proportionate reduction clause in Texas

1962The overriding royalty is, withal, ‘royalty’, State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509 , 143 S.W.2d 757 , and Griffith v. Taylor, [156] Tex. [1], 291 S.W.2d 673 , and in the absence of the words ‘without reduction’ the proportionate reduction clause would require its reduction to a Jio2nd of production.” Apparently Newport and Delta were mutually mistaken as to the legal effect of the overriding royalty provision of the oil and gas lease.

1962The overriding royalty is, withal, ‘royalty’, State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509 , 143 S.W.2d 757 , and Griffith v. Taylor, [156] Tex. [1], 291 S.W.2d 673 , and in the absence of the words ‘without reduction’ the proportionate reduction clause would require its reduction to a Jio2nd of production.” Apparently Newport and Delta were mutually mistaken as to the legal effect of the overriding royalty provision of the oil and gas lease.

1962The overriding royalty is, withal, ‘royalty’, State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Tex. 509 , 143 S.W.2d 757 , and Griffith v. Taylor, [156] Tex. [1], 291 S.W.2d 673 , and in the absence of the words ‘without reduction’ the proportionate reduction clause would require its reduction to a Jio2nd of production.” Apparently Newport and Delta were mutually mistaken as to the legal effect of the overriding royalty provision of the oil and gas lease.

1957The overriding royalty is, withal, “royalty,” State National Bank of Corpus Christi v. Morgan, 135 Texas 509 , 143 S.W. 2d 757 , and Griffith v. Taylor, 156 Texas 1 , 291 S.W. 2d 673 , and in the absence of the words “without reduction” the proportionate reduction clause would require its reduction to a l/192nd of production.

1956We cannot conceive how parties could draw a lease which would provide for ⅛⅛ of the oil and gas produced from a tract of land in any clearer language than was here used. • Respondents contend that the fact that the proportionate reduction clause was stricken from the lease cannot be considered in construing the meaning of the royalty reservation of “Ysth of that produced and saved from said land.”<£As early as 1866, this Court, in the case of Self v. King, 28 Tex. 552, 554 , said: ‡ The Court may • read a ■•written document in the light of surrounding circumstances, which can be proved, in ord

1956Respondents contend that the fact that the proportionate reduction clause was stricken from the lease cannot be considered in construing the meaning of the royalty reservation of “l/8th of that produced and saved from said land.” As early as 1866, this Court, in the case of Self v. King, 28 Texas 552, 554 , said: “* * * The Court may read a written document in the light of surrounding circumstances, which can be proved, in order to arrive at the true meaning and intention of the parties as expressed in the words used, but will not hear parol evidence of language or words other than those used

2015“Where the meaning of the contract is plain and unambiguous, a party’s construction is immaterial.” Id. 6 In its appeal, Fort Apache has not raised an issue that asserts the trial court failed to apply a proportionate reduction clause, found in another part of the assignment, when it calculated the damages that resulted from Fort Apache’s breach.

2015Id. at 182 .

2015Id.

1976SW Title contends the proper method for submitting the measure of damages suffered by insured, who has sustained a partial rather than a total loss, is set out in Southern Title Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Sup., 1973).

1973In holding that this proportionate reduction clause applies to any defect in the insured ownership, whether it be because of a partial interest or because of an interest in partial acreage, we overrule Shaver v. National Title & Abstract Co., 361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1962), to the extent of the inconsistency.

1963In Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781 , the proportionate reduction clause was entirely deleted.

1963In Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289 , 294 S.W.2d 781 , the proportionate reduction clause was entirely deleted.

1962As pointed out by our Supreme Court in Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336 , 321 S.W.2d 62 , by Justice Walker, “Equity will grant relief by way of reformation if the circumstances otherwise warrant an exercise of its power. * * * Respondent is not entitled to equitable relief against a bona fide purchaser, however, and he has the burden of showing that petitioner does not enjoy that status.” Mize testified he had no figures showing the interest of Newport but that he was purchasing Delta’s entire interest under the Goldsmith lease; that before entering into this contract, he had no specific knowled

1962As pointed out by our Supreme Court in Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336 , 321 S.W.2d 62 , by Justice Walker, “Equity will grant relief by way of reformation if the circumstances otherwise warrant an exercise of its power. * * * Respondent is not entitled to equitable relief against a bona fide purchaser, however, and he has the burden of showing that petitioner does not enjoy that status.” Mize testified he had no figures showing the interest of Newport but that he was purchasing Delta’s entire interest under the Goldsmith lease; that before entering into this contract, he had no specific knowled

1956No-other words are to be added to or subtracted from the written instrument.” Again, in Ryan v. Kent, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 1007 (1, 2), 1010, Judge Leddy said that in -construing a contract a court may look to the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was entered into, the situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the instrument, regardless of whether the language used in the contract be ambiguous.

1956No other words are to be added to or subtracted from the written instrument." Again, in Ryan v. Kent, Tex.Com.App., 36 S.W.2d 1007 (1, 2), 1010, Judge Leddy said that in construing a contract a court may look to the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was entered into, the situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the instrument, regardless of whether the language used in the contract be ambiguous.

1955Since appellants have conceded, in oral argument before this Court, that they must rely on the proportionate reduction clause to prevent a breach of their warranty clause in the lease, which is correct as a matter of law, their theory advanced here subjects them to the rule decreed by the Supreme Court in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 .

1955Since appellants have conceded, in oral argument before this Court, that they must rely on the proportionate reduction clause to prevent a breach of their warranty clause in the lease, which is correct as a matter of law, their theory advanced here subjects them to the rule decreed by the Supreme Court in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Tex. 503 , 144 S.W.2d 878 .

1955App., 135 Tex. 509 , 143 S.W.2d 757, 761 , [5]; Patterson v. Texas Co.', 5 Cir. 131 F. 2d 998 , Syl. 1-5. ’’ The overriding royalty, as provided for in the clause' appellants prepared’ and attached to the lease, is in fact royalty and therefore is subject to the proportionate reduction clause in the lease as hereinabove quoted and discussed.