seems rule in Oklahoma

1939See, also, City of Norman v. Lewis, 180 Okla. 344 , 69 P. 2d 377 ; Robinson Oil Corporation v. Davis, 171 Okla. 557 , 43 P. 2d 754 , and Ponca City v. Swayne, 174 Okla. 576 , 50 P. 2d 1082 .

1939See, also, City of Norman v. Lewis, 180 Okla. 344 , 69 P. 2d 377 ; Robinson Oil Corporation v. Davis, 171 Okla. 557 , 43 P. 2d 754 , and Ponca City v. Swayne, 174 Okla. 576 , 50 P. 2d 1082 .

1939See, also, City of Norman v. Lewis, 180 Okla. 344 , 69 P. 2d 377 ; Robinson Oil Corporation v. Davis, 171 Okla. 557 , 43 P. 2d 754 , and Ponca City v. Swayne, 174 Okla. 576 , 50 P. 2d 1082 .

1939See, also, City of Norman v. Lewis, 180 Okla. 344 , 69 P. 2d 377 ; Robinson Oil Corporation v. Davis, 171 Okla. 557 , 43 P. 2d 754 , and Ponca City v. Swayne, 174 Okla. 576 , 50 P. 2d 1082 .

1939In her argument she cites a number of authorities to support her contention, but only one Oklahoma *173 authority, which is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Malone, 179 Okla. 449 , 66 P. 2d 5 ; this case holds in paragraph 1 of the syllabus as follows: “A view by the jury of property, the subject of the action, is discretionary with, the trial court, and his ruling thereon will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.” This seems to be the rule laid down by our court.

1939In her argument she cites a number of authorities to support her contention, but only one Oklahoma *173 authority, which is Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Malone, 179 Okla. 449 , 66 P. 2d 5 ; this case holds in paragraph 1 of the syllabus as follows: “A view by the jury of property, the subject of the action, is discretionary with, the trial court, and his ruling thereon will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.” This seems to be the rule laid down by our court.

1934In the ease of Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674 , 78 P. 118 , it is declared that: ‘‘A memorandum to be sufficient under the statute of frauds must be complete in itself and leave nothing to rest in parol.” This seems to be a doctrine pronounced and adhered to by this court without exception and by numerous decisions.

1934In the ease of Halsell v. Renfrow, 14 Okla. 674 , 78 P. 118 , it is declared that: ‘‘A memorandum to be sufficient under the statute of frauds must be complete in itself and leave nothing to rest in parol.” This seems to be a doctrine pronounced and adhered to by this court without exception and by numerous decisions.

1926Section 2, 29 Oyc. 1132, states the rule, under the head of “Novation,” as follows: “It is not essential that the assent to an acceptance of the terms of novation be shown by express words to that effect, but the same may be implied from_ the facts and circumstances attending the transaction, and the conduct of the parties thereafter.” This seems to be the rule adhered to in Jones v. Austin (Ind.) 59 N. E. 1082 ; Barnes v. Crockett. 111 Va. 240 , 68 S. E. 983 . 36 L.

1926Section 2, 29 Oyc. 1132, states the rule, under the head of “Novation,” as follows: “It is not essential that the assent to an acceptance of the terms of novation be shown by express words to that effect, but the same may be implied from_ the facts and circumstances attending the transaction, and the conduct of the parties thereafter.” This seems to be the rule adhered to in Jones v. Austin (Ind.) 59 N. E. 1082 ; Barnes v. Crockett. 111 Va. 240 , 68 S. E. 983 . 36 L.

1926Section 2, 29 Oyc. 1132, states the rule, under the head of “Novation,” as follows: “It is not essential that the assent to an acceptance of the terms of novation be shown by express words to that effect, but the same may be implied from_ the facts and circumstances attending the transaction, and the conduct of the parties thereafter.” This seems to be the rule adhered to in Jones v. Austin (Ind.) 59 N. E. 1082 ; Barnes v. Crockett. 111 Va. 240 , 68 S. E. 983 . 36 L.

1916A very thorough discussion of the subject is found in Meyer et al. v. Richards, 163 U. S. 385 , 16 Sup. Ct. 1148, 41 L.

1916A very thorough discussion of the subject is found in Meyer et al. v. Richards, 163 U. S. 385 , 16 Sup. Ct. 1148, 41 L.

1915We find it stated in 34 Cyc. 1567, as follows: *449 “Thus it is very generally held'that if the defendant seizes the property without a bona fide claim or right, in bad faith, or under circumstances of aggravation or outrage, this would furnish a case for the exercise of the discretion of the jury in the allowance of exemplary or punitive damages, as in the case of a willful or malicious trespass ; and, on the other hand, plaintiff is entitled to damages of this character where there have been peculiar circumstances of outrage, oppression, and wrong in the taking or detention of the property.”

1911Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Company, 35 Minn. 251 , 28 N W. 708; Summer v. Utley, 7 Conn. 257 ; Simons v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 189 , 60 N W. 476.

1911Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Company, 35 Minn. 251 , 28 N W. 708; Summer v. Utley, 7 Conn. 257 ; Simons v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 189 , 60 N W. 476.

1911Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Company, 35 Minn. 251 , 28 N W. 708; Summer v. Utley, 7 Conn. 257 ; Simons v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 189 , 60 N W. 476.

1910Elder v. Kutner, 97 Cal. 490 , 32 Pac. 563 .

1910Elder v. Kutner, 97 Cal. 490 , 32 Pac. 563 .

1910Schrader v. Wolflin, 21 Ind. 238 .