68 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1926–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lanegreen2 sentences2025The res gestae doctrine recognizes evidence may be admissible if it aids in “ ‘complet[ing] the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’ ” State v. Lane, 125 Wn.2d 825, 831 , 889 P.2d 929 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Tharp, 27 7 No. 85622-7-I/8 Wn. 2025The res gestae doctrine recognizes evidence may be admissible if it aids in “ ‘complet[ing] the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’ ” State v. Lane, 125 Wn.2d 825, 831 , 889 P.2d 929 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Tharp, 27 7 No. 85622-7-I/8 Wn. | 4 | 11 |
Beck v. Dyegreen2 sentences2009Beck, 200 Wash. at 9-10 , 92 P.2d 1113 . ¶ 28 Pugh contends, however, that the excited utterance exception did not come into existence until too long after the constitution was adopted for it to have been within the contemplation of the framers, and that it is so different from the res gestae exception that the fact the res gestae exception was recognized early on is not sufficient to demonstrate that excited utterances would have been admitted despite the state confrontation clause. 2009Beck, 200 Wash. at 9-10 . ¶28 Pugh contends, however, that the excited utterance exception did not come into existence until too long after the constitution was adopted for it to have been within the contemplation of the framers, and that it is so different from the res gestae exception that the fact the res gestae exception was recognized early on is not sufficient to demonstrate that excited utterances would have been admitted despite the state confrontation clause. | 3 | 19 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2026Evidence may be considered under the res gestae doctrine if it “complete[s] the story of the crime by establishing the immediate time and place of its occurrence.” Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 571 . 2025In State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 574 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997), the court admitted a rape victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault to rebut a defendant’s claims that a sexual assault of another victim was consensual where the two assaults were “markedly similar.” In State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 594 , 637 P.2d 961 (1981), the court admitted under the res gestae doctrine evidence of “uncharged crimes” in an “unbroken sequence of incidents . . . all of which were necessary to be placed before the jury in order that it have the entire story of what transpired on that particular evening.” The co | 3 | 15 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2025See State v. Garcia, 177 Wn. 2025See State v. Garcia, 177 Wn. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Pughgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Pugh, 167 Wn.2d 825 , 837–38, 839–40, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) (noting that the res gestae doctrine evolved into several common law hearsay exceptions and requires the declarant to have observed or participated in the event). 28 No. 82049-4-I/29 But any error in admitting Nephew’s statement on the 911 call was harmless. 2012The court concluded that — because the statements made during the 911 call fell within the res gestae doctrine — such statements “simply do not implicate the right to confrontation under article I, section 22.” Pugh, 167 Wn.2d at 843 . ¶72 O’Cain contends that a similar analysis is required in this case and that, because statements for purposes of medical diagnosis would not have been admissible as substantive evidence at the time our state constitution was adopted, article I, section 22 precludes the admission of such unconfronted statements today. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Griergreen2 sentences2016See Grier, 168 Wn. 2012App. 635, 645 , 278 P.3d 225 (2012), which departs “from characterizing this ‘res gestae’ evidence as an exception to ER 404(b).” Such a distinction, in our view, is necessary because as other courts and commentators have noted, “characterizing the res gestae rule as an exception to ER 404(b) is indefinite, is prone to abuse, and ‘tends merely to obscure’ ER 404(b) analysis.” Grier, 168 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Herman v. Krezdorngreen2 sentences2012App. at 645 n.19 (quoting United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir. 1981)). ¶36 This case illustrates the evils of conflating res gestae evidence with ER 404(b) evidence. 2012United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1332 (5th Cir.1981); see also United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928-29 (D.C.Cir.2000); 1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 218, at 1888 (Tillers rev. 1983); E. | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Owengreen2 sentences2009Id.; see, e.g., State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 307 , 136 P. 137 (1913) (it was proper to permit the mother to testify that the complaint was made by her very young daughter, but error to permit her to repeat the child's statements, "there being no contention that the" child's statements "were any part of the res gestae"). 2009Id.; see, e.g., State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 307 , 136 P. 137 (1913) (it was proper to permit the mother to testify that the complaint was made by her very young daughter, but error to permit her to repeat the child’s statements, “there being no contention that the” child’s statements “were any part of the res gestae”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Freidrichgreen2 sentences2009See also State v. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204, 214 , 29 P. 1055 (1892) (referring to res gestae as a general rule of evidence). 2009See also State v. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204, 214 , 29 P. 1055 (1892) (referring to res gestae as a general rule of evidence). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Beaudingreen2 sentences2009Id.; see, e.g., State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 307 , 136 P. 137 (1913) (it was proper to permit the mother to testify that the complaint was made by her very young daughter, but error to permit her to repeat the child's statements, "there being no contention that the" child's statements "were any part of the res gestae"). 2009Id.; see, e.g., State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 307 , 136 P. 137 (1913) (it was proper to permit the mother to testify that the complaint was made by her very young daughter, but error to permit her to repeat the child’s statements, “there being no contention that the” child’s statements “were any part of the res gestae”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2025In State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 574 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997), the court admitted a rape victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault to rebut a defendant’s claims that a sexual assault of another victim was consensual where the two assaults were “markedly similar.” In State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 594 , 637 P.2d 961 (1981), the court admitted under the res gestae doctrine evidence of “uncharged crimes” in an “unbroken sequence of incidents . . . all of which were necessary to be placed before the jury in order that it have the entire story of what transpired on that particular evening.” The co 2025In State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 574 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997), the court admitted a rape victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault to rebut a defendant’s claims that a sexual assault of another victim was consensual where the two assaults were “markedly similar.” In State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 594 , 637 P.2d 961 (1981), the court admitted under the res gestae doctrine evidence of “uncharged crimes” in an “unbroken sequence of incidents . . . all of which were necessary to be placed before the jury in order that it have the entire story of what transpired on that particular evening.” The co | 1 | 11 |
State v. Tharpgreen2 sentences2025In State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 574 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997), the court admitted a rape victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault to rebut a defendant’s claims that a sexual assault of another victim was consensual where the two assaults were “markedly similar.” In State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 594 , 637 P.2d 961 (1981), the court admitted under the res gestae doctrine evidence of “uncharged crimes” in an “unbroken sequence of incidents . . . all of which were necessary to be placed before the jury in order that it have the entire story of what transpired on that particular evening.” The co 2025In State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 574 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997), the court admitted a rape victim’s testimony regarding a sexual assault to rebut a defendant’s claims that a sexual assault of another victim was consensual where the two assaults were “markedly similar.” In State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 594 , 637 P.2d 961 (1981), the court admitted under the res gestae doctrine evidence of “uncharged crimes” in an “unbroken sequence of incidents . . . all of which were necessary to be placed before the jury in order that it have the entire story of what transpired on that particular evening.” The co | 1 | 10 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2012Division One held that this testimony was (1) " relevant under the res gestae exception, because this conduct took place in between the time Thompson [acted aggressively and threateningly] and the time of the shootings"; and (2) admissible because it provided a more complete factual context of the crime. [28] Thompson, 47 Wash.App. at 12 , 733 P.2d 584 (emphasis added). *232 ¶ 24 Similarly, testimony about Grier's brandishing a gun and acting belligerently before the shooting was admissible because it was relevant and it showed a continuing course of action by Grier. 2012Division One held that this testimony was (1) " relevant under the res gestae exception, because this conduct took place in between the time Thompson [acted aggressively and threateningly] and the time of the shootings"; and (2) admissible because it provided a more complete factual context of the crime. [28] Thompson, 47 Wash.App. at 12 , 733 P.2d 584 (emphasis added). *232 ¶ 24 Similarly, testimony about Grier's brandishing a gun and acting belligerently before the shooting was admissible because it was relevant and it showed a continuing course of action by Grier. | 1 | 3 |
Johnston v. Ohlsgreen2 sentences1979The elements of the exception are set out in Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398, 405 , 457 P.2d 194 (1969). 1979The elements of the exception are set out in Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398, 405 , 457 P.2d 194 (1969). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Pughgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Pugh, 167 Wn.2d 825 , 837–38, 839–40, 225 P.3d 892 (2009) (noting that the res gestae doctrine evolved into several common law hearsay exceptions and requires the declarant to have observed or participated in the event). 28 No. 82049-4-I/29 But any error in admitting Nephew’s statement on the 911 call was harmless. 2019State v. Pugh, 167 Wn.2d 825, 837 , 225 P.3d 892 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 10-11 , 92 P.2d 1113 (1939)). | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Bowie, Juangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olivencia Velázquez v. Registrar of Property of San Germángreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newman v. Buzardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fishgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hutchisongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Tharp
green
2 sentences2006Contrary to Warren's argument, the res gestae exception includes admission of prior bad acts when necessary to "complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place." Tharp, 27 Wash.App. at 204, 616 P.2d 693 ; see also State v. Fish, 99 Wash. App. 86 , 94 992 P.2d 505 (1999). ¶ 39 Like other ER 404(b) evidence, such evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than showing propensity, and it must not be unduly prejudicial. 2006Contrary to Warren’s argument, the res gestae exception includes admission of prior bad acts when necessary to “ ‘complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’ ” State v. Tharp, 27 Wn. | 6 | 1995–2025 |
State v. Lillard
green
2 sentences2010Under the res gestae exception to ER 404(b), "evidence of other crimes or bad acts is admissible to complete the story of a crime or to provide the immediate context for events close in both time and place to the charged crime." Lillard, 122 Wash.App. at 432 , 93 P.3d 969 . 2010Under the res gestae exception to ER 404(b), “evidence of other crimes or bad acts is admissible to complete the story of a crime or to provide the immediate context for events close in both time and place to the charged crime.” Lillard, 122 Wn. | 3 | 2010–2016 |
State v. Aldrick
neutral
2 sentences2012Indeed, the court adhered to this approach in Pugh, explaining that “[t]he theory underlying admissibility of statements under the res gestae doctrine was that ‘[w]hat is said or done by participants under the immediate spur of a transaction becomes thus part of the transaction, because it is then the transaction that thus speaks.’ ” 167 Wn.2d at 837 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Aldrick, 97 Wash. 593, 596 , 166 P. 1130 (1917)). 2012Indeed, the court adhered to this approach in Pugh, explaining that “[t]he theory underlying admissibility of statements under the res gestae doctrine was that ‘[w]hat is said or done by participants under the immediate spur of a transaction becomes thus part of the transaction, because it is then the transaction that thus speaks.’ ” 167 Wn.2d at 837 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Aldrick, 97 Wash. 593, 596 , 166 P. 1130 (1917)). | 3 | 2009–2012 |
Walters v. Spokane International Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences2009This court upheld admission of the testimony under the res gestae exception, stating that “it is not always essential to . . . admissibility that the declarations and principal occurrence shall be identical in point of time” and explaining that exact concurrence of the statements or admissions and the principal act is not required “if they arise naturally therefrom, without evidence of premeditation, and directly tend to characterize or explain it.” Walters v. Spokane Int’l Ry., 58 Wash. 293, 297-98 , 108 P. 593 (1910). ¶31 Thus, the Washington court was more concerned with whether the rationa 2009This court upheld admission of the testimony under the res gestae exception, stating that “it is not always essential to . . . admissibility that the declarations and principal occurrence shall be identical in point of time” and explaining that exact concurrence of the statements or admissions and the principal act is not required “if they arise naturally therefrom, without evidence of premeditation, and directly tend to characterize or explain it.” Walters v. Spokane Int’l Ry., 58 Wash. 293, 297-98 , 108 P. 593 (1910). ¶31 Thus, the Washington court was more concerned with whether the rationa | 3 | 1975–2009 |
Robbins v. Greene
green
2 sentences1975Robbins v. Greene, 43 Wn.2d 315, 321 , 261 P.2d 83 (1953), explains: The so-called res gestae rule is applied with respect to the admission of testimony concerning statements made by participants in a transaction or by other persons present thereat. 1975Robbins v. Greene, 43 Wn.2d 315, 321 , 261 P.2d 83 (1953), explains: The so-called res gestae rule is applied with respect to the admission of testimony concerning statements made by participants in a transaction or by other persons present thereat. | 3 | 1954–1975 |
May v. Wright
green
2 sentences1970Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 9-10 , 92 P.2d 1113 , 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939); Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398 , 457 P.2d 194 (1969); May v. Wright, 62 Wn.2d 69 , 381 P.2d 601 (1963); Robbins v. Greene, 43 Wn.2d 315 , 261 P.2d 83 (1953). 1970Beck v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 9-10 , 92 P.2d 1113 , 127 A.L.R. 1022 (1939); Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wn.2d 398 , 457 P.2d 194 (1969); May v. Wright, 62 Wn.2d 69 , 381 P.2d 601 (1963); Robbins v. Greene, 43 Wn.2d 315 , 261 P.2d 83 (1953). | 3 | 1969–1970 |
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences2026Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 263 . 1998Powell, 126 Wn.2d at 264 . | 2 | 1998–2026 |
State v. Dixon
green
2 sentences2009The difference, he maintains, is that the "res gestae" exception is more restrictive than the excited utterance exception because excited utterances do not have to be contemporaneous with the event, citing State v. Dixon, 37 Wash.App. 867, 873 , 684 P.2d 725 (1984). ¶ 29 The res gestae doctrine evolved into several present day hearsay exceptions, usually identified as the present sense impression, the excited utterance, and statements of present bodily condition, mental states, and emotions. 2 KENNETH S. BROUN, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 268, at 245-46 (6th ed.2006). 2009App. 867, 873 , 684 P.2d 725 (1984), is that the “res gestae” exception is more restrictive than the excited utterance exception because excited utterances do not have to be contemporaneous with the event. ¶29 The res gestae doctrine evolved into several present day hearsay exceptions, usually identified as the present sense impression, the excited utterance, and statements of present bodily condition, mental states, and emotions. 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 268, at 245-46 (6th ed. 2006). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Labbee
neutral
2 sentences2009In State v. Labbee, 134 Wash. 55, 58 , 234 P. 1049 (1925), the court concluded that a statement made by the declarant within 15 to 20 minutes after the event, even though in response to a question, was spontaneous and instinctive, and “was clearly a part of the res gestae.” ¶33 Mr. Pugh maintains that at the time the state constitution was adopted, the res gestae doctrine was not recognized by this court, although by 1917 it was recognized by the court. 2009In State v. Labbee, 134 Wash. 55, 58 , 234 P. 1049 (1925), the court concluded that a statement made by the declarant within 15 to 20 minutes after the event, even though in response to a question, was spontaneous and instinctive, and “was clearly a part of the res gestae.” ¶33 Mr. Pugh maintains that at the time the state constitution was adopted, the res gestae doctrine was not recognized by this court, although by 1917 it was recognized by the court. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Lucchesi v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences2009In Labbee , the court supported its ruling that statements were admissible as res gestae in part by citing Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352 , 216 P. 12 (1923). 2009In Labbee , the court supported its ruling that statements were admissible as res gestae in part by citing Lucchesi v. Reynolds, 125 Wash. 352 , 216 P. 12 (1923). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Smith
neutral
2 sentences2009Greenleaf's evidence treatise summarizes two main inquiries under the doctrine: "whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character." GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 108, at 144-45. [7] ¶ 27 The res gestae doctrine was applied in State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 (1901), where statements of a robbery victim made almost immediately after the robbery were admissible as res gestae. 2009Greenleaf’s evidence treatise summarizes two main inquiries under the doctrine: “whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character.” Greenleaf on Evidence, supra, § 108, at 144-45. 7 ¶27 The res gestae doctrine was applied in State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 (1901), where statements of a robbery victim made almost immediately after the robbery were admissible as res gestae. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Bausman v. Cameron
neutral
2 sentences2009Greenleaf's evidence treatise summarizes two main inquiries under the doctrine: "whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character." GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 108, at 144-45. [7] ¶ 27 The res gestae doctrine was applied in State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 (1901), where statements of a robbery victim made almost immediately after the robbery were admissible as res gestae. 2009Greenleaf’s evidence treatise summarizes two main inquiries under the doctrine: “whether the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected with it as to illustrate its character.” Greenleaf on Evidence, supra, § 108, at 144-45. 7 ¶27 The res gestae doctrine was applied in State v. Smith, 26 Wash. 354 , 67 P. 70 (1901), where statements of a robbery victim made almost immediately after the robbery were admissible as res gestae. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Holcomb
green
2 sentences2009State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 656 , 132 P. 416 (1913). ¶35 As a separate matter, a rape victim’s statements giving additional detail might be admissible if they were made immediately after the crime and fell within the res gestae exception. 2009State v. Holcomb, 73 Wash. 652, 656 , 132 P. 416 (1913). ¶35 As a separate matter, a rape victim’s statements giving additional detail might be admissible if they were made immediately after the crime and fell within the res gestae exception. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Elmore
green
2 sentences2004Acosta argues that State v. Elmore should inform our decision. 139 Wash.2d 250 , 985 *513 P.2d 289 (1999). 2004Acosta argues that State v. Elmore should inform our decision. 139 Wn.2d 250 , 985 P.2d 289 (1999). | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Barragan
green
2 sentences2003Although the court did not fully articulate the prejudicial value against its probative value on the record, the record provides adequate reasoning. 8 State v. Barragan, 102 Wn. 2003Although the court did not fully articulate the prejudicial value against its probative value on the record, the record provides adequate reasoning. [8] State v. Barragan, 102 Wash.App. 754, 759 , 9 P.3d 942 (2000); State v. Carleton, 82 Wash.App. 680, 685 , 919 P.2d 128 (1996) (if record reflects that the trial court adopted the express argument of one of the parties as to the relative weight of probative value and prejudice, there is no error). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| McCandless v. INLAND NW FILM SER., INC. green | 2 | 1966–1969 |
| State v. Crossguns green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Markle green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Barriga Figueroa v. Prieto Mariscal green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Filitaula green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Schaffer green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Hughes procedural | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Trickler neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Grier neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Trickler green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Hughes green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Boot green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Lillard green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Rosa v. Hernández neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People ex rel. Salgado v. López neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. López Bros. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Wethered green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Douthitt v. MacCulsky green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Mullen v. Sackett neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Coey v. Darknell neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Dolan v. Scott neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Richmond v. Morford neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sayward v. Gardner neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Eddon green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Elmore green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.