mitigation hearing in District of Columbia

2021In his view, he satisfied the three-prong mitigation test we outlined in In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987).

2011See generally In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); see also In re Marshall, 762 A.2d 530 (D.C.2000) (holding that a mitigation defense cannot be based on the attorney’s addiction to illegal drugs). .

2021See, e.g., In re Salo, 48 A.3d 174 (D.C. 2012) (there is a rebuttable presumption that identical discipline will be imposed unless respondent shows by clear and convincing evidence that one of the five exceptions applies); In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C. 2003) (“Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum to reargue the foreign discipline.”).

2020Reciprocal disciplinary proceedings are the improper forum to raise this mitigation defense, see In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C. 2003) (“Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum to reargue the foreign discipline.”).

2011See In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24-26 (D.C.2005). [17] See generally In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); see also In re Marshall, 762 A.2d 530 (D.C.2000) (holding that a mitigation defense cannot be based on the attorney's addiction to illegal drugs). [18] See D.C.

2011See generally In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); see also In re Marshall, 762 A.2d 530 (D.C.2000) (holding that a mitigation defense cannot be based on the attorney’s addiction to illegal drugs). .

2024So while we take no issue with the trial court’s decision to credit Kluger’s projected eight-month free rent period over Goldman’s twelve-to- sixteen month free rent projection, the trial court failed to account for any move-in period, i.e., the amount of time it would take a new tenant, once identified, to actually move into it. 31 A calculation of damages must rest on “an adequate basis for a reasoned judgment.” Vector Realty Grp., Inc. v. 711 Fourteenth St., Inc., 659 A.2d 230, 234 (D.C. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021“In order to qualify for a reduced sanction under the Kersey doctrine,” an attorney 22 must demonstrate “(1) by clear and convincing evidence that he had a disability; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability substantially affected his misconduct; and (3) by clear and convincing evidence that he has been substantially rehabilitated.” In re Lopes, 770 A.2d 561, 567 (D.C. 2001).

2021See, e.g., In re Salo, 48 A.3d 174 (D.C. 2012) (there is a rebuttable presumption that identical discipline will be imposed unless respondent shows by clear and convincing evidence that one of the five exceptions applies); In re Zdravkovich, 831 A.2d 964, 969 (D.C. 2003) (“Put simply, reciprocal discipline proceedings are not a forum to reargue the foreign discipline.”).

2015The District argues that in deciding whether something was part of the “compensation system” in effect on December 31, 1979, we have long recognized a “distinction between concrete statutory entitlements and benefits on the one hand and statutory processes, mechanisms, and procedures used in personnel administration on the other.” District of Columbia v. Hunt, 520 A.2d 300, 303 (D.C.1987).

2011See In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 24-26 (D.C.2005). [17] See generally In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C.1987); see also In re Marshall, 762 A.2d 530 (D.C.2000) (holding that a mitigation defense cannot be based on the attorney's addiction to illegal drugs). [18] See D.C.

2007See In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 434-35 (D.C.1997) (holding that an attorney’s voluntary resignation from the Florida Bar during disciplinary proceedings was a valid waiver of a mitigation hearing in D.C.

2007See In re Sharp, 674 A.2d 899, 900 (D.C.1996) (holding that the procedures for determining moral turpitude under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) satisfy due process requirements and that automatic disbarment under this section does not violate substantive due process); Colson, supra, 412 A.2d at 1165 n. 8 (“[A] respondent’s constitutional guarantee of due process is safeguarded, [when a mitigation hearing is obviated], not only by the hearing necessary to verify his conviction but also by his right to a jury trial and appellate review of the criminal conviction itself.”). 6 *1043 Alternatively, responde

2007See In re Sharp, 674 A.2d 899, 900 (D.C.1996) (holding that the procedures for determining moral turpitude under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) satisfy due process requirements and that automatic disbarment under this section does not violate substantive due process); Colson, supra, 412 A.2d at 1165 n. 8 (“[A] respondent’s constitutional guarantee of due process is safeguarded, [when a mitigation hearing is obviated], not only by the hearing necessary to verify his conviction but also by his right to a jury trial and appellate review of the criminal conviction itself.”). 6 *1043 Alternatively, responde

2007Board Report at 12 (quoting from In re Stanback, 681 A.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.1996)).

2004See generally State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759, 769 (1984).

2004See generally State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759, 769 (1984).

1999Rather, her sole objection was that “there is no evidence to support” a mitigation instruction, a complaint not well-taken. 3 Although our decisions before trial in this case had made clear that “the burden of proving that ... damages could have been ... mitigated rests with the party that committed the breach,” Obelisk Corp. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 668 A.2d 847, 856 (D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Edward M.

1999Rather, her sole objection was that "there is no evidence to support" a mitigation instruction, a complaint not well-taken. [3] Although our decisions before trial in this case had made clear that "the burden of proving that ... damages could have been ... mitigated rests with the party that committed the breach," Obelisk Corp. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 668 A.2d 847, 856 (D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Edward M.

1995However, the burden of proving that the damage — that damage could have been avoided or mitigated rests with the party that committed the breach. [9] Although generally there is no duty to mitigate damages when the contract does not require the personal services of a contracting party, see, e.g., Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693, 695 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 629 , 45 S.Ct. 195 , 69 L.Ed. 477 (1924), the trial judge appropriately decided to apply the mitigation rule in this case.

1995However, “[u]nder District law, ... a lease provision giving the reentering lessor a right to lost rent is construed as creating a right to damages, subject to the mitigation doctrine.” Lennon, supra, 287 U.S.App.D.C. at 206 , 920 F.2d at 1000 (citing Satin v. Buckley, 246 A.2d 778, 781 (D.C.1968)).

1992The mitigation principle recognizes the " ‘weaknesses’ or 'infirmity 1 of human nature” in which "[ljegally recognized mitigating factors serve to extenuate or 'dampen' the otherwise malicious nature of the perpetrator’s mental state, and thus serve as a bar to a conviction for murder.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 41-42 (D.C.1990) (citations omitted). 3 .Appellant was indicted for first-degree murder, D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989 Repl.), and the court charged the jury that it might find appellant guilty upon the lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree, as well as voluntary