscious device or afterthought”) (citation omitted)); (ii) whether the declarant was able to deliberate about the statement (see, e.g., Walthour v. State, 269 Ga. 396, 397 (2) ( 497 SE2d 79

1980When "[tjested by well-established rules concerning the res gestae exception, this evidence was not free from suspicion of afterthought but was rather in the nature of narrations of past transaction.” Peebles v. State, 236 Ga. 93, 95 ( 222 SE2d 376 ) (1976).

1980When "[tjested by well-established rules concerning the res gestae exception, this evidence was not free from suspicion of afterthought but was rather in the nature of narrations of past transaction.” Peebles v. State, 236 Ga. 93, 95 ( 222 SE2d 376 ) (1976).

2004On appeal, “a *271 trial court’s determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae will not be disturbed unless that finding is clearly erroneous.” (Punctuation omitted.) Davison v. State, 241 Ga. App. 685, 687 (3) ( 527 SE2d 285 ) (1999), citing Copeland v. State, 235 Ga. App. 682, 684 (2) (a) ( 510 SE2d 124 ) (1998).

2004On appeal, “a *271 trial court’s determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae will not be disturbed unless that finding is clearly erroneous.” (Punctuation omitted.) Davison v. State, 241 Ga. App. 685, 687 (3) ( 527 SE2d 285 ) (1999), citing Copeland v. State, 235 Ga. App. 682, 684 (2) (a) ( 510 SE2d 124 ) (1998).

1984Likewise, there is nothing whatsoever to indicate the means by which the unidentified source had acquired the information concerning the spanking which the former employee had “heard.” Thus, the testimony clearly does not relate to a “trustworthy” out-of-court statement, such as is required for the admission of hearsay pursuant to the res gestae exception. “ ‘[T]he declarant must have had an opportunity to know the fact declared, i.e., have testimonial knowledge . . . .’ [Cit.] Absent evidence showing that the declarant spoke from personal knowledge, the statement is reduced to a mere expressi

1984Likewise, there is nothing whatsoever to indicate the means by which the unidentified source had acquired the information concerning the spanking which the former employee had “heard.” Thus, the testimony clearly does not relate to a “trustworthy” out-of-court statement, such as is required for the admission of hearsay pursuant to the res gestae exception. “ ‘[T]he declarant must have had an opportunity to know the fact declared, i.e., have testimonial knowledge . . . .’ [Cit.] Absent evidence showing that the declarant spoke from personal knowledge, the statement is reduced to a mere expressi

1999See Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga. App. 424, 426 ( 504 SE2d 245 ) (1998) (excited utterances come within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule).

1999See Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga. App. 424, 426 ( 504 SE2d 245 ) (1998) (excited utterances come within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule).

2000Thus, we decline Christensen's additional invitation to define the types of injuries that can meet such standard. [15] Yawn v. State, 237 Ga.App. 206, 207 , 515 S.E.2d 182 (1999). [16] Jones v. State, 242 Ga.App. 357, 359 (2), 529 S.E.2d 644 (2000). [17] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brinson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 556, 557 (1), 430 S.E.2d 875 (1993). [18] Since the evidence was properly admitted under a res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, we will not address Christensen's contention that the State failed to prove the evidence was admissible under a necessity theory.

2000Thus, we decline Christensen's additional invitation to define the types of injuries that can meet such standard. [15] Yawn v. State, 237 Ga.App. 206, 207 , 515 S.E.2d 182 (1999). [16] Jones v. State, 242 Ga.App. 357, 359 (2), 529 S.E.2d 644 (2000). [17] (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brinson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 556, 557 (1), 430 S.E.2d 875 (1993). [18] Since the evidence was properly admitted under a res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, we will not address Christensen's contention that the State failed to prove the evidence was admissible under a necessity theory.

1988In Allen v. State, 174 Ga. App. 206, 207 ( 329 SE2d 586 ), this court had the following to say: "Each case concerning the application of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule must turn on its own circumstances, and the admissibility of such testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge." The trial judge in this case did not abuse its discretion.

1988In Allen v. State, 174 Ga. App. 206, 207 ( 329 SE2d 586 ), this court had the following to say: "Each case concerning the application of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule must turn on its own circumstances, and the admissibility of such testimony is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge." The trial judge in this case did not abuse its discretion.

2005“Atrial court’s determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 139 (1) ( 453 SE2d 110 ) (1995).

2005“Atrial court’s determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 139 (1) ( 453 SE2d 110 ) (1995).

2010See Patel v. State, 278 Ga. 403, 404-405 (2) ( 603 SE2d 237 ) (2004).

2010See Patel v. State, 278 Ga. 403, 404-405 (2) ( 603 SE2d 237 ) (2004).

2001Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga.App. 424, 426 , 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga.App. 463, 465-466 (3), 469 S.E.2d 763 (1996); Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga.App. 459, 460 , 436 S.E.2d 513 (1993).

2001Sutton v. Winn Dixie Stores, 233 Ga.App. 424, 426 , 504 S.E.2d 245 (1998); Quiktrip Corp. v. Childs, 220 Ga.App. 463, 465-466 (3), 469 S.E.2d 763 (1996); Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga.App. 459, 460 , 436 S.E.2d 513 (1993).