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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. City of Fremontgreen2 sentences2022To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability. [Citation.] Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result [citation]; (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior [citation]; (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct [citations]; or (4) engaged in inherently harmful acts.” ( 2012“To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability,” and courts require a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior, (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct, or (4) engaged in inherently harmful acts. {Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 270 | 6 | 7 |
Martinez v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'ngreen2 sentences2023“To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability.” (Martinez v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 883, 896 .) To assign moral blame, courts have required inherently harmful acts, acting with the intent of causing harm, actual or constructive knowledge the harm would result, or recklessness. 2007To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability. [Citation.] Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result [citation]; (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior [citation]; (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct [citations]; or (4) engaged in inherently harmful acts [ci | 1 | 2 |
Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grillgreen2 sentences2019(See Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1188, fn. 1, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 [noting in relevant part that the factor of moral blame " 'require[s] a higher degree of moral culpability' " and " ' "is generally *62 not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability," ' " and that the policy of preventing future harm is not served by imposing costs on the defendant in the absent of the requisite foreseeability].) In sum, absent admissible evidence of "prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent crimina 2019(See Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1188, fn. 1, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 [noting in relevant part that the factor of moral blame " 'require[s] a higher degree of moral culpability' " and " ' "is generally *62 not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability," ' " and that the policy of preventing future harm is not served by imposing costs on the defendant in the absent of the requisite foreseeability].) In sum, absent admissible evidence of "prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent crimina | 1 | 2 |
Sakai v. Massco Invs., LLCgreen2 sentences2019(See Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1188, fn. 1, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 [noting in relevant part that the factor of moral blame " 'require[s] a higher degree of moral culpability' " and " ' "is generally *62 not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability," ' " and that the policy of preventing future harm is not served by imposing costs on the defendant in the absent of the requisite foreseeability].) In sum, absent admissible evidence of "prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent crimina 2019(See Sakai v. Massco Investments, LLC (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1178 , 1188, fn. 1, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 775 [noting in relevant part that the factor of moral blame " 'require[s] a higher degree of moral culpability' " and " ' "is generally *62 not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability," ' " and that the policy of preventing future harm is not served by imposing costs on the defendant in the absent of the requisite foreseeability].) In sum, absent admissible evidence of "prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent crimina | 1 | 2 |
Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp.green2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( 1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( | 1 | 1 |
McCollum v. CBS, INC.green2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( 1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( | 1 | 1 |
Merenda v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( 1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Chevron U.S.A.green2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( 1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rotolo v. San Jose Sports & Entertainment, LLC
green
2 sentences2018To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability. [Citation.] Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result [citation]; (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior [citation]; (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct [citations]; or (4) engaged in inherently harmful acts [ci 2018To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability. [Citation.] Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result [citation]; (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior [citation]; (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct [citations]; or (4) engaged in inherently harmful acts [ci | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Campbell v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences2018BENDIX, J. * The other public policy considerations are either neutral due to a lack of evidence (e.g., availability of insurance) or weigh heavily in favor of a no duty finding (e.g., moral blame and preventing future harm.) " 'To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability,' and courts require a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the 2018BENDIX, J. * The other public policy considerations are either neutral due to a lack of evidence (e.g., availability of insurance) or weigh heavily in favor of a no duty finding (e.g., moral blame and preventing future harm.) " 'To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability,' and courts require a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
green
2 sentences2018"The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible." ( Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 781 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 .) In general, internalizing the cost of injuries caused by a particular behavior will induce changes in that behavior to make it safer. 2018"The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible." ( Cabral , supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 781 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 .) In general, internalizing the cost of injuries caused by a particular behavior will induce changes in that behavior to make it safer. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Formet v. the Lloyd Termite Control Co.
green
2 sentences2018The final Rowland factor-the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved-is not at issue here, because the record before the trial court did not include any evidence regarding insurance. 6 (See Formet v. The Lloyd Termite Control Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 595 , 604, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 [court cannot evaluate insurance factor in the absence of evidence regarding liability insurance].) *76 In sum, the balance of the Rowland factors weigh in favor of finding that Lupo did not owe plaintiffs a duty to ensure that Wild Card obtain and maintain an AED on the premises where 2018The final Rowland factor-the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved-is not at issue here, because the record before the trial court did not include any evidence regarding insurance. 6 (See Formet v. The Lloyd Termite Control Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 595 , 604, 110 Cal.Rptr.3d 551 [court cannot evaluate insurance factor in the absence of evidence regarding liability insurance].) *76 In sum, the balance of the Rowland factors weigh in favor of finding that Lupo did not owe plaintiffs a duty to ensure that Wild Card obtain and maintain an AED on the premises where | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Castaneda v. Olsher
green
1 sentence2018(Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213 .) Accordingly, we will focus our policy analysis on that issue.1 Sakai argues that in order to guard 1The other public policy considerations are either neutral due to a lack of evidence (e.g., availability of insurance) or weigh heavily in favor of a no duty finding (e.g., moral blame and preventing future harm.) “ ‘To avoid redundancy with the other Rowland factors, the moral blame that attends ordinary negligence is generally not sufficient to tip the balance of the Rowland factors in favor of liability,’ and courts require a higher degree o | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Oddone v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2012As explained in Oddone v. Superior Court, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 813 , 822 in a closely related context, the “principal difficulty with these factors is that it is hard to draw the line between those nonemployee persons to whom a duty is owed and those nonemployee persons to whom no duty is owed. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Dutton v. City of Pacifica
green
2 sentences1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 .) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct (see 1999(See, e.g., Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-11 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ].) Instead, courts have required a higher degree of moral culpability such as where the defendant (1) intended or planned the harmful result (see, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 989, 1005 [ 249 Cal.Rptr. 187 ]); (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of the harmful consequences of their behavior (see, e.g., Rosenbaum v. Security Pacific Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1098 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 ]); (3) acted in bad faith or with a reckless indifference to the results of their conduct ( | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.