res gestae rule in Kentucky

1939Poe v. Hankins’ Adm’x, 251 Ky. 466, 468 , 65 S. W. (2d) 457 ; Louisville Railroad Company v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 131 Ky. 277 , 115 S. W. 207 , 20 L.

1939Poe v. Hankins’ Adm’x, 251 Ky. 466, 468 , 65 S. W. (2d) 457 ; Louisville Railroad Company v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 131 Ky. 277 , 115 S. W. 207 , 20 L.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1985McClure relies on Roland v. Beckham, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 628 (1966), for the idea that spontaneity is the most important consideration in determining the existence of the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1985State v. Rodriquez, 8 Kan.App.2d 353 , 657 P.2d 79 (1983), four-hour lapse of time; People v. Pottruff, 116 Mich.App. 367 , 323 N.W.2d 402 (1982), five-year-old’s statement to mother within 24 hours; and Love v. State, 64 Wis.2d 432 , 219 N.W.2d 294 (1974), three-year-old girl’s statement to her mother on the following day.

1955Co. v. Studdard, 34 Ga.App. 570 , 130 S.E. 532 .

1955Co. v. Studdard, 34 Ga.App. 570 , 130 S.E. 532 .

1955Admitting Buchanan might not have been sane at the time he made them, yet his remarks were admissible since it is the event which determines the competency of the proof, and whatever is a part of the event becomes admissible under the res gestae rule. 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 578, p. 574; State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10 , 106 N.E. 660 , L.R.A.1915E, 202, Ann.Cas.1916C, 1182; State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 ; Louisville & N. R.

1955Admitting Buchanan might not have been sane at the time he made them, yet his remarks were admissible since it is the event which determines the competency of the proof, and whatever is a part of the event becomes admissible under the res gestae rule. 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 578, p. 574; State v. Lasecki, 90 Ohio St. 10 , 106 N.E. 660 , L.R.A.1915E, 202, Ann.Cas.1916C, 1182; State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 ; Louisville & N. R.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1950Ballard & Ballard Co. v. Durr, 165 Ky. 632 , 177 S. W. 445 ; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Brown’s Adm’x, 281 Ky. 133 , 135 S. W. 2d 70 ; Coleman v. Daniel, 292 Ky. 553 , 166 S. W. 2d 978 ; 20 Am.

1948Appellants cite in support of this view Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Louisville Trust Company, 207 Ky. 654 , 269 S. W. 1014 , and Edwards v. Equitable Life Assur.

1948Appellants cite in support of this view Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v. Louisville Trust Company, 207 Ky. 654 , 269 S. W. 1014 , and Edwards v. Equitable Life Assur.

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1939Poe v. Hankins’ Adm’x, 251 Ky. 466, 468 , 65 S. W. (2d) 457 ; Louisville Railroad Company v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 131 Ky. 277 , 115 S. W. 207 , 20 L.

1939Poe v. Hankins’ Adm’x, 251 Ky. 466, 468 , 65 S. W. (2d) 457 ; Louisville Railroad Company v. Johnson’s Adm’r, 131 Ky. 277 , 115 S. W. 207 , 20 L.

1939Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or at least, as lacking the usual grounds of untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts.” A like statement of the general principle of this res gestae exception was given in State v. Wag

1936Co. v. Molloy’s Adm’x, 122 Ky. 219 , 91 S. W. 685 , 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1113 ; Hughes’ Adm’r v. Louisville & N. R.

1935Returning now to the urged grounds supra, it is argued in support of ground 1 that the exclamation of Mrs. Kilkarney was inadmissible under the res gestae doctrine, because it was made by a bystander who was not engaged, or participating in or connected with, the principal transaction, which in this case was the homicide; nor from one personally “concerned in the act of killing.” As stated by some courts, the exclamation was not made by a “party to the occurrence.” In support of that contention the cases of Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 576 ; Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354 , 1 S. W. 5

1935Returning now to the urged grounds supra, it is argued in support of ground 1 that the exclamation of Mrs. Kilkarney was inadmissible under the res gestae doctrine, because it was made by a bystander who was not engaged, or participating in or connected with, the principal transaction, which in this case was the homicide; nor from one personally “concerned in the act of killing.” As stated by some courts, the exclamation was not made by a “party to the occurrence.” In support of that contention the cases of Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 576 ; Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354 , 1 S. W. 5

1935Returning now to the urged grounds supra, it is argued in support of ground 1 that the exclamation of Mrs. Kilkarney was inadmissible under the res gestae doctrine, because it was made by a bystander who was not engaged, or participating in or connected with, the principal transaction, which in this case was the homicide; nor from one personally “concerned in the act of killing.” As stated by some courts, the exclamation was not made by a “party to the occurrence.” In support of that contention the cases of Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 576 ; Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354 , 1 S. W. 5

1935Returning now to the urged grounds supra, it is argued in support of ground 1 that the exclamation of Mrs. Kilkarney was inadmissible under the res gestae doctrine, because it was made by a bystander who was not engaged, or participating in or connected with, the principal transaction, which in this case was the homicide; nor from one personally “concerned in the act of killing.” As stated by some courts, the exclamation was not made by a “party to the occurrence.” In support of that contention the cases of Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 576 ; Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 354 , 1 S. W. 5

1928Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37 , 228 S. W. 1036 .

1928Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37 , 228 S. W. 1036 .

1918L. 976, thus: “Such statements are of the res gestae, are of the nature of verbal acts and are admissible in evidence with the remainder of the transaction which they illustrate.” On page 977, in defining the conditions under which the res gestae rule will apply it is said: ‘ ‘ To bring acts and declarations within the doctrine of res gestae, they must be connected with, and grow out of, the act or transaction which is the subject matter of inquiry so as to form one continuous transaction, and must in some way illustrate, elucidate,- qualify or characterize the act, and, in a legal sense, be a

1918L. 976, thus: “Such statements are of the res gestae, are of the nature of verbal acts and are admissible in evidence with the remainder of the transaction which they illustrate.” On page 977, in defining the conditions under which the res gestae rule will apply it is said: ‘ ‘ To bring acts and declarations within the doctrine of res gestae, they must be connected with, and grow out of, the act or transaction which is the subject matter of inquiry so as to form one continuous transaction, and must in some way illustrate, elucidate,- qualify or characterize the act, and, in a legal sense, be a

1915In the case of Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Earl’s Admx., 94 Ky., 368 , a statement of the deceased immediately following the accident to the, effect that the accident was caused by the fool fireman was held admissible under the res gestae rule.

1909So that the entire transaction, wherein it is claimed the wrong in issue was done may be shown, though it includes also other' crimes, and even though each transaction wias a continuing one, or transpiring in parts on different days.” Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, Sec. 53, and volume 3, Sec. 15; Tye v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 59 ; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 122 ; O’Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608 , 74 S. W. 666 , 24 R. 2511 .

1909So that the entire transaction, wherein it is claimed the wrong in issue was done may be shown, though it includes also other' crimes, and even though each transaction wias a continuing one, or transpiring in parts on different days.” Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, Sec. 53, and volume 3, Sec. 15; Tye v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 59 ; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 122 ; O’Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608 , 74 S. W. 666 , 24 R. 2511 .

1909So that the entire transaction, wherein it is claimed the wrong in issue was done may be shown, though it includes also other' crimes, and even though each transaction wias a continuing one, or transpiring in parts on different days.” Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, Sec. 53, and volume 3, Sec. 15; Tye v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 59 ; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 122 ; O’Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608 , 74 S. W. 666 , 24 R. 2511 .

1909So that the entire transaction, wherein it is claimed the wrong in issue was done may be shown, though it includes also other' crimes, and even though each transaction wias a continuing one, or transpiring in parts on different days.” Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, Sec. 53, and volume 3, Sec. 15; Tye v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. Law Rep. 59 ; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 1 Ky. Law Rep. 122 ; O’Brien v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 608 , 74 S. W. 666 , 24 R. 2511 .