mitigation doctrine in Connecticut

2015The mitigation factors include: ‘‘(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitu- tion or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical or mental disability or impairment; (i) delay in disciplin- ary proceedings; (j) interim rehabilitation; (k) imposi- tion of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; [

2014The mitigation factors include: ‘‘(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify conse- quences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward pro- ceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical or mental disability or impairment; (i) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (j) interim rehabilitation; (k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; [an

2008When there are facts in evidence that indicate that a plaintiff may have failed to promote his recovery and do what a reasonably prudent person would be expected to do under the same circumstances, the court, when requested to do so, is obliged to charge on the duty to mitigate damages.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Futterleib v. Mr. Happy’s, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 497, 501 , 548 A.2d 728 (1988). *172 The plaintiff does not allege that there are no facts in evidence that warranted a mitigation instruction.

2008When there are facts in evidence that indicate that a plaintiff may have failed to promote his recovery and do what a reasonably prudent person would be expected to do under the same circumstances, the court, when requested to do so, is obliged to charge on the duty to mitigate damages.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Futterleib v. Mr. Happy’s, Inc., 16 Conn. App. 497, 501 , 548 A.2d 728 (1988). *172 The plaintiff does not allege that there are no facts in evidence that warranted a mitigation instruction.

2003Thus, [the decedent’s] duty to mitigate his damages is a duty to promote recovery from an injury that he already sustained, not a duty to prevent the injury from occurring in the first place by wearing a motorcycle helmet.” Ruth and Dubicki v. Auster, Superior Court, judical district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 107712 (March 8,1996) (Hendel, J.) ( 16 Conn. L.

2001"The concept of mitigation of damages presupposes that an injured party has one or more courses of conduct available at or after the time a breach occurs and an obligation therefore exists to pursue that course that results in the least damages to the offending party." Rametta v. Stella , 214 Conn. 484 , 492 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Preston v. Keith , supra, 217 Conn. 15 ; Ruth v. Poggie , supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 52750 ("The doctrine of mitigation, however, contemplates a duty on the injured plaintiffs part which arises only after the negligence of the defendant results in the

2001"The concept of mitigation of damages presupposes that an injured party has one or more courses of conduct available at or after the time a breach occurs and an obligation therefore exists to pursue that course that results in the least damages to the offending party." Rametta v. Stella , 214 Conn. 484 , 492 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Preston v. Keith , supra, 217 Conn. 15 ; Ruth v. Poggie , supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 52750 ("The doctrine of mitigation, however, contemplates a duty on the injured plaintiffs part which arises only after the negligence of the defendant results in the

1997In State v. Faulkner, supra, 301 Md. 504 , the Maryland Appellate Court stated: “Logically, because the statutory offense [assault with intent to murder] is defined in terms of murder, all the defenses available in a murder prosecution are applicable in an assault with intent to murder prosecution.” While the Faulkner decision held that the mitigation defense of imperfect self-defense applies to the statutory crime of assault with intent to murder, that same court later held that this was a “generous expansion of the law of self-defense . . . .” Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95 , 106 n.3, 613 A.2d

1997In State v. Faulkner, supra, 301 Md. 504 , the Maryland Appellate Court stated: “Logically, because the statutory offense [assault with intent to murder] is defined in terms of murder, all the defenses available in a murder prosecution are applicable in an assault with intent to murder prosecution.” While the Faulkner decision held that the mitigation defense of imperfect self-defense applies to the statutory crime of assault with intent to murder, that same court later held that this was a “generous expansion of the law of self-defense . . . .” Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95 , 106 n.3, 613 A.2d

1993Preston v. Keith, 217 Conn. 12 , 15 (1991).