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109 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jenkinsred2 sentences2002See, e.g., Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164 , 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 ; State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 453 , 700 N.E.2d 596 ; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 653 N.E.2d 253 ; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1 , 520 N.E.2d 568 , syllabus. 41 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY {¶168} At the mitigation hearing, Myers testified at length and subjected himself to cross-examination. 2002See, e.g., Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164 , 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 ; State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 453 , 700 N.E.2d 596 ; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 653 N.E.2d 253 ; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1 , 520 N.E.2d 568 , syllabus. 41 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY {¶168} At the mitigation hearing, Myers testified at length and subjected himself to cross-examination. | 3 | 4 |
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2020Timeliness of parole revocation hearing {¶19} With regard to the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing, Mr. Glover claims he is a member of the Kellogg v. Shoemaker class and therefore, he was entitled to a mitigation hearing that comports with due process requirements outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 2020Timeliness of parole revocation hearing {¶19} With regard to the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing, Mr. Glover claims he is a member of the Kellogg v. Shoemaker class and therefore, he was entitled to a mitigation hearing that comports with due process requirements outlined in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 2 | 6 |
Kellogg v. Shoemakergreen2 sentences2013The waiver of the right to a mitigation hearing shall be in writing and shall not be accepted by sentence imposed upon him by any court in Ohio for an offense he committed while on any release granted by the adult parole authority.” 8 the OPB Hearing Officer unless the class member has first been advised in writing (and orally if the class member is illiterate) of the rights set forth in Paragraph V(a) above.” Id. 2013According to the terms of the Decree, class members, such as McIntyre, have “[t]he right to a mitigation hearing to determine whether revocation of parole is appropriate,” “[t]he right to advance notice of the class member’s rights at the hearing,” and, “[w]here the class member alleges that there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult for the class member to develop or present, the right to be represented by the Ohio Public Defender or private counsel (at the member’s expense).” I | 2 | 5 |
State v. Penixgreen2 sentences1990Denson appealed, and this court, finding error in the sentencing proceedings, reversed the aggravated-murder conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty hearing where imposition of the death penalty would remain a possibility. 1 Upon review, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed with respect to the breadth of our remand order, and remanded the case to the trial court for the resentencing of Denson to life imprisonment on the aggravated-murder conviction pursuant to State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 . 2 *835 Prior to the resentencing hearing, Denson f 1990Denson appealed, and this court, finding error in the sentencing proceedings, reversed the aggravated-murder conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty hearing where imposition of the death penalty would remain a possibility. 1 Upon review, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed with respect to the breadth of our remand order, and remanded the case to the trial court for the resentencing of Denson to life imprisonment on the aggravated-murder conviction pursuant to State v. Penix (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 369 , 513 N.E.2d 744 . 2 *835 Prior to the resentencing hearing, Denson f | 2 | 4 |
Jells v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2018This constitutionally required background investigation is necessary to enable counsel to make strategic choices about presenting a mitigation defense. * * * Indeed, the deference owed to counsel’s strategic judgments about mitigation is directly 53 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO proportional to the adequacy of the investigations supporting such judgments. * * * Accordingly, when evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s mitigation strategy in a capital case, “a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy.” Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478 , 492 ( 2018This constitutionally required background investigation is necessary to enable counsel to make strategic choices about presenting a mitigation defense. * * * Indeed, the deference owed to counsel’s strategic judgments about mitigation is directly 53 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO proportional to the adequacy of the investigations supporting such judgments. * * * Accordingly, when evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s mitigation strategy in a capital case, “a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy.” Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478 , 492 ( | 2 | 3 |
State v. Johnsonred2 sentences2002See, also, State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344 , 662 N.E.2d 311 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87 , 24 OBR 282, 494 N.E.2d 1061 , syllabus, overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 ; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 40 , 752 N.E.2d 859 ; State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 442 , 751 N.E.2d 946 ; State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 422 , 739 N.E.2d 300 ; State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 361 , 738 N.E.2d 1208 ; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 495-496 , 2002See, also, State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344 , 662 N.E.2d 311 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Johnson (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 87 , 24 OBR 282, 494 N.E.2d 1061 , syllabus, overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 ; State v. Nields (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 6, 40 , 752 N.E.2d 859 ; State v. Jackson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 442 , 751 N.E.2d 946 ; State v. Jones (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 422 , 739 N.E.2d 300 ; State v. Green (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 352, 361 , 738 N.E.2d 1208 ; State v. Bey (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 495-496 , | 1 | 3 |
State v. Ahmedgreen2 sentences2008A mitigation hearing with respect to counts two and four was conducted on that date, and the jury, on November 20, 2006, recommended that two sentences of life imprisonment without parole be imposed on appellant. {¶ 90} On November 29, 2006, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, and on December 11, 2006, sentenced appellant to serve a term of life imprisonment without parole on count two, life imprisonment without parole on count four, ten years on count *Page 24 five, ten years on count six, ten years on count seven, and eight years on count nine, all sentences to run consecutively to ea 2006See Ahmed , 103 Ohio St.3d 27 . {¶ 25} In the meantime, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief in the trial court raising 17 causes of action. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Blackgreen2 sentences1978Moreover, in State v. Harris (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 351 , decided five days after State v. Black, supra, and before the mitigation hearing in the instant cause, this court was faced with an analogous situation. 1978Tompkins, a social worker with an extended professional association with appellant, when asked if he believed the crime to have been the product of appellant’s mental deficiency, replied: “I don’t think that I could say it would be a product of his mental deficiency as much as the way that his environment has had an influence upon his own behavior.” Nor, can we find in the record any implication that the trial court narrowly interpreted the mitigating circumstances in contravention of State v. Black (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 262 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Westgreen2 sentences2026See Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, at ¶ 17 (observing that “four justices determined in West that a plain-error analysis is still necessary when the party asserting a structural error did not object to that error in the trial court”), citing State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35 (lead opinion), and West at ¶ 38-41 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). 2026See Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, at ¶ 17 (observing that “four justices determined in West that a plain-error analysis is still necessary when the party asserting a structural error did not object to that error in the trial court”), citing State v. West, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶ 35 (lead opinion), and West at ¶ 38-41 (Donnelly, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bondgreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kirkland (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2026See State v. Kirkland, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 97 ; see also State v. Hale, 2008- Ohio-3426, ¶ 131-132 (improper questions of a mitigation-hearing witness were cured by the independent sentence evaluation). | 1 | 1 |
| Spellman v. Kirchnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Whitegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Densongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goodwin v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Buggs, 06 Ma 28 (6-22-2007)green | 1 | 1 |
| Sandoval v. Calderongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martin (Slip Opinion)green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Steffengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Salernogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Halegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Davisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Postred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Huntergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. DePew
green
2 sentences2026The State contends that Brinkman objected only to the admission of the photographs for the purpose of the mitigation hearing and that the State later withdrew the challenged autopsy photographs during the mitigation hearing. 47 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 129} At the mitigation stage of a capital proceeding, a prosecutor may introduce “‘any evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing.’” State v. DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d 275 (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting R.C. 2929.03(D)(1). 2022In DePew, we also observed that not only is repetition of trial-phase evidence for the mitigation hearing required by the statute but it is also logical given “the prosecution’s obligation to demonstrate, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation.” Id. at 283 . {¶ 143} Although exhibit No. 1433 does contain many irrelevant internet searches connected to McAlpin’s Google account, the majority of the irrelevant 45 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO material was noninflammatory, with | 7 | 1997–2026 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2013The second prong requires the appellant to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694 . {¶ 12} While Warren asserts that he would not have been sentenced to "such a long sentence" but for his counsel failing "to present a better mitigation hearing," the record indicates otherwise. 2001Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 , 104 S.Ct. at 2065 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 694 . {¶ 163} Counsel’s decision not to attempt to introduce defendant’s taped confession at the mitigation hearing was a tactical one. | 7 | 1986–2022 |
State v. Tyler
yellow
2 sentences1997State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24 , 553 N.E.2d 576 . {¶ 68} Appellant’s counsel had filed a list of many witnesses, which included several members of appellant’s family that they intended to call at the mitigation hearing. 1997State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24 , 553 N.E.2d 576 . {¶ 68} Appellant’s counsel had filed a list of many witnesses, which included several members of appellant’s family that they intended to call at the mitigation hearing. | 6 | 1997–2003 |
State v. Ashworth
green
2 sentences2013After a hearing pursuant to State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus, the trial judge determined that Roberts was competent to make that decision. {¶ 10} At the mitigation hearing, Roberts exercised her right under R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) to make an unsworn statement to the jury. 2013After a hearing pursuant to State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231 (1999), paragraph one of the syllabus, the trial judge determined that Roberts was competent to make that decision. {¶ 10} At the mitigation hearing, Roberts exercised her right under R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) to make an unsworn statement to the jury. | 5 | 2000–2019 |
State v. Downs
yellow
2 sentences1978The appellee erroneously states in its brief to this court the following: “It is important to note that in such a mitigation hearing it is the Defendant-Appellant who has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.” In State v. Downs (1977), 51 Ohio St. 2d 47 , this court stated that the mitigation hearing is not an adversary proceeding and neither party bears the burden of proof. 1978Under the doctrine espoused in State v. Downs, supra, we find no reversible error as to the trial court’s conducting of the mitigation hearing. | 5 | 1977–1978 |
Hurst v. Florida
green
2 sentences2017The judge’s recent jury ruling (¶ 13} The prosecutors also assert that in March 2017, Judge Collier-Williams issued an eleventh-hour decision assigning a jury to Foust’s mitigation hearing, purportedly based on Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). 2017The judge’s recent jury ruling (¶ 13} The prosecutors also assert that in March 2017, Judge Collier-Williams issued an eleventh-hour decision assigning a jury to Foust’s mitigation hearing, purportedly based on Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 616 , 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016). | 3 | 2017–2021 |
State v. Beeman
green
2 sentences2000The trial judge specifically asked appellant if that was accurate, and appellant replied, “Yes, it is, Your Honor.” On the second day of the mitigation hearing, the court informed the defense that it would not instruct the jury on residual doubt based on the decision in Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 56-57 , 656 N.E.2d at 632 . 2000The trial judge specifically asked appellant if that was accurate, and appellant replied, “Yes, it is, 12 January Term, 2000 Your Honor.” On the second day of the mitigation hearing, the court informed the defense that it would not instruct the jury on residual doubt based on the decision in Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 56-57 , 656 N.E.2d at 632 . {¶ 41} As we noted recently in State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 63 , 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1238 , even if the court attempted to require an attorney to present mitigating evidence, it cannot force an unwilling defendant to provide that evidence to | 3 | 2000–2016 |
State v. Garner
green
2 sentences2000The trial judge specifically asked appellant if that was accurate, and appellant replied, “Yes, it is, Your Honor.” On the second day of the mitigation hearing, the court informed the defense that it would not instruct the jury on residual doubt based on the decision in Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 56-57 , 656 N.E.2d at 632 . 2000The trial judge specifically asked appellant if that was accurate, and appellant replied, “Yes, it is, 12 January Term, 2000 Your Honor.” On the second day of the mitigation hearing, the court informed the defense that it would not instruct the jury on residual doubt based on the decision in Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d at 56-57 , 656 N.E.2d at 632 . {¶ 41} As we noted recently in State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 63 , 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1238 , even if the court attempted to require an attorney to present mitigating evidence, it cannot force an unwilling defendant to provide that evidence to | 3 | 2000–2016 |
State v. Gumm
green
2 sentences2002See, e.g., Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164 , 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 ; State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 453 , 700 N.E.2d 596 ; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 653 N.E.2d 253 ; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1 , 520 N.E.2d 568 , syllabus. 41 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY {¶168} At the mitigation hearing, Myers testified at length and subjected himself to cross-examination. 2002See, e.g., Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164 , 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264 ; State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 453 , 700 N.E.2d 596 ; Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239 , 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768 ; State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413 , 653 N.E.2d 253 ; State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1 , 520 N.E.2d 568 , syllabus. 41 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND PROPORTIONALITY {¶168} At the mitigation hearing, Myers testified at length and subjected himself to cross-examination. | 3 | 1998–2002 |
Foust v. Houk
green
2 sentences2018Foust v. Houk , 655 F.3d 524 (6th Cir.2011). 2017Id. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Cooey
yellow
2 sentences2014But in State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 33 , 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989), the court held that a psychological report on sanity is relevant to the existence of the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor, stating, “The issues involved are similar: whether a ‘mental disease or defect’ existed and, if so, whether and to what degree it may have impaired [the defendant’s] cognition and volition.” See State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 244 , 586 N.E.2d 1042 (1992) (“the results of a competency evaluation would also be relevant to mitigation”). {¶ 186} Defense counsel was motivated at the mitigation hearing 2014But in State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 33 , 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989), the court held that a psychological report on sanity is relevant to the existence of the R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor, stating, “The issues involved are similar: whether a ‘mental disease or defect’ existed and, if so, whether and to what degree it may have impaired [the defendant’s] cognition and volition.” See State v. Evans, 63 Ohio St.3d 231, 244 , 586 N.E.2d 1042 (1992) (“the results of a competency evaluation would also be relevant to mitigation”). {¶ 186} Defense counsel was motivated at the mitigation hearing | 2 | 1992–2014 |
Kellogg v. Shoemaker
green
2 sentences2009Thus, the trial court did not err in using Johnson's revocation of his community control on the attempted failure to comply conviction as the triggering event for Johnson's right to a Kellogg mitigation hearing. {¶ 27} Since we have determined that the proper triggering incident for Johnson's Kellogg hearing was his community control revocation on the attempted failure to comply conviction, which occurred on November 3, 2006, we must next determine whether Johnson's hearing was unreasonably delayed. {¶ 28} According to the Sixth Circuit's opinion with respect to this mitigation hearing, Johnso 2009However, under the new rules, parolees who committed new felonies while on parole would be subject to revocation without having a right to a mitigation hearing. 1 Id. at 506 . {¶ 16} The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that eliminating the mitigation hearing did not violate a new parolee's due process rights when the hearing officer did not have any discretion in deciding whether to revoke his parole. | 2 | 2003–2009 |
State v. Burke
green
2 sentences2003"As to defense counsel's waiver of closing argument at the mitigation hearing, we find this may have simply been a tactical decision to prevent the state from splitting closing argument and staging a strong rebuttal." State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399 , 405 . 2000In State v. Burke (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 399 , the court found that defense counsel waiving closing argument at a mitigation hearing may simply have been a tactical decision and did not show ineffective assistance of counsel. | 2 | 2000–2003 |
State v. Jester
green
2 sentences1997Appellant claims that discussing such matters with prospective jurors violates R.C. 2929.03(B), which provides that, in a capital case, the trial court’s instructions to the jury “shall not mention the penalty that may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.” However, “R.C. 2929.03(B) applies to the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, directing that during such phase the jury shall not be permitted to consider a possible penalty.” State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 154 , 512 N.E.2d 962, 970 . 1997Appellant claims that discussing such matters with prospective jurors violates R.C. 2929.03(B), which provides that, in a capital case, the trial court’s instructions to the jury “shall not mention the penalty that may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.” However, “R.C. 2929.03(B) applies to the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, directing that during such phase the jury shall not be permitted to consider a possible penalty.” State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 154 , 512 N.E.2d 962, 970 . | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Apanovitch
green
2 sentences1995(See State v. Apanovitch [1987], 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 24-25 , 514 N.E.2d 394, 400-401 .) We do not find that appellant has proven his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1995(See State v. Apanovitch [1987], 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 24-25 , 514 N.E.2d 394, 400-401 .) We do not find that appellant has proven his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 2 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Steffen
green
2 sentences1988This court has upheld as reasonable a three-day preparation period in State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St. 3d 111 , 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E. 2d 383 . 1988State v. Steffen, supra, at 121 , 31 OBR at 281-282, 509 N.E. 2d at 393 . | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Johnson v. Abdullah (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38 . {¶ 54} During the mitigation hearing, when it denied Brinkman’s request to deem Drs. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Lindsey
green
1 sentence2026Yet Brinkman cites a recent opinion from this court affirming a death sentence and observing that the trial court has a “duty to determine which trial-phase exhibits are relevant to the aggravating circumstances for purposes of the mitigation phase.” State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio- 1567, ¶ 201, citing State v. Lindsey, 2000-Ohio-465, ¶ 23 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Belton (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026Brinkman also argues that Ohio’s death-penalty statutes deny him the right to 71 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO present a defense by not allowing a jury the opportunity to consider a guilty plea as mitigating evidence. {¶ 201} R.C. 2945.06 and Crim.R. 11(C)(3) govern “[t]he process for entering a plea of guilty or no contest to charges of aggravated murder and related capital specifications.” State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 51 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Brinkman (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2026State v. Brinkman, 2021-Ohio-2473, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| G&E HC Reit II Parkway Med. Ctr., L.L.C. v. Drs. Ford & Soud, Inc. neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Keith green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Humphrey v. Lane green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Were green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Pickens (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Bates (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Perry green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Arnett green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Townsend v. Burke green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Gardner v. Florida green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Skipper v. South Carolina green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Von Clark Davis v. Ralph Coyle, Warden green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Thompson (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Foust green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Roberts green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State ex rel. Kline v. Carroll green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Herring (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Hester green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Frazier green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.