seems rule in Texas

1958This seems to be the rule in Texas as well: "'It is very generally held that a corpora- tion is an inhabitant of the state under whose law it is incorporated, and that it has a resi- n. ' 0 0 ." (Emphasis added) F'ittsburgWater Heater& v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417 , 282 S.W. 576 .

1958This seems to be the rule in Texas as well: "'It is very generally held that a corpora- tion is an inhabitant of the state under whose law it is incorporated, and that it has a resi- n. ' 0 0 ." (Emphasis added) F'ittsburgWater Heater& v. Sullivan, 115 Tex. 417 , 282 S.W. 576 .

1958This rule is restated in Nergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Herrmann, (Tex.Civ.App.) 211 S.W.2d 633 , but the distinction is made that to be such a resident, the corporation must actually be doing business in Texas.

1947Duncan v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 668 , 7 S.W.2d 78 .

1947Duncan v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 668 , 7 S.W.2d 78 .

1936This seems to be the rule laid down by this court in the case of Chambers v. State, 44 S. W., 495 ; Peddy v. State, 51 S. W. (2d) 331 ; McInnis v. State, 54 S. W. (2d) 96 .

1936Brown v. Clippinger, 113 Tex. 364 , 256 S.W. 254 .

1936Brown v. Clippinger, 113 Tex. 364 , 256 S.W. 254 .

1936This seems to be the rule laid down by this court in the case of Chambers v. State, 44 S. W., 495 ; Peddy v. State, 51 S. W. (2d) 331 ; McInnis v. State, 54 S. W. (2d) 96 .

1925This seems to be the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1 , 6 S. Ct. 242 , 29 L.

1925This seems to be the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1 , 6 S. Ct. 242 , 29 L.

1925Davidson and Thompson v. State, 40 Tex. Cr.

1920This seems to be the rule since Williford v. State, 38 Texas Crim.

1919Campbell v. Barrera, 32 S. W. 724 ; Mowry v. Norman (Mo. Sup.) 103 S. W. 15 ; Davis v. Calvert, 5 Gill & J.

1918Jones v. Shaw, 16 Tex. Civ.

1915It was first announced in Supreme Council, etc., v. Batte, 34 Tex. Civ.

1911Whatever benefits accrued or could have accrued to appellant by reason of its becoming Robinson’s surety were certainly not direct, but at most only indirect, or by way of reaction, as it were, and this seems to be the test of corporate powers as laid down by the Supreme Court, in Northside Railway Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562 , 30 S. W. 1055 , 53 Am.

1911Whatever benefits accrued or could have accrued to appellant by reason of its becoming Robinson’s surety were certainly not direct, but at most only indirect, or by way of reaction, as it were, and this seems to be the test of corporate powers as laid down by the Supreme Court, in Northside Railway Co. v. Worthington, 88 Tex. 562 , 30 S. W. 1055 , 53 Am.

1910In People v. Meyer, 75 Cal. 383 , this doctrine was 'announced and followed.

1907(Merle v. Andrews, 4 Texas, 200 .) The fact that the suit, in which said judgment was rendered, was retained upon the docket of the court for the purpose of carrying it into *610 effect and winding up the business of the receivership, does not materially affect the question.

1890White v. The State, 72 Ala., 195 .

1882Co., 63 N. Y., 556 , where it is said that this seems to be the rule even though the train has stopped, but started again before the passenger could alight.

1882Ibid.

1864In the case of Wells v. Moore ( 15 Tex., 521 ,) there was a special plea of non est factum, alleging an alteration of the bond upon which the suit was brought, and the court say that tlieburden of proving the alteration in the bond rested upon the party pleading it.