dispute claim in California

1984Code, § 3543.2; see also, Los Angeles Council of School Nurses v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 666, 671-672 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 893 ].) However, the fact that wages are the subject of the dispute at bar does not resolve the question whether refusal to pay wages claimed under section 45203 constitutes an unfair practice.

1984Code, § 3543.2; see also, Los Angeles Council of School Nurses v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 666, 671-672 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 893 ].) However, the fact that wages are the subject of the dispute at bar does not resolve the question whether refusal to pay wages claimed under section 45203 constitutes an unfair practice.

2015Wynns is correct that “ ‘[i]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 .) But “[t]his, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word ‘honest’ when juxtaposed to the word ‘fraudulent’ 8 conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or ‘bona fide.’ ” (FEI Enterprises, Inc. v. Yoon (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 790, 803 .) “While it is not necessary that the dispute or controversy should be well founded, it is necessary that it

2011(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [ 234 P.2d 16 ].) “ ‘[I]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Ibid.; see Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) This, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word “honest” when juxtaposed with the word “fraudulent” conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or “bona fide.” d.

2014(Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ].) In many respects, that did not happen with these cases.

2014(Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 770 ].) In many respects, that did not happen with these cases.

2004The contractual language being interpreted by those courts read, in relevant part: “ ‘If any party commences an action based on a dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.’ ” (Blackburn v. Charnley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 ; Leamon v. Krajkiewcz, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 432 ; Johnson v. Siegel (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1100 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) In Blackburn v.

2004The contractual language being interpreted by those courts read, in relevant part: “ ‘If any party commences an action based on a dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.’ ” (Blackburn v. Charnley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 ; Leamon v. Krajkiewcz, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 432 ; Johnson v. Siegel (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1100 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) In Blackburn v.

2017(City of Chula Vista, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 686 [relevant factor in “considering the appropriate source for the compensation” is “whether the party to be charged obtained a benefit from the receiver’s services”]; Stanton v. Pratt (1941) 18 Cal.2d 599, 603 [ 116 P.2d 609 ] [when insufficient funds receiver may “look to the parties at whose instance he was appointed” or “for whose benefit the receivership was created”]; Clark, supra, § 637.1(b)-(r), pp. 1056-1068 [listing multiple exceptions to general rule fees paid from receivership estate].) And, relevant to this appeal, the tinting of

2017(City of Chula Vista, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 686 [relevant factor in “considering the appropriate source for the compensation” is “whether the party to be charged obtained a benefit from the receiver’s services”]; Stanton v. Pratt (1941) 18 Cal.2d 599, 603 [ 116 P.2d 609 ] [when insufficient funds receiver may “look to the parties at whose instance he was appointed” or “for whose benefit the receivership was created”]; Clark, supra, § 637.1(b)-(r), pp. 1056-1068 [listing multiple exceptions to general rule fees paid from receivership estate].) And, relevant to this appeal, the tinting of

2017(City of Chula Vista, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 686 [relevant factor in “considering the appropriate source for the compensation” is “whether the party to be charged obtained a benefit from the receiver’s services”]; Stanton v. Pratt (1941) 18 Cal.2d 599, 603 [ 116 P.2d 609 ] [when insufficient funds receiver may “look to the parties at whose instance he was appointed” or “for whose benefit the receivership was created”]; Clark, supra, § 637.1(b)-(r), pp. 1056-1068 [listing multiple exceptions to general rule fees paid from receivership estate].) And, relevant to this appeal, the tinting of

2011(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [ 234 P.2d 16 ].) “ ‘[I]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Ibid.; see Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) This, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word “honest” when juxtaposed with the word “fraudulent” conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or “bona fide.” d.

2011(Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. (1951) 37 Cal.2d 592, 597 [ 234 P.2d 16 ].) “ ‘[I]t matters not that there was no solid foundation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent.’ ” (Ibid.; see Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].) This, in context, also amounts to an objective standard as the word “honest” when juxtaposed with the word “fraudulent” conveys the meaning that the dispute must be actual, real or “bona fide.” d.

2006Rather, CSAA must prove that “the public improvement which, as designed; constructed and maintained presents an inherent risk of damage to private property, and the inherent risks materialize to cause damage.” (See Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 607 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 ].) While the City focuses primarily on the language of Albers , and its requirement that liability under a theory of inverse condemnation will attach only if damage is caused by the public work as “deliberately designed and constructed” ( Albers, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 263-264), CSAA cites the ca

2006Rather, CSAA must prove that “the public improvement which, as designed; constructed and maintained presents an inherent risk of damage to private property, and the inherent risks materialize to cause damage.” (See Pacific Bell v. City of San Diego (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 596, 607 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 897 ].) While the City focuses primarily on the language of Albers , and its requirement that liability under a theory of inverse condemnation will attach only if damage is caused by the public work as “deliberately designed and constructed” ( Albers, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 263-264), CSAA cites the ca

2004The contractual language being interpreted by those courts read, in relevant part: “ ‘If any party commences an action based on a dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.’ ” (Blackburn v. Charnley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 ; Leamon v. Krajkiewcz, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 432 ; Johnson v. Siegel (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1100 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) In Blackburn v.

2004The contractual language being interpreted by those courts read, in relevant part: “ ‘If any party commences an action based on a dispute or claim to which this paragraph applies, without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation, then that party shall not be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, even if they would otherwise be available to that party in any such action.’ ” (Blackburn v. Charnley, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 767 ; Leamon v. Krajkiewcz, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 432 ; Johnson v. Siegel (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1087, 1100 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 412 ].) In Blackburn v.

1952Of course, for the principle of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, there must be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218 [ 124 P.2d 826 ]), but ‘it matters not that there was no solid foun *754 dation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent’ (B. & W.

1952Of course, for the principle of accord and satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claim, there must be a ‘bona fide dispute’ between the parties (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 218 [ 124 P.2d 826 ]), but ‘it matters not that there was no solid foun *754 dation for the dispute’ as the test is whether ‘the dispute was honest or fraudulent’ (B. & W.

1952Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164,171 [ 137 P. 624 ] Also, the debtor must make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction.

1952Engineering Co. v. Beam, 23 Cal.App. 164,171 [ 137 P. 624 ] Also, the debtor must make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that it shall be in full satisfaction.