14 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1966–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garcia v. Stategreen2 sentences2008"As a contemporaneous utterance, it was admissible under the res gestae rule." Id. (emphasis supplied). 1992Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.) (officer who responded to crime was properly permitted to testify regarding what victim told him when he asked what happened, as a contemporaneous utterance admissible under the res gestae rule), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1996We begin our analysis with a recognition of our previous acknowledgement that "[t]he former res gestae exception to the hearsay rule is not included in the new evidence code." State v. Johnson, 382 So.2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). 1996As we further noted in Johnson , however, "[u]nder the new code, the res gestae rule has been broken down into its various components." Id. | 1 | 3 |
Monarca v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Jano v. State, 510 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (exceptions under sections 90.803(1) (spontaneous statement) and 90.803(2) (excited utterance), Florida Statutes (1979), encompass evidence frequently considered under what was referred to as the res gestae exception prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code), approved, State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (excited utterance exception not new theory of Florida evidence but one of a group of exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (general phi 1992The deceased victim’s statement to the police officer did not qualify for admission into evidence under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule but it was properly admitted under the res gestae exception to hearsay rule as explained in Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). | 1 | 2 |
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986); Hack v. State, 596 So.2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Davis v. State, 582 So.2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [9] As noted in Corpus Juris Secundum, "[s]uicide was a felony at common law, punishable by forfeiture of the goods and chattels of the offender, and the ignominious burial of his body in the highway." 83 C.J.S. 1992Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.) (officer who responded to crime was properly permitted to testify regarding what victim told him when he asked what happened, as a contemporaneous utterance admissible under the res gestae rule), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
Garcia v. Floridagreen2 sentences1992Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.) (officer who responded to crime was properly permitted to testify regarding what victim told him when he asked what happened, as a contemporaneous utterance admissible under the res gestae rule), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). 1992Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.) (officer who responded to crime was properly permitted to testify regarding what victim told him when he asked what happened, as a contemporaneous utterance admissible under the res gestae rule), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
Tampa Electric Company v. Getrostgreen2 sentences2008In Tampa Electric Co. v. Getrost, 151 Fla. 558 , 10 So.2d 83 (1942), an assistant to an electric lineman was permitted to testify that the lineman told him that he had called the plant and ordered the power in the line cut off. 2008At the time it was uttered there was no occasion for it to have resulted from reflection or premeditation, nor was there motive to make it self-serving." Id. at 85. [12] Nevertheless, Wigmore's theory requiring a startling event in order for the res gestae exception to be invoked was more often referenced in Florida's case law before the adoption of the evidence code. | 1 | 1 |
Jefferson v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Construing the felony murder statute, Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132, 136 (Fla. *1069 1961), focused on whether the killing was "part of the same transaction as the felony." The supreme court quoted the res gestae rule from a learned treatise: Whether the felony was technically completed, is not of itself sufficient to take the case out of the category of felony murders. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Janogreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Jano v. State, 510 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (exceptions under sections 90.803(1) (spontaneous statement) and 90.803(2) (excited utterance), Florida Statutes (1979), encompass evidence frequently considered under what was referred to as the res gestae exception prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code), approved, State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (excited utterance exception not new theory of Florida evidence but one of a group of exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (general phi | 1 | 1 |
Bryan v. Stategreen1 sentence1996Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441 (Fla.1993). [6] As noted in In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1979), the Code took effect July 1, 1979. [7] See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 , 109 S.Ct. 1765 , 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). [8] We note in passing that even after the enactment of the Florida Evidence Code, the res gestae rule has been used as an independent basis for justifying the admission of statements of both victims and defendants. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986); Hack v. State, 596 So.2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Davis v. State, 582 So.2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [9] As noted in Corpus Juris Secundum, "[s]uicide was a felony at common law, punishable by forfeiture of the goods and chattels of the offender, and the ignominious burial of his body in the highway." 83 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
Alexander v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Jano v. State, 510 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (exceptions under sections 90.803(1) (spontaneous statement) and 90.803(2) (excited utterance), Florida Statutes (1979), encompass evidence frequently considered under what was referred to as the res gestae exception prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code), approved, State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (excited utterance exception not new theory of Florida evidence but one of a group of exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (general phi | 1 | 1 |
Jano v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See, e.g., Jano v. State, 510 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (exceptions under sections 90.803(1) (spontaneous statement) and 90.803(2) (excited utterance), Florida Statutes (1979), encompass evidence frequently considered under what was referred to as the res gestae exception prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code), approved, State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (excited utterance exception not new theory of Florida evidence but one of a group of exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (general phi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carver v. State
green
2 sentences1987In Carver v. State, 344 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert denied, 352 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1977), the Court presented the standard for determining whether a statement is part of the res gestae exception: The term “res gestae” comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design and in the formulation of content. ... 1987In Carver v. State, 344 So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 352 So.2d 174 (Fla. 1977), the court presented the standard for determining whether a statement is part of the res gestae exception: The term "res gestae" comprehends a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made under such circumstances as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of content. | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Hutchinson v. State
red
2 sentences2008In Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943 (Fla.2004), this Court stated that both the spontaneous statement and the excited utterance exception "require the declarant to be laboring under the influence of a starling event at the time that the statement is made." Id. at 951 . 2008In Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943 (Fla.2004), this Court stated that both the spontaneous statement and the excited utterance exception "require the declarant to be laboring under the influence of a starling event at the time that the statement is made." Id. at 951 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Matot
green
1 sentence2001One commentator has recognized that there was no way that the scope of the res gestae rule could be defined with precision: Although the vagaries in the use of the term "res gestae" have been frequently criticized, as in United States v. Matot , [5] [ 146 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.1944)], there seems to be little indication that its meaning will be clarified in the future, no doubt because of the academic character of the problem, and also because of the weight and influence of prior decisions. 2 CHARLES E. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Burks v. State
green
1 sentence1996Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441 (Fla.1993). [6] As noted in In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1979), the Code took effect July 1, 1979. [7] See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 , 109 S.Ct. 1765 , 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). [8] We note in passing that even after the enactment of the Florida Evidence Code, the res gestae rule has been used as an independent basis for justifying the admission of statements of both victims and defendants. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Florida Evidence Code
green
1 sentence1996Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441 (Fla.1993). [6] As noted in In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1979), the Code took effect July 1, 1979. [7] See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 , 109 S.Ct. 1765 , 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). [8] We note in passing that even after the enactment of the Florida Evidence Code, the res gestae rule has been used as an independent basis for justifying the admission of statements of both victims and defendants. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Hollinger
green
1 sentence1996See Garcia v. State, 492 So.2d 360, 365 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1022 , 107 S.Ct. 680 , 93 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986); Hack v. State, 596 So.2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Davis v. State, 582 So.2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). [9] As noted in Corpus Juris Secundum, "[s]uicide was a felony at common law, punishable by forfeiture of the goods and chattels of the offender, and the ignominious burial of his body in the highway." 83 C.J.S. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Stiles v. State
green
1 sentence1996See, e.g., Jano v. State, 510 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (exceptions under sections 90.803(1) (spontaneous statement) and 90.803(2) (excited utterance), Florida Statutes (1979), encompass evidence frequently considered under what was referred to as the res gestae exception prior to the adoption of the Florida Evidence Code), approved, State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (excited utterance exception not new theory of Florida evidence but one of a group of exceptions subsumed under the old term of res gestae); Monarca v. State, 412 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (general phi | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Roan Eagle v. United States
green
1 sentence1996Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441 (Fla.1993). [6] As noted in In re Florida Evidence Code, 376 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1979), the Code took effect July 1, 1979. [7] See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028 , 109 S.Ct. 1765 , 104 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). [8] We note in passing that even after the enactment of the Florida Evidence Code, the res gestae rule has been used as an independent basis for justifying the admission of statements of both victims and defendants. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence1986State v. Williams, 198 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1967). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Custer v. State
green
1 sentence1977It is even more objectionable because the mother relates not merely what her daughter said but from what was told her she drew her own inference and conclusion. .. . 34 So.2d at 112 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Ellis v. State
green
1 sentence1977The applicable law is set out in Ellis v. State, 25 Fla. 702 , 6 So. 768 , 770 (1889): The female outraged should seek the first opportunity to complain, and the fact that she does complain goes to the jury as evidence, but her detailed statement of the circumstances under which she was outraged cannot be given in evidence on the trial of the case by the party to whom she made the statement. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Lawrence v. State
green
1 sentence1975Lawrence v. State, 294 So.2d 371 (Fla.App. 1974); See: Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, § 297. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Washington v. State
green
1 sentence1970In the absence of such showing, the questions objected to cannot be held to relate to declarations which were produced by the occurrences to which they relate, but, rather, that they relate to a retrospective narration of them, and they were therefore properly excluded." (Emphasis added.) The difficulty inherent in determining whether a statement comes within the res gestae rule is alluded to in Washington v. State, 1923, 86 Fla. 533 , 98 So. 606 , wherein the court stated: "Immediately after the shooting the deceased proceeded to the home of Lillie Walker, about 70 to 100 yards distant; on ap | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Goff v. State
green
2 sentences1967For the same general rule regarding declarations as a part of the res gestae and regarding the role of the trial court in determining *23 admissibility see Goff v. State (1918), 75 Fla. 87 , 77 So. 877 . [Despite comment to the contrary it appears to us, as it did to the trial court, that the offenses here were related and the occurrences were part of the res gestae. 1967For the same general rule regarding declarations as a part of the res gestae and regarding the role of the trial court in determining *23 admissibility see Goff v. State (1918), 75 Fla. 87 , 77 So. 877 . [Despite comment to the contrary it appears to us, as it did to the trial court, that the offenses here were related and the occurrences were part of the res gestae. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Washington v. State
green
1 sentence1967"Each case must depend upon its own facts and circumstances in the application of the res gestae rule, and the duty is imposed upon the trial court to exercise sound judicial discretion in determining whether or not the facts and circumstances bring the offered evidence with that rule." Washington et al. v. State (Fla.App. 1960), 118 So.2d 650 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Green v. State green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| State v. Walker green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State v. Dale
neutral
2 sentences1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in 1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Garcia v. State
green
2 sentences1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in 1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Collins v. State
neutral
2 sentences1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in 1966And our own Florida Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Ellis, in Green v. State, 93 Fla. 1076 , 113 So. 121 , refers deprecatingly to res gestae as "whatever may be meant by that term, invented, so it has been said, because of its convenient ambiguity a sort of `catch all' in which to save a point when it may not be clearly brought under some better and more clearly defined head." The res gestae rule was originally evolved, no doubt, in good faith and for a salutary purpose; being confined to things done and statements made, in fact spontaneous, so as to be, in truth as well as in | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.