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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Trout v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2026(See Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.”]; Firato v. Tuttle (1957) 48 Cal.2d 136, 139 .) In the present case the trial court found, and no party disputes, that Urwell and the sellers agreed the seller’s deeds of trust would record in first priority position. 2026(See Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.”]; Firato v. Tuttle (1957) 48 Cal.2d 136, 139 .) In the present case the trial court found, and no party disputes, that Urwell and the sellers agreed the seller’s deeds of trust would record in first priority position. | 4 | 5 |
Smitton v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences1959And in Smitton. v. McCullough, 182 Cal. 530, 537 [ 189 P. 686 ], the court said: “The law in this state on this question is well settled to the effect that not only does an antecedent indebtedness constitute a valuable consideration for a transfer in satisfaction and discharge of said indebtedness, but it is also a valuable consideration, within the protection of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, for a transfer merely as security for a pre-existing debt. (2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., § 749.) The earliest cases in this state held that an antecedent indebtedness was a v 1959And in Smitton. v. McCullough, 182 Cal. 530, 537 [ 189 P. 686 ], the court said: “The law in this state on this question is well settled to the effect that not only does an antecedent indebtedness constitute a valuable consideration for a transfer in satisfaction and discharge of said indebtedness, but it is also a valuable consideration, within the protection of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, for a transfer merely as security for a pre-existing debt. (2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., § 749.) The earliest cases in this state held that an antecedent indebtedness was a v | 2 | 3 |
Erickson v. Bohnegreen2 sentences2020(Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 378 [“A deed is void if the grantor’s signature is forged”]; 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 8:52, p. 8-152 [“A forged deed is completely void and ineffective to transfer any title to the grantee”].) Further, “[a] subsequent title derived through a forged instrument is completely unenforceable, even if recorded and held by a bona fide purchaser, unless the grantor is estopped to assert that the deed is invalid.” (3 Miller & Starr, supra, § 8:52, at pp. 8- 152–8-153, fns. omitted; see Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 Cal.A 1996When a deed is void ab initio, it “constitutes a nullity; as such it cannot provide the basis for a superior title as against the original *585 grantor. [Citations.]” (Wutzke v. Bill Reid Painting Service, Inc. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 36, 43 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 418 ].) “ ‘A void deed passes no title and cannot be made the foundation of a good title even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.’ ” (Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 553, 557 [ 279 P.2d 619 ], quoting 26 C.J.S. at pp. 307-308.) No matter what the spouses wanted to do, intended to do, and tried to do in regard to the Fu | 2 | 2 |
Wutzke v. Bill Reid Painting Service, Inc.green2 sentences2017These circumstances include: where a grantor failed to deliver the deed; an instrument is altered without authority before it is recorded; fraud in the inception; a deed without a description or an inadequate description; and recording a forged or invalid instrument. (4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2016) §§ 10:71 to 10:75, pp. 10-258 to 10-265.) For example, ‘“an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.” (Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [ 32 P.2d 968 ]. 2000Under such circumstances there was no effective execution or delivery of the deed, ... it was void ab initio and an action to avoid it could be brought at any time. ... ‘A void deed passes no title and cannot be made the foundation of a good title even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.’ ” (Id. at p. 557.) In Wutzke, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 36 , the plaintiff sold property to the Millers and took back a promissory note and a deed of trust. | 1 | 3 |
Estate of Stephensgreen1 sentence2022(See, e.g., Estate of Stephens (2002) 28 Cal.4th 665, 672 [when attorney-in-fact acts without authority under invalid power of attorney, attempted action is void, and any conveyance under such circumstances is void]; Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, a forged instrument, or a deed in blank, cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase”].) Lone Oak argues that these new allegations are inconsistent with the allegations mad | 1 | 1 |
Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothersgreen1 sentence2020(Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 378 [“A deed is void if the grantor’s signature is forged”]; 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 8:52, p. 8-152 [“A forged deed is completely void and ineffective to transfer any title to the grantee”].) Further, “[a] subsequent title derived through a forged instrument is completely unenforceable, even if recorded and held by a bona fide purchaser, unless the grantor is estopped to assert that the deed is invalid.” (3 Miller & Starr, supra, § 8:52, at pp. 8- 152–8-153, fns. omitted; see Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 Cal.A | 1 | 1 |
Montgomery v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass'ngreen2 sentences1953(Bryce v. O’Brien, 5 Cal.2d 615, 616 [ 55 P.2d 488 ] ; Montgomery v. Bank of America, 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 564 [ 193 P.2d 475 ].) We are unable to find any basis for the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. 1953(Bryce v. O’Brien, 5 Cal.2d 615, 616 [ 55 P.2d 488 ] ; Montgomery v. Bank of America, 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 564 [ 193 P.2d 475 ].) We are unable to find any basis for the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. | 1 | 1 |
Bryce v. O'BRIENgreen2 sentences1953(Bryce v. O’Brien, 5 Cal.2d 615, 616 [ 55 P.2d 488 ] ; Montgomery v. Bank of America, 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 564 [ 193 P.2d 475 ].) We are unable to find any basis for the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. 1953(Bryce v. O’Brien, 5 Cal.2d 615, 616 [ 55 P.2d 488 ] ; Montgomery v. Bank of America, 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 564 [ 193 P.2d 475 ].) We are unable to find any basis for the conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Payne v. Bensley
neutral
2 sentences1959(Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260 [68 Am.Dec. 318]; Robinson v. Smith, 14 Cal. 94 ; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 450 ; Jones’ Pledges and Collateral Securities, 2d ed., § 128; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., §§ 480, 749.) While these cases dealt with a bona fide purchaser under the law-merchant, the reasoning there adopted for holding the antecedent debt a valuable consideration was not based upon the peculiar requirements of commerce and mercantile business, and, in Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335, 342 , the general rule was definitely laid down, and has never since been receded from in this s 1930(Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260 [ 68 Am. | 3 | 1920–1959 |
Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp.
green
2 sentences2026In keeping with this agreement (see ante), each of the three real estate sale contracts identified just one loan—that being the seller financing—and in none of those contracts was there a check mark in the box that was to be checked in the event that the transaction were to include a 23 Describing the implications of an instrument being void, our Supreme Court said in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 929 , that: “A void contract is without legal effect. [Citation.] ‘It binds no one and is a mere nullity.’ [Citation.] ‘Such a contract has no existence whatever. 2026In keeping with this agreement (see ante), each of the three real estate sale contracts identified just one loan—that being the seller financing—and in none of those contracts was there a check mark in the box that was to be checked in the event that the transaction were to include a 22 Describing the implications of an instrument being void, our Supreme Court said in Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 929 , that: “A void contract is without legal effect. [Citation.] ‘It binds no one and is a mere nullity.’ [Citation.] ‘Such a contract has no existence whatever. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Firato v. Tuttle
green
2 sentences2026(See Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.”]; Firato v. Tuttle (1957) 48 Cal.2d 136, 139 .) In the present case the trial court found, and no party disputes, that Urwell and the sellers agreed the seller’s deeds of trust would record in first priority position. 2026(See Trout v. Taylor (1934) 220 Cal. 652, 656 [“Numerous authorities have established the rule that an instrument wholly void, such as an undelivered deed, . . . cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.”]; Firato v. Tuttle (1957) 48 Cal.2d 136, 139 .) In the present case the trial court found, and no party disputes, that Urwell and the sellers agreed the seller’s deeds of trust would record in first priority position. | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Gould v. Wise
green
2 sentences1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. 1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. | 2 | 1934–1959 |
Promis v. Duke
green
2 sentences1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. 1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. | 2 | 1934–1959 |
Barden v. Grace
green
2 sentences1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. 1959(Promis v. Duke, 208 Cal. 420 [ 281 P. 613 ] ; Gould v. Wise, 97 Cal. 532 [ 32 P. 576 , 33 P. 323 ] ; Bardin v. Grace, supra.) ( 167 Ala. 453 [ 52 So. 425 , Ann. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Robinson v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1959(Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260 [68 Am.Dec. 318]; Robinson v. Smith, 14 Cal. 94 ; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 450 ; Jones’ Pledges and Collateral Securities, 2d ed., § 128; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., §§ 480, 749.) While these cases dealt with a bona fide purchaser under the law-merchant, the reasoning there adopted for holding the antecedent debt a valuable consideration was not based upon the peculiar requirements of commerce and mercantile business, and, in Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335, 342 , the general rule was definitely laid down, and has never since been receded from in this s | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Naglee & Parrott v. Lyman
green
1 sentence1959(Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260 [68 Am.Dec. 318]; Robinson v. Smith, 14 Cal. 94 ; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 450 ; Jones’ Pledges and Collateral Securities, 2d ed., § 128; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., §§ 480, 749.) While these cases dealt with a bona fide purchaser under the law-merchant, the reasoning there adopted for holding the antecedent debt a valuable consideration was not based upon the peculiar requirements of commerce and mercantile business, and, in Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335, 342 , the general rule was definitely laid down, and has never since been receded from in this s | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Frey v. Clifford
neutral
1 sentence1959(Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 260 [68 Am.Dec. 318]; Robinson v. Smith, 14 Cal. 94 ; Naglee v. Lyman, 14 Cal. 450 ; Jones’ Pledges and Collateral Securities, 2d ed., § 128; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., §§ 480, 749.) While these cases dealt with a bona fide purchaser under the law-merchant, the reasoning there adopted for holding the antecedent debt a valuable consideration was not based upon the peculiar requirements of commerce and mercantile business, and, in Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal. 335, 342 , the general rule was definitely laid down, and has never since been receded from in this s | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Price v. Elmbank
green
1 sentence1920(The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610 ; Citizens’ etc. Bank v. Judy, 146 Ind. 330 , [ 43 N. E. 259 ].) Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, that is not the rule in California. [8] The law in this state on this question is well settled to the effect that not only does an antecedent indebtedness constitute a valuable consideration for a transfer in satisfaction and discharge of said indebtedness, but it is also a valuable consideration, within the protection of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, for a transfer merely as security for a pre-existing debt. (2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurispruden | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Citizens' National Bank v. Judy
green
1 sentence1920(The Elmbank, 72 Fed. 610 ; Citizens’ etc. Bank v. Judy, 146 Ind. 330 , [ 43 N. E. 259 ].) Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, that is not the rule in California. [8] The law in this state on this question is well settled to the effect that not only does an antecedent indebtedness constitute a valuable consideration for a transfer in satisfaction and discharge of said indebtedness, but it is also a valuable consideration, within the protection of the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase, for a transfer merely as security for a pre-existing debt. (2 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurispruden | 1 | 1920–1920 |