curfew violation in California

2010From this predicate, A. G. asserts the true finding must be reversed because the prosecution neither pleaded nor proved A. G. had previously been issued a warning citation for a curfew violation. *1464 Section 625.5 provides it shall "only apply to a city, county, or city and county in which the governing body of the city, county, or city and county has enacted an ordinance prohibiting minors from remaining in or upon the public streets unsupervised after hours and has adopted a resolution to implement this section." ( Id., subd. (b).) Section 625.5 provides: "(c) Except as provided in subdivi

1999In Justin B. a panel of the Second District held a peace officer abridges a youth’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when his only offense is a curfew violation and the officer “transports the minor to the police station and subjects the minor to questioning designed to elicit incriminating responses.” (Id. at p. 883.) The appellate panel concluded, “. . . the officer was not authorized by law to conduct a custodial interrogation of [the minor] at the station based on a curfew violation.” ( 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 888 .) Reviewing the statutory scheme, the

2018We find nothing in the language of section 626 requiring the release of a minor to be unconditional, and case law suggests that this type of protective temporary detention is permitted by statute. ( Ian C. , supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 859-860, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 ; Charles C. , supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 .) In Ian C. , supra , 87 Cal.App.4th 856 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 , a minor challenged a " 'patdown' " search by police after *72 he was stopped for a curfew violation and transported to a curfew center to wait for his parents. ( Id. at p. 858, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 .

2018We find nothing in the language of section 626 requiring the release of a minor to be unconditional, and case law suggests that this type of protective temporary detention is permitted by statute. ( Ian C. , supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 859-860, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 ; Charles C. , supra , 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 .) In Ian C. , supra , 87 Cal.App.4th 856 , 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 , a minor challenged a " 'patdown' " search by police after *72 he was stopped for a curfew violation and transported to a curfew center to wait for his parents. ( Id. at p. 858, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 854 .

2022The vagueness doctrine ‘ “bars enforcement of ‘a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “In reviewing a condition of mandatory supervision to determine if it is vague . . . , we must assign ‘ “ ‘the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader’ ” ’ when presented with the condition.” (People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861 , 870.) “Whether a term of probation is unconstitutionally vague . . . presents a question of law,

2014(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119 ; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327 .) 4 A Regarding defendant’s claim that Officer Edens did not have reasonable suspicion for the detention, defendant argues the only suspicious circumstances were the curfew violation and the attempt by the driver of the vehicle to avoid contact with the officers.

2014Defendant asserts that because the initial detention was invalid, Officer Edens’s subsequent questions regarding defendant’s probation or parole status, and his observations of defendant’s hand movements, were unlawful. “[I]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention[,] the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3

2014(People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119 ; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327 .) 4 A Regarding defendant’s claim that Officer Edens did not have reasonable suspicion for the detention, defendant argues the only suspicious circumstances were the curfew violation and the attempt by the driver of the vehicle to avoid contact with the officers.

2013Palmer contends that this admission identified Palmer as one of the men in the car with him because Officer Vasquez had earlier testified that she stopped Allen and Palmer in August 2007 for a curfew violation.11 Palmer argues that this testimony, coupled with Allen‟s admission “led to the obvious inference that Palmer was one of the other persons who were with Allen in the car at the time of the crimes.” In essence, Palmer contends that Allen‟s confession was so “powerfully incriminating” that the jurors could not be expected to follow the court‟s instruction to ignore it as to Palmer; and th

2013(Turner, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056 .) The district attorney took the opposite position, that the not-true finding should have no effect 6 whatsoever once Turner was released and subsequently returned to custody.

2003The parents knew nothing adverse about him other than that he might have had a curfew violation. ( Id. at p. 1088, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 .) "The circumstantial evidence on which plaintiffs relied included (among other things) [the boy's] school records showing he had a long history of misconduct, including sexual harassment of female students, fighting and other misbehavior that resulted in numerous detentions and suspensions; as well as evidence that [the boy] had been arrested and charged with vandalism.

1994The section was quickly enacted by the City Council in response to our decision in People v. Continola, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th Supp. 20 in which we determined that the former charging statute, section 8.77, as written required that a defendant’s mere presence on the streets was insufficient to charge him with a curfew violation, and that, as written, the section required a showing that the defendant prevented, hindered or delayed police or other officials’ duties.

1993(See San Jose City Ord., § 10.28.010.) “As stated in Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 285 , 288 . . . : ‘Under our system of law the power to make an arrest of another individual is a power grudgingly given in furtherance of the public interest in preventing crime.