country violation in California

2005(E.g., In re Guardianship of Melissa W. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1299 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 [grandparents who took child out of the country in violation of court order could not appeal denial of their guardianship petition]; Adoption of Jacob C. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 617, 623-624 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 [mother who abducted child could not challenge stepmother's petition to terminate mother's parental rights to another child].) The doctrine also has been applied to conduct that frustrates the ability of a party to obtain information it needs to protect its rights. ( In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.Ap

2005(E.g., In re Guardianship of Melissa W. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1299 , 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 42 [grandparents who took child out of the country in violation of court order could not appeal denial of their guardianship petition]; Adoption of Jacob C. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 617, 623-624 , 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 [mother who abducted child could not challenge stepmother's petition to terminate mother's parental rights to another child].) The doctrine also has been applied to conduct that frustrates the ability of a party to obtain information it needs to protect its rights. ( In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.Ap

1958(People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [ 144 P.2d 605 ]; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [ 2 N.E.2d 38 ]; and see the many eases collected in the notes in 48 A.L.R. 1115 ; 57 A.L.R. 424 ; 103 A.L.R. 866 ; 109 A.L.R. 709 ; 113 A.L.R. 1121 .) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence 650 ‘that no sooner is the term “lottery” defined by a court, than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief discussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious

1958(People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [ 144 P.2d 605 ]; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [ 2 N.E.2d 38 ]; and see the many eases collected in the notes in 48 A.L.R. 1115 ; 57 A.L.R. 424 ; 103 A.L.R. 866 ; 109 A.L.R. 709 ; 113 A.L.R. 1121 .) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence 650 ‘that no sooner is the term “lottery” defined by a court, than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief discussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious

1958(People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [ 144 P.2d 605 ]; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [ 2 N.E.2d 38 ]; and see the many eases collected in the notes in 48 A.L.R. 1115 ; 57 A.L.R. 424 ; 103 A.L.R. 866 ; 109 A.L.R. 709 ; 113 A.L.R. 1121 .) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence 650 ‘that no sooner is the term “lottery” defined by a court, than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief discussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious

1958(People v. Gonzales, 62 Cal.App.2d 274 [ 144 P.2d 605 ]; People v. Miller, 271 N.Y. 44 [ 2 N.E.2d 38 ]; and see the many eases collected in the notes in 48 A.L.R. 1115 ; 57 A.L.R. 424 ; 103 A.L.R. 866 ; 109 A.L.R. 709 ; 113 A.L.R. 1121 .) It is said in 34 American Jurisprudence 650 ‘that no sooner is the term “lottery” defined by a court, than ingenuity evolves some scheme within the mischief discussed, although not quite within the letter of the definition given; but an examination of the many cases on the subject will show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious

2020In People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509 , for example, the defendant “did not deny strangling his wife, but claimed through his own testimony and the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder, that he was provoked into killing her because of a sudden and uncontrollable rage .…” (Id. at p. 513.) He testified his wife left the country shortly after they were married and, upon her announced return, “she had fallen in love with another man, one Yako, and had enjoyed his sexual favors, that he was coming to this country to claim her and that she wished a divorce.” (Ibid.) The wife spent the n

2020Supreme Court held these facts supported a finding that the defendant acted “in wild desperation induced by [his mistress’s] long continued provocatory conduct.” (Id. at p. 329.) Finally, in Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 1461 , “abundant evidence” was presented regarding “the acrimonious relationship between [the] defendant and [her ex-boyfriend], particularly concerning their ongoing custody battle over their son .…” (Id. at p. 1483.) He made “repeated threats to take custody of their son away” and the evidence reflected an “ongoing battle … over custody, child support, and their son’s care.

2020Supreme Court held these facts supported a finding that the defendant acted “in wild desperation induced by [his mistress’s] long continued provocatory conduct.” (Id. at p. 329.) Finally, in Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 1461 , “abundant evidence” was presented regarding “the acrimonious relationship between [the] defendant and [her ex-boyfriend], particularly concerning their ongoing custody battle over their son .…” (Id. at p. 1483.) He made “repeated threats to take custody of their son away” and the evidence reflected an “ongoing battle … over custody, child support, and their son’s care.

2020In People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509 , for example, the defendant “did not deny strangling his wife, but claimed through his own testimony and the testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder, that he was provoked into killing her because of a sudden and uncontrollable rage .…” (Id. at p. 513.) He testified his wife left the country shortly after they were married and, upon her announced return, “she had fallen in love with another man, one Yako, and had enjoyed his sexual favors, that he was coming to this country to claim her and that she wished a divorce.” (Ibid.) The wife spent the n

2016(Western, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 325 .) In reaching this conclusion, the Western court noted that "[s]ince the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that because the power to arrest a [defendant] can be exercised only within the territory of the United States, 'there is an implied covenant on the part of the [defendant] with his sureties, when he is admitted to bail, that he will not depart out of this territory without their assent.' " (Id. at p. 322.) The Western court further relied on long standing case law that " '[a]ny Government action that substantially enc

2016(Western, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 325 .) In reaching this conclusion, the Western court noted that "[s]ince the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that because the power to arrest a [defendant] can be exercised only within the territory of the United States, 'there is an implied covenant on the part of the [defendant] with his sureties, when he is admitted to bail, that he will not depart out of this territory without their assent.' " (Id. at p. 322.) The Western court further relied on long standing case law that " '[a]ny Government action that substantially enc

2016(Western, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 325 .) In reaching this conclusion, the Western court noted that "[s]ince the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that because the power to arrest a [defendant] can be exercised only within the territory of the United States, 'there is an implied covenant on the part of the [defendant] with his sureties, when he is admitted to bail, that he will not depart out of this territory without their assent.' " (Id. at p. 322.) The Western court further relied on long standing case law that " '[a]ny Government action that substantially enc

2013(Id. at p. 1324.) Finding the case controlled by Reese , the Ninth Circuit reversed an order denying the surety’s motion to set aside the bond forfeiture, holding that “[a]ny Government action that substantially encourages the defendant to leave the country in violation of the terms of the bond is a material breach of the Government’s implied covenant not to interfere with the covenant between the defendant and the surety.” (Id. at p. 1325.) Similarly, in U.S. v. Aguilar (N.D.Cal. 1993) 813 F.Supp. 727 (Aguilar), the district court set aside a bond forfeiture after a magistrate judge had permi

2008(Gonzales v. City of Peoria (9th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 468, 475 , overruled on other grounds in *932 Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina (9th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 1037, 1040, fn. 1 ; People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 195 ]; 3A Am.Jur.2d (2005) Aliens and Citizens, § 99; 3 Cal.Jur.3d (2008) Aliens and Citizens, § 16.) State and local law enforcement authorities may legally arrest a person for being in this country in violation of the criminal provisions of the INA (most commonly 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 [improper entry by alien, a misdemeanor] and 1326 [improper reentry by removed alien,

2008(Gonzales v. City of Peoria (9th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 468, 475 , overruled on other grounds in *932 Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina (9th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 1037, 1040, fn. 1 ; People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 195 ]; 3A Am.Jur.2d (2005) Aliens and Citizens, § 99; 3 Cal.Jur.3d (2008) Aliens and Citizens, § 16.) State and local law enforcement authorities may legally arrest a person for being in this country in violation of the criminal provisions of the INA (most commonly 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 [improper entry by alien, a misdemeanor] and 1326 [improper reentry by removed alien,

2008Forum v. Miller (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 859 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 371 ], decided three years after Gates , and relying in part upon it, the court held that the collection and dissemination by local law enforcement officers of information indicating an arrestee’s immigration status, does not violate the arrestee’s constitutional right of privacy under the California Constitution nor deny him or her equal protection of the laws or due process of law. 16 In making this determination, the Gates court relied on a 1984 opinion of the California Attorney General ( 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 331 (1984)), concluding

2008In 1992, a Bay Area legislator asked for an opinion on the following question: “May a city prohibit its officers and employees from cooperating in their official capacities with Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation, detention, or arrest procedures relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration laws.” ( 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 270 (1992).) Relying in part upon Gates, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 205 at page 219, the Attorney General answered that, “[d]ue to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,” a city may not impose such a prohibition

2008(Gonzales v. City of Peoria (9th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 468, 475 , overruled on other grounds in *932 Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina (9th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 1037, 1040, fn. 1 ; People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999 [ 147 Cal.Rptr. 195 ]; 3A Am.Jur.2d (2005) Aliens and Citizens, § 99; 3 Cal.Jur.3d (2008) Aliens and Citizens, § 16.) State and local law enforcement authorities may legally arrest a person for being in this country in violation of the criminal provisions of the INA (most commonly 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 [improper entry by alien, a misdemeanor] and 1326 [improper reentry by removed alien,

2008In 1992, a Bay Area legislator asked for an opinion on the following question: “May a city prohibit its officers and employees from cooperating in their official capacities with Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation, detention, or arrest procedures relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration laws.” ( 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 270 (1992).) Relying in part upon Gates, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 205 at page 219, the Attorney General answered that, “[d]ue to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,” a city may not impose such a prohibition

2008In 1992, a Bay Area legislator asked for an opinion on the following question: “May a city prohibit its officers and employees from cooperating in their official capacities with Immigration and Naturalization Service investigation, detention, or arrest procedures relating to alleged violations of the civil provisions of the federal immigration laws.” ( 75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 270 (1992).) Relying in part upon Gates, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d 205 at page 219, the Attorney General answered that, “[d]ue to the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,” a city may not impose such a prohibition

2008Forum v. Miller (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 859 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 371 ], decided three years after Gates , and relying in part upon it, the court held that the collection and dissemination by local law enforcement officers of information indicating an arrestee’s immigration status, does not violate the arrestee’s constitutional right of privacy under the California Constitution nor deny him or her equal protection of the laws or due process of law. 16 In making this determination, the Gates court relied on a 1984 opinion of the California Attorney General ( 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 331 (1984)), concluding

2008Forum v. Miller (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 859 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 371 ], decided three years after Gates , and relying in part upon it, the court held that the collection and dissemination by local law enforcement officers of information indicating an arrestee’s immigration status, does not violate the arrestee’s constitutional right of privacy under the California Constitution nor deny him or her equal protection of the laws or due process of law. 16 In making this determination, the Gates court relied on a 1984 opinion of the California Attorney General ( 67 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 331 (1984)), concluding

2002Conversely, a promotional scheme is illegal where any and all persons cannot participate in a chance for the prize and some of the participants who want a chance to win must pay for it." ( People v. Shira, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 459 .) Although numerous attempts have been made to disguise the element of valuable consideration ( id. at pp. 458-461), "it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan, short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which has not been held by the courts of this country to be in violation of the lotter

2002Conversely, a promotional scheme is illegal where any and all persons cannot participate in a chance for the prize and some of the participants who want a chance to win must pay for it." ( People v. Shira, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. 459 .) Although numerous attempts have been made to disguise the element of valuable consideration ( id. at pp. 458-461), "it is very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan, short of a gratuitous distribution of property, which has not been held by the courts of this country to be in violation of the lotter

1922In the recent case of Estate of Yano, ante, p. 645 [ 206 Pac. 995 ], the court held that the provision of the law preventing the appointment of such aliens as guardians of their minor children bom in this country was not a violation of the treaty, but that it was discriminative and therefore violative of the constitutions of this state and of the United States.

1919In French v. Old South Soc., 106 Mass. 479 , where a pew was sold on condition that, the grantee and his representatives should pay a tax assessed on the pew, and if they should leave the meeting-house they would offer the pew to the grantor, the court held that the condition in the conveyance was not void for remoteness.

1917The fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States declares that, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States' and of the state wherein they reside.” It was said by Field, J., while sitting in the circuit court, that, “Independently of the constitutional provision it has always been the doctrine of this country, except as applied to Africans brought here and sold as slaves, that birth within the dominion and jurisdiction of the United States of itself creates citizenship.” (In re Look Tin Sing,

1916In this country the rule is that the attorney general or state’s attorney may file the information in behalf of the people, where the interests of the general public are involved, at any time, and that, in conformity with the maxim, ‘Nullum tern-pus occwrrit regi,’ lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding.” (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sec. 621; Commonwealth v. Allen, 128 Mass. 308 .) In High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, section 621, it is said: “In the absence of any statutory period of limitation, it is held in this country that the attorney-general may file the infor

1913(Browne v. Dexter, 66 Cal. 40 , [ 4 Pac. 913 ]; Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 302 ; Burton v. Burton (N. Y.), 1 Keyes, 359 ; 1 Abb.

1913(Browne v. Dexter, 66 Cal. 40 , [ 4 Pac. 913 ]; Kane v. McCarthy, 63 N. C. 302 ; Burton v. Burton (N. Y.), 1 Keyes, 359 ; 1 Abb.

1900Eq., 4th ed., p. 297; Orem v. Wrightson, 51 Md. 34 , 34 Am.