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7 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weatherall v. Stategreen2 sentences1991In Weatherall , the defendant sought adoption of both the ABA standard requiring individualized consideration before imposing consecutive sentences and a twenty-five-year limit on consecutive sentences. 73 Wis. 2d at 33-34, 242 N.W.2d 220 . 1991In Weatherall , the defendant sought adoption of both the ABA standard requiring individualized consideration before imposing consecutive sentences and a twenty-five-year limit on consecutive sentences. 73 Wis. 2d at 33-34, 242 N.W.2d 220 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Galliongreen2 sentences2026Cf. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶25 (noting that our supreme court had “expressly adopted” an ABA standard in an earlier case); see also State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 66 , 471 N.W.2d 55 (1991) (explaining that our supreme court “has repeatedly refused to accept guidelines or limitations on consecutive sentencing” and gathering cases). 2026Cf. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶25 (noting that our supreme court had “expressly adopted” an ABA standard in an earlier case); see also State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 66 , 471 N.W.2d 55 (1991) (explaining that our supreme court “has repeatedly refused to accept guidelines or limitations on consecutive sentencing” and gathering cases). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paskegreen2 sentences2026Cf. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶25 (noting that our supreme court had “expressly adopted” an ABA standard in an earlier case); see also State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 66 , 471 N.W.2d 55 (1991) (explaining that our supreme court “has repeatedly refused to accept guidelines or limitations on consecutive sentencing” and gathering cases). 2026Cf. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶25 (noting that our supreme court had “expressly adopted” an ABA standard in an earlier case); see also State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 66 , 471 N.W.2d 55 (1991) (explaining that our supreme court “has repeatedly refused to accept guidelines or limitations on consecutive sentencing” and gathering cases). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences2026See Hall, 255 Wis. 2d 662, ¶¶12-15 . 2026See Hall, 255 Wis. 2d 662, ¶¶12-15 . | 1 | 1 |
Dudrey v. Stategreen2 sentences2014This court applied the Approved Draft in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29 , 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) and Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482 , 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976), except that the court substituted the word "should" for the word "may" in each case. ¶118 In effect, the court reworded the ABA rule to read: "Before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. 2014This court applied the Approved Draft in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29 , 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) and Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482 , 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976), except that the court substituted the word "should" for the word "may" in each case. ¶118 In effect, the court reworded the ABA rule to read: "Before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. | 1 | 1 |
Argersinger v. Hamlingreen2 sentences2014Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). ¶126 Argersinger (involving the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases) was not decided until five years after the tentative ABA rule on plea withdrawal was issued. 2014See id. ¶127 In sharp contrast, Wisconsin has recognized a criminal defendant's right to counsel for more than 150 years. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul A. Russellgreen1 sentence1991Although some courts have determined that any desire to withdraw the plea before sentence is "fair and just" as long as the prosecution would not be prejudiced, see, e.g., United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 38 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gauntlettgreen2 sentences1991The drug produces an alphabet of adverse reactions from acne to cancer to weight gain." People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 314-15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted). 5 The supreme court adopted the ABA standard because it tracked the "manifest injustice" test of Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 1991The drug produces an alphabet of adverse reactions from acne to cancer to weight gain." People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 314-15 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (citations omitted). 5 The supreme court adopted the ABA standard because it tracked the "manifest injustice" test of Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. | 1 | 1 |
O'Connor v. State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences1991See Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 22, 25-26 , 242 N.W.2d 220, 222 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976). 8 We refuse to rummage through the record and speculate whether counsel's performance was deficient; whether it prejudiced Krieger; and whether it constitutes a "manifest injustice." Our conclusion that the factual situation does not fall under any of the six examples in the ABA standard does not end our inquiry. 1991See Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 22, 25-26 , 242 N.W.2d 220, 222 , cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976). 8 We refuse to rummage through the record and speculate whether counsel's performance was deficient; whether it prejudiced Krieger; and whether it constitutes a "manifest injustice." Our conclusion that the factual situation does not fall under any of the six examples in the ABA standard does not end our inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Canedy
green
2 sentences2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul 2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul | 2 | 2007–2014 |
State v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul 2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul 2014This limitation was later deemed regulatory, not mandatory, in State v. Lee, 88 Wis. 2d 239, 246-47 , 276 N.W.2d 268 (1979), but the court still noted that it was not "inappropriate for the state to object to the consideration of a motion to withdraw a plea that was brought beyond the time prescribed by statutory regulation. . . . [E]ntertaining an untimely motion to withdraw a plea would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. at 247 . 2 "In 1979 the ABA standard was revised to read as follows: 'After entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and before sentence, the court shoul | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Libke v. State
green
2 sentences2014This court applied the Approved Draft in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29 , 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) and Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482 , 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976), except that the court substituted the word "should" for the word "may" in each case. ¶118 In effect, the court reworded the ABA rule to read: "Before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. 2014This court applied the Approved Draft in Libke v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 121, 128-29 , 208 N.W.2d 331 (1973) and Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 482 , 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976), except that the court substituted the word "should" for the word "may" in each case. ¶118 In effect, the court reworded the ABA rule to read: "Before sentence, the court should allow the defendant to (4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. MacHner
green
2 sentences1996NOTES [†] Petition to review denied. [1] See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). [2] The commentary to ABA standard 4-5.2(a)(i) provides: It is also important in a jury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully with the accused about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit to the jury. 1996NOTES [†] Petition to review denied. [1] See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). [2] The commentary to ABA standard 4-5.2(a)(i) provides: It is also important in a jury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully with the accused about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit to the jury. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Reppin
green
2 sentences1991When State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377 , 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967), was decided in 1967, Rule 32(d) allowed a federal court, upon motion, to correct a "manifest injustice" after sentencing by setting aside the judgment of conviction and allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. 1991When State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 377 , 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967), was decided in 1967, Rule 32(d) allowed a federal court, upon motion, to correct a "manifest injustice" after sentencing by setting aside the judgment of conviction and allowing the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.