surrender clause in Texas

2018In Ridge Oil , we recognized that "[e]ven if an oil and gas lease does not contain a surrender clause, the parties may mutually agree to a release, or they effectively terminate their lease by signing a new one ." Ridge Oil , 148 S.W.3d at 152-53 (emphasis added) (citing Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ); Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ("We ... hold that, by signing a new lease with the intent to terminate a prior lease, a lessor waives strict compliance with a surrender clause and effectively terminates or releases the prior lease.").

2018In Ridge Oil , we recognized that "[e]ven if an oil and gas lease does not contain a surrender clause, the parties may mutually agree to a release, or they effectively terminate their lease by signing a new one ." Ridge Oil , 148 S.W.3d at 152-53 (emphasis added) (citing Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ); Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ("We ... hold that, by signing a new lease with the intent to terminate a prior lease, a lessor waives strict compliance with a surrender clause and effectively terminates or releases the prior lease.").

2026Id. at 154 (citing Matter of GHR Energy Corp., 972 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the lessee “was free to terminate the leasehold estate” and “cut off” the overriding royalties pursuant to the lease’s surrender clause, despite the fact that gas production never ceased)).

2018In Ridge Oil , we recognized that "[e]ven if an oil and gas lease does not contain a surrender clause, the parties may mutually agree to a release, or they effectively terminate their lease by signing a new one ." Ridge Oil , 148 S.W.3d at 152-53 (emphasis added) (citing Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ); Sasser , 906 S.W.2d at 603 ("We ... hold that, by signing a new lease with the intent to terminate a prior lease, a lessor waives strict compliance with a surrender clause and effectively terminates or releases the prior lease.").

2018Taylor v. Bonilla, 801 S.W.2d 553, 560 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, writ denied).

2018Taylor v. Bonilla, 801 S.W.2d 553, 560 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, writ denied).

2013The court further concluded that “merely because” the lease did not contain a surrender clause did not “mean that a fiduciary relationship exist[ed].” Id. at 126 .

2013See Exploration Co., 843 S.W.2d at 124, 126 .

2013The surrender clause provided that Sunac “would be under no obligation to keep the lease in force by payment of rentals, by drilling, or by development operations, and that assignee should have ‘the right to surrender any or all part of such leased acreage without the consent of assignor [Parkes].’ ” Id.

2013The surrender clause provided that Sunac “would be under no obligation to keep the lease in 29 force by payment of rentals, by drilling, or by development operations, and that assignee should have ‘the right to surrender any or all part of such leased acreage without the consent of assignor [Parkes].’” Id.

2026Id. at 154 (citing Matter of GHR Energy Corp., 972 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding the lessee “was free to terminate the leasehold estate” and “cut off” the overriding royalties pursuant to the lease’s surrender clause, despite the fact that gas production never ceased)).

2026The Court quoted the Fifth Circuit’s caveat stating: “We might well reach a different result if the facts here had suggested that [the lessee] surrendered its interest in the lease to destroy the rights of the overriding royalty interest owner.” Id. (citing GHR Energy, 979 F.2d at 41).

2026The Court quoted the Fifth Circuit’s caveat stating: “We might well reach a different result if the facts here had suggested that [the lessee] surrendered its interest in the lease to destroy the rights of the overriding royalty interest owner.” Id. (citing GHR Energy, 979 F.2d at 41).

2026Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Investments, Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 152 (Tex. 2004); see Holman v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (citing cases).

2018The Court held: “In exercising its Article I powers Congress may subject the States to private suits in their own courts only if there is ‘compelling evidence’ that the States were required to surrender this power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional design”; that is, there must be “compelling evidence” that “this derogation of the States’ sovereignty is ‘inherent in the constitutional compact.’” Id. at 731, 741 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991)).

2018XI, immunity from suit “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.” Alden, 527 U.S at 713.2 Thus, the States retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty” which includes immunity to non-consensual suits in its own courts “save where there has been ‘a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.’” Id. at 715, 730 (quoting Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 , 322–23 (1934)).

2000In Holguin v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 954 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1997, writ denied), this Court explained the effect of Section 1300g.

1995See Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.1966) (per curiam) (recognizing that lessor and lessee can effect limited release by “mutual agreement”).

1995See Shell Oil Co. v. Stansbury, 401 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 410 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.1966) (per curiam) (recognizing that lessor and lessee can effect limited release by “mutual agreement”).