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15 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Disciplinary Matter Involving Buckalewgreen2 sentences2016A class B felony conviction for criminal sexual assault could result in 45 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 625 (Alaska 2001). 46 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § III.A.1.3 (emphasis added). 47 Alaska Bar R. 22(e) (“Bar Counsel will have the burden at any hearing of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has . . . committed misconduct as provided in [Bar] Rule 15.”). 48 See Alaska Bar R. 15 (defining grounds for attorney discipline); see also In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52 (Alaska 1986) (adopting ABA framework for imposing attorney discipline sanctions). 49 AS 11.41.4 2016See Alaska Bar R, 15 (defining grounds for attorney discipline); see also In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52 (Alaska 1986) (adopting ABA framework for imposing attorney discipline sanctions). . | 3 | 3 |
In the Disciplinary Matter of Friedmangreen2 sentences2016A class B felony conviction for criminal sexual assault could result in 45 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 625 (Alaska 2001). 46 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § III.A.1.3 (emphasis added). 47 Alaska Bar R. 22(e) (“Bar Counsel will have the burden at any hearing of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has . . . committed misconduct as provided in [Bar] Rule 15.”). 48 See Alaska Bar R. 15 (defining grounds for attorney discipline); see also In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52 (Alaska 1986) (adopting ABA framework for imposing attorney discipline sanctions). 49 AS 11.41.4 2016A class B felony conviction for criminal sexual assault in the second degree carries a presumptive sentence of 5 to 15 years with a maximum sentence of 45 In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 625 (Alaska 2001). 46 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § III.A.1.3 (emphasis added). 47 Alaska Bar R. 22(e) (“Bar Counsel will have the burden at any hearing of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has . . . committed misconduct as provided in [Bar] Rule 15.”). 48 See Alaska Bar R. 15 (defining grounds for attorney discipline); see also In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52 (Alaska 1986) (a | 2 | 2 |
Donlun v. Stategreen2 sentences1981The record does not show that this provision played any part in the sentence. 3 Viveros also contends his sentence is excessive in light of the ABA standard, approved in Donlun v. State, 527 P.2d 472, 475 (Alaska 1974), and in other cases, that prison terms over five years should not be imposed except for particularly dangerous *291 offenses and dangerous offenders. 1981The record does not show that this provision played any part in the sentence. 3 Viveros also contends his sentence is excessive in light of the ABA standard, approved in Donlun v. State, 527 P.2d 472, 475 (Alaska 1974), and in other cases, that prison terms over five years should not be imposed except for particularly dangerous *291 offenses and dangerous offenders. | 2 | 2 |
Peterson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018We note that the predecessor to the current Rule 45(c)(3) was also based on the ABA standards, but it referred to new charges "arising out of the same conduct." In Peterson v. State , the Alaska Supreme Court held that Rule 45(c)(3) should be read consistently with the ABA standard that it was modeled on and that the term "same conduct" therefore also included the concept of "same criminal episode." Peterson , 562 P.2d at 1356-58 (citing former Alaska R. 2018We note that the predecessor to the current Rule 45(c)(3) was also based on the ABA standards, but it referred to new charges "arising out of the same conduct." In Peterson v. State , the Alaska Supreme Court held that Rule 45(c)(3) should be read consistently with the ABA standard that it was modeled on and that the term "same conduct" therefore also included the concept of "same criminal episode." Peterson , 562 P.2d at 1356-58 (citing former Alaska R. | 1 | 2 |
Burkholder v. Stategreen2 sentences2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of 2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of | 1 | 1 |
Coger v. Stategreen2 sentences2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of 2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of | 1 | 1 |
Taggard v. Stategreen2 sentences2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of 2025However, in appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.”); see also Coger v. State, 517 P.2d 1403, 1406 n.5 (Alaska 1974) (describing Section 3.6(a) of ABA Standards as having been “adopted” in Taggard, 500 P.2d at 242 n.14, and Burkholder, 491 P.2d at 758 n.14). 47 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.6 cmt., at 89 (“As a general principle, the use of secondary evidence before a grand jury should be avoided unless - 42 - 7740 approach, the commentary to the preceding section of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gieffelsgreen2 sentences2025On the other hand, some jurisdictions allow an indictment to rest on evidence which would not be admissible at trial, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).”); see also Gieffels, 554 P.2d at 463 (recognizing commentary to these standards as persuasive authority). 48 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.5 cmt., at 88. 49 Id. § 3.6(a), at 88. 50 See id. (“[I]n appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.” (emphasis added)); id. § 3.6(b) (“The prosecutor should disclose t 2025On the other hand, some jurisdictions allow an indictment to rest on evidence which would not be admissible at trial, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).”); see also Gieffels, 554 P.2d at 463 (recognizing commentary to these standards as persuasive authority). 48 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.5 cmt., at 88. 49 Id. § 3.6(a), at 88. 50 See id. (“[I]n appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.” (emphasis added)); id. § 3.6(b) (“The prosecutor should disclose t | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jeskegreen2 sentences2023Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) (indicating that there must be evidence of strong legislative intent to depart from the plain meaning of a statute, and “[e]ven if legislative history is ‘somewhat contrary’ to the plain meaning of a statute, plain meaning still controls” (citations omitted)). 25 See Scrivener’s error, Black’s Law Dictionary, at 683 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scrivener’s error” as “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence”). 26 See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 823 P.2d 6 , 8 n.1 (Alaska App. 1991) (“The State argues that the Alaska Supreme Court, wh 2023Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) (indicating that there must be evidence of strong legislative intent to depart from the plain meaning of a statute, and “[e]ven if legislative history is ‘somewhat contrary’ to the plain meaning of a statute, plain meaning still controls” (citations omitted)). 25 See Scrivener’s error, Black’s Law Dictionary, at 683 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scrivener’s error” as “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence”). 26 See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 823 P.2d 6 , 8 n.1 (Alaska App. 1991) (“The State argues that the Alaska Supreme Court, wh | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Kim Ex Rel. Alexander v. Coxegreen2 sentences2023Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) (indicating that there must be evidence of strong legislative intent to depart from the plain meaning of a statute, and “[e]ven if legislative history is ‘somewhat contrary’ to the plain meaning of a statute, plain meaning still controls” (citations omitted)). 25 See Scrivener’s error, Black’s Law Dictionary, at 683 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scrivener’s error” as “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence”). 26 See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 823 P.2d 6 , 8 n.1 (Alaska App. 1991) (“The State argues that the Alaska Supreme Court, wh 2023Alexander v. Coxe, 295 P.3d 380, 387 (Alaska 2013) (indicating that there must be evidence of strong legislative intent to depart from the plain meaning of a statute, and “[e]ven if legislative history is ‘somewhat contrary’ to the plain meaning of a statute, plain meaning still controls” (citations omitted)). 25 See Scrivener’s error, Black’s Law Dictionary, at 683 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “scrivener’s error” as “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence”). 26 See, e.g., State v. Jeske, 823 P.2d 6 , 8 n.1 (Alaska App. 1991) (“The State argues that the Alaska Supreme Court, wh | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See Williams v. State, 800 P.2d 955 , 959 n. 5 (Alaska App.1990). 14 . 2003See Williams v. State, 800 P.2d 955 , 959 n. 5 (Alaska App.1990). 14 . | 1 | 1 |
Fields v. Stategreen2 sentences1990See Fields, 487 P.2d at 843 n. 37. 1990See Fields, 487 P.2d at 843 n. 37. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mallott v. State
green
2 sentences1989The supreme court quoted this section of the ABA standard in Mallott at 608 P.2d 737 , 749 n. 30. 2 . 1989The supreme court quoted this section of the ABA standard in Mallott at 608 P.2d 737 , 749 n. 30. 2 . | 2 | 1988–1989 |
Costello v. United States
green
2 sentences2025On the other hand, some jurisdictions allow an indictment to rest on evidence which would not be admissible at trial, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).”); see also Gieffels, 554 P.2d at 463 (recognizing commentary to these standards as persuasive authority). 48 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.5 cmt., at 88. 49 Id. § 3.6(a), at 88. 50 See id. (“[I]n appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.” (emphasis added)); id. § 3.6(b) (“The prosecutor should disclose t 2025On the other hand, some jurisdictions allow an indictment to rest on evidence which would not be admissible at trial, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).”); see also Gieffels, 554 P.2d at 463 (recognizing commentary to these standards as persuasive authority). 48 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 46, § 3.5 cmt., at 88. 49 Id. § 3.6(a), at 88. 50 See id. (“[I]n appropriate cases the prosecutor may present witnesses to summarize admissible evidence available to him which he believes he will be able to present at trial.” (emphasis added)); id. § 3.6(b) (“The prosecutor should disclose t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Frink v. State
green
2 sentences1985Frink, 597 P.2d at 166 . 1985Frink, 597 P.2d at 166 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Clouatre
green
2 sentences1985We hold that the excluded periods [listed in Rule 45(d)] must be deducted in computing the time for trial, regardless of whether the event giving rise to the period of postponement caused an actual delay of trial. 516 P.2d at 1191 . 1 We note that the ABA standard from which Criminal Rule 45 is derived does not limit the excluded period for interlocutory appeals to any particular period or require an express stay of proceedings. 1985We hold that the excluded periods [listed in Rule 45(d)] must be deducted in computing the time for trial, regardless of whether the event giving rise to the period of postponement caused an actual delay of trial. 516 P.2d at 1191 . 1 We note that the ABA standard from which Criminal Rule 45 is derived does not limit the excluded period for interlocutory appeals to any particular period or require an express stay of proceedings. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.