Moreno motion in Texas

2015Given that determina- Presbyterian is vicariously liable for the doctors' tion, we do not address whether the court of appeals negligence. 401 S.W.3d 163 .

2013The court of appeals affirmed as to the adequacy of the reports regarding Moreno’s claim that Presbyterian is vicariously liable for the doctors’ negligence. 401 S.W.3d 163 .

2022The State argues that it “accounted for this delay by citing limited time and resources,” but overcrowded courts and dockets are not a valid reason for a delay and should be counted against the State because the “ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.” See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 ; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890 ; see also Barker, 407 U.S at 538 (White, J., concurring) (observing that “unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State’s cr

2022The State argues that it “accounted for this delay by citing limited time and resources,” but overcrowded courts and dockets are not a valid reason for a delay and should be counted against the State because the “ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.” See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 ; Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890 ; see also Barker, 407 U.S at 538 (White, J., concurring) (observing that “unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State’s cr

2020Indeed, that Angeles had to add information to the affidavit before Judge Wahlberg would sign the warrant supports our conclusions that a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause was supplied by the resulting affidavit and that Angeles relied on the warrant in good faith. 9 Massi, 761 F.3d at 528 (quoting McClintock, 541 S.W.3d at 71 ). 6 Because we find Angeles relied in good faith on the warrant, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Moreno’s motion to suppress.

2020Indeed, that Angeles had to add information to the affidavit before Judge Wahlberg would sign the warrant supports our conclusions that a reasonable officer would have believed that probable cause was supplied by the resulting affidavit and that Angeles relied on the warrant in good faith. 9 Massi, 761 F.3d at 528 (quoting McClintock, 541 S.W.3d at 71 ). 6 Because we find Angeles relied in good faith on the warrant, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Moreno’s motion to suppress.

2016Id. at 522 .

2015Id., at 431 . -8- PRAYER Because Polly is clearly entitled to the 10-year plea offer lost as a result of Aguilar's ineffective assistance of counsel, because this Court either overlooked Claim One of the initial .application, or unreasonably applied the Strickland standard to Claim One, Polly respectfully prays the Court will find he meets each of the four Moreno factors, and grant him reconsider ation of his initial Claim One on the Court's own motion pursuant to Rule 79.2(d), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2015Id., at 431 . -8- PRAYER Because Polly is clearly entitled to the 10-year plea offer lost as a result of Aguilar's ineffective assistance of counsel, because this Court either overlooked Claim One of the initial .application, or unreasonably applied the Strickland standard to Claim One, Polly respectfully prays the Court will find he meets each of the four Moreno factors, and grant him reconsider ation of his initial Claim One on the Court's own motion pursuant to Rule 79.2(d), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2009Your motion’s granted.” After the judge granted the motion, the prosecutor said, “But, Your Honor, have we – – we have met elements of the offense.” The judge responded, “I don’t think you did.” A few days later, the judge signed an order granting Moreno’s motion for “a Directed Verdict.” The judge granted the motion “after due consideration of said motion, having heard all of the evidence and arguments of counsel,” and then the judge “dismissed [the cause] with Prejudice.” The State appealed the trial judge’s order to the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals.2 The State argued that the judge could

2007See Renteria , 206 S.W.3d at 699; Vasquez , 67 S.W.3d at 240 ; Heiselbetz , 906 S.W.2d at 512.

1992The Texas Supreme Court recently construed that this statute does not contradict State or public policy by prescribing a definite one-year limitations period for bringing forth proof of an actual informal marriage in Mossier v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1991).

1992The Texas Supreme Court recently construed that this statute does not contradict State or public policy by prescribing a definite one-year limitations period for bringing forth proof of an actual informal marriage in Mossier v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1991).

1986Under article 36.09, severance is not a matter of right, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, Sonderup v. State, 418 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.Crim.App.1967), unless one defendant has no prior admissible convictions, and a co-defendant has one or more prior admissible convictions.

1978Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Heard & Jones Drug Stores, Inc., 446 S.W.2d 911 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1969, no writ).