comparative indemnity doctrine in California

1990(See Note, Contribution and Indemnity in California (1969) 57 Cal.L.Rev. 490, 492-493 & fn. 12.) Before the advent of the comparative indemnity doctrine in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578 (American Motorcycle), cases applying the then all-or-nothing implied contractual indemnity doctrine recognized the necessity of ameliorating the effect of its all-or-nothing nature by precluding a party from obtaining such indemnity “if his negligence [was] active or affirmative as distinguished from negligence which [was] passive.” (See, e.g., Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clementi

1990(See Note, Contribution and Indemnity in California (1969) 57 Cal.L.Rev. 490, 492-493 & fn. 12.) Before the advent of the comparative indemnity doctrine in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578 ( American Motorcycle ), cases applying the then all-or-nothing implied contractual indemnity doctrine recognized the necessity of ameliorating the effect of its all-or-nothing nature by precluding a party from obtaining such indemnity "if his negligence [was] active or affirmative as distinguished from negligence which [was] passive." (See, e.g., Cahill Bros., Inc. v. Clemen

2007Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine in this case whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in which a party’s liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 332, fn. 5, italics added.) Just as Safeway was not applicable to Wimberly , it is inapplicable here where “plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by a defective product and the only parties among whom ‘fault’ can be apportioned under Proposition 51 are in its chain of distribution.” (Wimberly, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 632 .) 9 In sum, following Wimberly, su

2007Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine in this case whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in which a party’s liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 332, fn. 5, italics added.) Just as Safeway was not applicable to Wimberly , it is inapplicable here where “plaintiff’s injuries were caused solely by a defective product and the only parties among whom ‘fault’ can be apportioned under Proposition 51 are in its chain of distribution.” (Wimberly, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 632 .) 9 In sum, following Wimberly, su

1986Previous Court of Appeal Decisions In its 1978 AMA decision, our Supreme Court determined that the principles of comparative negligence adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ] should be used to apportion liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors under a comparative indemnity doctrine.

1986Previous Court of Appeal Decisions In its 1978 AMA decision, our Supreme Court determined that the principles of comparative negligence adopted in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 532 P.2d 1226 , 78 A.L.R.3d 393 ] should be used to apportion liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors under a comparative indemnity doctrine.

2010(Id. at pp. 512, fn. 1, 521.) The Hoyem court stated the school district had a “firmly established duty to exercise due care in supervising [the plaintiff] while he was on school premises.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 515 .) The court rejected the district’s argument that if a school district may be liable for injuries to a truant, it would require school districts to construct “truant-proof’ schools.

1998The Far West court concluded, at least in the context of indemnity, that the Safeway footnote cannot be read to support a limitation of the application of comparative fault principles to negligent parties alone. [10] Unlike an employer, whose immunity is founded on an alternative compensation scheme, a defendant who is truly immune from liability cannot be allocated a percentage of responsibility for damages. ( Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 989 [ 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 103 , 928 P.2d 1181 ] [tobacco company, statutorily immune from liability, commits no tort by selling produ

1998The Far West court concluded, at least in the context of indemnity, that the Safeway footnote cannot be read to support a limitation of the application of comparative fault principles to negligent parties alone. [10] Unlike an employer, whose immunity is founded on an alternative compensation scheme, a defendant who is truly immune from liability cannot be allocated a percentage of responsibility for damages. ( Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 985, 989 [ 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 103 , 928 P.2d 1181 ] [tobacco company, statutorily immune from liability, commits no tort by selling produ

1989For instance in Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 432 ] (Jaffe), the developers of a condominium complex attempted to recover all or a portion of the amounts they paid to homeowners from the board of directors of the homeowners association and we affirmed a judgment dismissing their indemnity claim.

1989For instance in Jaffe v. Huxley Architecture (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1188 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 432 ] (Jaffe), the developers of a condominium complex attempted to recover all or a portion of the amounts they paid to homeowners from the board of directors of the homeowners association and we affirmed a judgment dismissing their indemnity claim.

1985In Huizar v. Abex Corp. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 534 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 47 ], plaintiff was injured by an allegedly defective punch press and sued the machine’s manufacturer and distributor.

1985In Huizar v. Abex Corp. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 534 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 47 ], plaintiff was injured by an allegedly defective punch press and sued the machine’s manufacturer and distributor.

1978(Cf. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., supra, 58 Wis.2d 641 [ 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-873 ] with Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. (1972) 31 N.Y.2d 25 [ 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 , 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 ].) [6] Although prior to Daly trial courts may have been in doubt as to whether comparative fault principles could be applied between negligent and strictly liable defendants, the instant case illustrates that plaintiffs often pursue alternative strict liability and negligence theories against multiple defendants.

1978(Cf. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., supra, 58 Wis.2d 641 [ 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-873 ] with Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. (1972) 31 N.Y.2d 25 [ 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 , 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 ].) [6] Although prior to Daly trial courts may have been in doubt as to whether comparative fault principles could be applied between negligent and strictly liable defendants, the instant case illustrates that plaintiffs often pursue alternative strict liability and negligence theories against multiple defendants.

1978In American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 , 574 P.2d 763 ], we have determined that principles of comparative negligence, applied in Li to apportion responsibility between a negligent plaintiff and *325 a negligent defendant, should be utilized as the basis for apportioning liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors pursuant to a comparative indemnity doctrine.

1978In American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [ 143 Cal. Rptr. 692 , 574 P.2d 763 ], we have determined that principles of comparative negligence, applied in Li to apportion responsibility between a negligent plaintiff and *325 a negligent defendant, should be utilized as the basis for apportioning liability among multiple negligent tortfeasors pursuant to a comparative indemnity doctrine.

1978(See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc. (5th Cir. 1977) 547 F.2d 885, 887 ; Uniform Comparative Fault Act, § 1, com.) Because we can discern no policy considerations that demand or justify such a result, we hold that in a case such as the instant one, the comparative indemnity doctrine may be utilized to allocate liability between a negligent and a strictly liable defendant. 5 3.

1978(See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc. (5th Cir.1977) 547 F.2d 885, 887 ; Uniform Comparative Fault Act, § 1, com.) (1b) Because we can discern no policy considerations that demand or justify such a result, we hold that in a case such as the instant one, the comparative indemnity doctrine may be utilized to allocate liability between a negligent and a strictly liable defendant. [5] 3.

1978In Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ] we have concluded that comparative fault principles should be applied to apportion responsibility between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff in a product liability action.

1978In Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 , 575 P.2d 1162 ] we have concluded that comparative fault principles should be applied to apportion responsibility between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent plaintiff in a product liability action.

1978(Cf. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., supra, 58 Wis.2d 641 [ 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-873 ] with Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. (1972) 31 N.Y.2d 25 [ 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 , 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 ].) [6] Although prior to Daly trial courts may have been in doubt as to whether comparative fault principles could be applied between negligent and strictly liable defendants, the instant case illustrates that plaintiffs often pursue alternative strict liability and negligence theories against multiple defendants.

1978(Cf. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., supra, 58 Wis.2d 641 [ 207 N.W.2d 866, 871-873 ] with Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. (1972) 31 N.Y.2d 25 [ 334 N.Y.S.2d 851 , 286 N.E.2d 241, 243 ].) [6] Although prior to Daly trial courts may have been in doubt as to whether comparative fault principles could be applied between negligent and strictly liable defendants, the instant case illustrates that plaintiffs often pursue alternative strict liability and negligence theories against multiple defendants.