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15 California opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Sankeygreen2 sentences2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s 2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s | 2 | 2 |
Winn v. Torrgreen2 sentences2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s 2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s | 2 | 2 |
Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc.green2 sentences2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s 2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s | 1 | 2 |
Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.green1 sentence2024(Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 259 .) In those cases, “the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was ‘not the type of mistake “ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.” ’ (Pazderka, at p. 671; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496– 1497.) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake.” (Zamora, at pp. 259–260.) Avila’s reliance on Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 620 i | 1 | 1 |
Titan Elec. v. La Unified School Dist.green1 sentence2024Bid peddling . . . is an attempt by a subcontractor to undercut known bids already submitted to the general contractor in order to procure the job.’ ” (Titan Electric, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 202, fn. 6 .) 23 this condition is “subject to the further provisions set forth in Section 4107.5.” (Id., subd. (a)(5).) Section 4107.5 requires that a prime contractor’s claim of inadvertent clerical error in the listing of the subcontractor be made “within two working days after the time of the prime bid opening by the awarding authority,” with timely notice to both the listed subcontractor and the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Meniusgreen1 sentence2022(See People v. Menius (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1294-1295 [sentence which is the result of an inadvertent clerical error by judge may be corrected on appeal].) We found nothing else in the record which would provide defendant with a better result. 3 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed as modified to order defendant to pay $763.82 in restitution to the California Victim Compensation Board for deposit in the Restitution Fund, instead of paying that restitution to the “victims of violent crime program” as the trial court previously ordered. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Kornbluthgreen2 sentences2002(See Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Kornbluth (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 518, 530-531 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 774 ] [omission of date of entry of judgment from one of five abstracts of judgment obviously an inadvertent clerical error].) Most likely an evidentiary hearing will be required to resolve this issue. 2002(See Commonwealth Land Title Co. v. Kornbluth (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 518, 530-531 [ 220 Cal.Rptr. 774 ] [omission of date of entry of judgment from one of five abstracts of judgment obviously an inadvertent clerical error].) Most likely an evidentiary hearing will be required to resolve this issue. | 1 | 1 |
Premium Commercial Services Corp. v. National Bankgreen1 sentence2002In both Pazderka and Premium Commercial Services, the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was "not the type of mistake `ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.'" ( Pazderka, at p. 671, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 ; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496-1497, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 65 .) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake. [5] The observation in Pazderka that courts will not set aside a valid s | 1 | 1 |
Rosse v. DeSoto Cab Co.green2 sentences1999(Rosse v. DeSoto Cab Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 ].) Main Issue The argument for Land is relatively simple: in the bid submitted pursuant to section 4104, Kiewit-Shea listed Land as the subcontractor for *425 glass paver panels; Kiewit-Shea had no lawful basis under the act to substitute any other subcontractor for the glass paver panel work, as there is no contention that Land was unable or unwilling to do the work, and Kiewit-Shea did not timely invoke the statutory procedure to claim that the listing of Land for the glass paver panel work was an inadvertent cle 1999(Rosse v. DeSoto Cab Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1050 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 680 ].) Main Issue The argument for Land is relatively simple: in the bid submitted pursuant to section 4104, Kiewit-Shea listed Land as the subcontractor for *425 glass paver panels; Kiewit-Shea had no lawful basis under the act to substitute any other subcontractor for the glass paver panel work, as there is no contention that Land was unable or unwilling to do the work, and Kiewit-Shea did not timely invoke the statutory procedure to claim that the listing of Land for the glass paver panel work was an inadvertent cle | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dumasgreen2 sentences1989(See People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 880 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 ]; People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 764 .) On these facts, we agree with the court below that Officer Hines had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant properly authorized the search he actually carried out. 1989(See People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 880 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 ]; People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 764 .) On these facts, we agree with the court below that Officer Hines had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant properly authorized the search he actually carried out. | 1 | 1 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences1989Suppressing evidence because the magistrate failed to correct an inadvertent clerical error “will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” (Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981, 991 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 ].) Further, the omission here did not result in “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 467 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ].) Only those items enumerated in the affidavit were seized. 1989Suppressing evidence because the magistrate failed to correct an inadvertent clerical error “will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” (Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981, 991 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 ].) Further, the omission here did not result in “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 467 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ].) Only those items enumerated in the affidavit were seized. | 1 | 1 |
Massachusetts v. Sheppardgreen2 sentences1989Suppressing evidence because the magistrate failed to correct an inadvertent clerical error “will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” (Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981, 991 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 ].) Further, the omission here did not result in “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 467 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ].) Only those items enumerated in the affidavit were seized. 1989Suppressing evidence because the magistrate failed to correct an inadvertent clerical error “will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.” (Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, 468 U.S. 981, 991 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 ].) Further, the omission here did not result in “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” (Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 467 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 583 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ].) Only those items enumerated in the affidavit were seized. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Wilsongreen2 sentences1985(LeMar v. Superior Court (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 126, 129 [ 196 P.2d 98 ]; Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 382, 384 [ 198 P.2d 916 ].) Further, an appellate court may direct the trial court to make an order nunc pro tunc. 1985(LeMar v. Superior Court (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 126, 129 [ 196 P.2d 98 ]; Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 382, 384 [ 198 P.2d 916 ].) Further, an appellate court may direct the trial court to make an order nunc pro tunc. | 1 | 1 |
Lámar v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1985(LeMar v. Superior Court (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 126, 129 [ 196 P.2d 98 ]; Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 382, 384 [ 198 P.2d 916 ].) Further, an appellate court may direct the trial court to make an order nunc pro tunc. 1985(LeMar v. Superior Court (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 126, 129 [ 196 P.2d 98 ]; Wilson v. Wilson (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 382, 384 [ 198 P.2d 916 ].) Further, an appellate court may direct the trial court to make an order nunc pro tunc. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Candelario
green
2 sentences2013In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true." (Canderlario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 706 .) In Canderlario, the trial court specifically mentioned defendant's prior conviction "numerous" times during the sentencing hearing. 1975In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true.” ( 3 Cal.3d at p. 706 .) The Attorney General seeks to distinguish Candelario on the ground that the prior convictions here were mentioned in thé minute order of judgment and the original abstract of judgment. | 2 | 1975–2013 |
Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024(Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 259 .) In those cases, “the Courts of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside a section 998 settlement because the erroneous omission of a provision for attorney fees and costs was ‘not the type of mistake “ordinarily made by a person with no special training or skill.” ’ (Pazderka, at p. 671; see also Premium Commercial Services, at pp. 1496– 1497.) By contrast, the inadvertent clerical error alleged here is such a mistake.” (Zamora, at pp. 259–260.) Avila’s reliance on Roden v. Bergen Brunswig Corp. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 620 i | 1 | 2024–2024 |
AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2015(Id. at p. 226.) In AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 890 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 ] (AvalonBay), AvalonBay prepared an internal funds transfer request and forwarded it to its cash management department (CMD). 2015(Id. at p. 226.) In AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 890 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 690 ] (AvalonBay), AvalonBay prepared an internal funds transfer request and forwarded it to its cash management department (CMD). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Mosby
green
2 sentences2013In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true." (Id. at p. 706.) 12 Young also relies on People v. Torres (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1073 , a case that was subsequently disapproved by Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353 . 2013In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true." (Id. at p. 706.) 12 Young also relies on People v. Torres (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1073 , a case that was subsequently disapproved by Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Torres
green
1 sentence2013In such circumstances the silence operates as a finding that the prior conviction was not true." (Id. at p. 706.) 12 Young also relies on People v. Torres (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1073 , a case that was subsequently disapproved by Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th 353 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments
green
2 sentences2002Although the law favors settlements ( Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 677 , 186 Cal. Rptr. 589 , 652 P.2d 437 ), it only favors authorized settlements. 2002Although the law favors settlements ( Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 677 , 186 Cal. Rptr. 589 , 652 P.2d 437 ), it only favors authorized settlements. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Southern California Acoustics Co. v. C. V. Holder, Inc.
green
1 sentence1999The theory of the summary judgment for Kiewit-Shea, which is the same as Kiewit-Shea’s first affirmative defense, runs as follows: Kiewit-Shea’s bid should be interpreted as having (inadvertently) listed two subcontractors, Land and Willis, to do the glass paver panel work; under section 4106, if a prime contractor lists two subcontractors to do the same work, the prime contractor must do the work itself; therefore, unlike the circumstances in Southern Cal. Acoustics, supra, 71 Cal.2d at page 727 , Land has no “right” to a subcontract. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Alvarez
green
1 sentence1991Suppressing evidence because the magistrate failed to correct an inadvertent clerical error ‘will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.’ ” (People v. Alvarez, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at p. 668 .) (3) The fact that different officers executed the search makes no difference in the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. MacAvoy
green
1 sentence1989(See People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 880 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 304 , 512 P.2d 1208 ]; People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 764 .) On these facts, we agree with the court below that Officer Hines had an objectively reasonable good faith belief that the warrant properly authorized the search he actually carried out. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Girard v. Monrovia City School District
green
2 sentences1988(Cf. Thompson v. Keckler (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 199 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 267 ]; Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist. (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 737 [ 264 P.2d 115 ].) We note that defendant at no time objected to the motion by the People to so amend. 1988(Cf. Thompson v. Keckler (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 199 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 267 ]; Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist. (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 737 [ 264 P.2d 115 ].) We note that defendant at no time objected to the motion by the People to so amend. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Thompson v. Keckler
green
2 sentences1988(Cf. Thompson v. Keckler (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 199 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 267 ]; Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist. (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 737 [ 264 P.2d 115 ].) We note that defendant at no time objected to the motion by the People to so amend. 1988(Cf. Thompson v. Keckler (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 199 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 267 ]; Girard v. Monrovia City School Dist. (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 737 [ 264 P.2d 115 ].) We note that defendant at no time objected to the motion by the People to so amend. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.