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15 California opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Collier v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2017Relevant here, section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines protected *94 activity to include "any...conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of...free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." This category "extends the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute beyond actual instances of free speech to 'all conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue.' " ( Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41 , 51, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 31 ( Collier ), italics omitted.) In determining whether a cause of a 2017Relevant here, section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines protected activity to include "any . . . conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of . . . free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest." This category "extends the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute beyond actual instances of free speech to 'all conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue.'" (Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 51 (Collier), italics omitted.) In determining whether a cause of action arises from pro | 2 | 3 |
Hunter v. CBS Broadcasting Inc.green2 sentences2017The court does this " ' "by identifying '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing... conduct that provides the foundation for the claim.' " ' " ( Hunter , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 .) "In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity." ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) In making this determination, the court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which t 2017The court does this "'"by identifying '[t]he allegedly 19 wrongful and injury-producing . . . conduct that provides the foundation for the claim.'"'" (Hunter, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520 .) "In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity." (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 .) In making this determination, the court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability . . . is based." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) The | 1 | 3 |
David Schaffner, Jr. v. Monsanto Corpgreen2 sentences2025(See Bates, at p. 451.) Similarly, the Schaffner court continually, and in our view, incorrectly, characterized an approved label that omits a certain warning as requiring such omission. 5 (See, e.g., Schaffner, supra, 113 F.4th at p. 385 [EPA “prohibited” Monsanto from adding a cancer warning].) That view “disregards the provision in FIFRA that registration and approval of a label is not a defense to a claim of misbranding,” and “ignores the explication in Bates that ‘FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products’ p 2025(See Bates, at p. 451.) Similarly, the Schaffner court continually, and in our view, incorrectly, characterized an approved label that omits a certain warning as requiring such omission. 5 (See, e.g., Schaffner, supra, 113 F.4th at p. 385 [EPA “prohibited” Monsanto from adding a cancer warning].) That view “disregards the provision in FIFRA that registration and approval of a label is not a defense to a claim of misbranding,” and “ignores the explication in Bates that ‘FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products’ p | 1 | 1 |
Sprengel v. Zbylutgreen2 sentences2021To be sure, some of these cases include overbroad language (e.g., Chodos, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 [“the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to claims of attorney malpractice”]; Sprengel, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 151 [malpractice claims are “generally not subject” to the anti-SLAPP law]), but each case looks beyond the label of the claim at issue to examine whether the specific conduct alleged qualifies as protected activity. 2021To be sure, some of these cases include overbroad language (e.g., Chodos, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 [“the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to claims of attorney malpractice”]; Sprengel, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 151 [malpractice claims are “generally not subject” to the anti-SLAPP law]), but each case looks beyond the label of the claim at issue to examine whether the specific conduct alleged qualifies as protected activity. | 1 | 1 |
Chodos v. Colegreen2 sentences2021To be sure, some of these cases include overbroad language (e.g., Chodos, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 [“the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to claims of attorney malpractice”]; Sprengel, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 151 [malpractice claims are “generally not subject” to the anti-SLAPP law]), but each case looks beyond the label of the claim at issue to examine whether the specific conduct alleged qualifies as protected activity. 2021To be sure, some of these cases include overbroad language (e.g., Chodos, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 [“the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to claims of attorney malpractice”]; Sprengel, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 151 [malpractice claims are “generally not subject” to the anti-SLAPP law]), but each case looks beyond the label of the claim at issue to examine whether the specific conduct alleged qualifies as protected activity. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Philip Morris Inc.green1 sentence2004Pollay testified that teenagers generally ignore all fine print in ads, warnings included, and that Whiteley may never have “attended” to the warning because the behavior of smoking, including handling the pack of cigarettes, “is so habituated a routine that one . . . doesn’t even need to look at the pack while handling it and getting a cigarette . . . .” (Accord, Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2002) 182 Ore.App. 44 [ 48 P.3d 824, 835, fn. 15 ], judgment vacated on other grounds and case remanded by Philip Morris U.S.A. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Silvagreen2 sentences1993Code, § 451, subd. (f); People v. Silva (1924) 67 Cal.App. 351, 357-358 [ 227 P. 976 ]; In Interest of T.D. (1983) 115 Ill.App.3d 872 [ 71 Ill.Dec. 20 , 450 N.E.2d 455 ].) The court therefore properly admitted the label under that exception. 1993Code, § 451, subd. (f); People v. Silva (1924) 67 Cal.App. 351, 357-358 [ 227 P. 976 ]; In Interest of T.D. (1983) 115 Ill.App.3d 872 [ 71 Ill.Dec. 20 , 450 N.E.2d 455 ].) The court therefore properly admitted the label under that exception. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Navellier v. Sletten
green
2 sentences2017The court does this " ' "by identifying '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing... conduct that provides the foundation for the claim.' " ' " ( Hunter , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 .) "In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity." ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) In making this determination, the court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which t 2017The court does this " ' "by identifying '[t]he allegedly wrongful and injury-producing... conduct that provides the foundation for the claim.' " ' " ( Hunter , supra , 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 123 .) "In the anti-SLAPP context, the critical consideration is whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free speech or petitioning activity." ( Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89 , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530 , 52 P.3d 703 .) In making this determination, the court "shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which t | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Wyeth, Inc. v. Danny Weeks and Vicki Weeks
red
2 sentences2016The unique relationship between brand-name and generic drugs as a result of federal law and FDA regulations, combined with the learned-intermediary doctrine and the fact that representations regarding prescription drugs are made not to the plaintiff but to a third party, create the sui generis context in which we find prescription medication." (Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, supra, 159 So.3d at p. 677 .) Similarly here, Novartis manufactured the brand-name drug terbutaline and was responsible for the label warnings through 2001. 2016The unique relationship between brand-name and generic drugs as a result of federal law and FDA regulations, combined with the learned-intermediary doctrine and the fact that representations regarding prescription drugs are made not to the plaintiff but to a third party, create the sui generis context in which we find prescription medication." (Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, supra, 159 So.3d at p. 677 .) Similarly here, Novartis manufactured the brand-name drug terbutaline and was responsible for the label warnings through 2001. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Snowney v. Harrah's Entertainment, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021The plaintiff in As You Sow sued a paint manufacturer that directly 11 The dissenting member of the Thurston panel was of the view the “relatedness” requirement was not met. ( Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1242–1245 (dis. opn. of Menetrez, J.).) 15 contacted distributors in California and sold and shipped its product to distributors in California for use in California, allegedly without complying with the label warning requirements of Proposition 65. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
green
1 sentence2021It disregards the provision in FIFRA that registration and approval of a label is not a defense to a claim of misbranding. (7 U.S.C. § 136a(f)(2).) It also ignores the explication in Bates that “FIFRA contemplates that pesticide labels will evolve over time, as manufacturers gain more information about their products’ performance in diverse settings,” and the observation that “tort suits can serve as a catalyst in this process.” (Bates, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 451 .) These statements in Bates are followed by an extensive quotation from Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. (D.C. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Richard Leander Ferebee, Jr. v. Chevron Chemical Company
green
1 sentence2021Cir. 1984) 736 F.2d 1529 (Ferebee) which we reproduce here: “ ‘By encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries not previously recognized as traceable to pesticides such as [the pesticide there at issue], a state tort action of the kind under review may aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with pesticides. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Dintino
green
1 sentence2013Corp. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 346 .) Construing the FAC liberally and disregarding the label of the claim, the eighth cause of action is essentially for quantum meruit. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Shively v. Bozanich
green
2 sentences2009DISPOSITION The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent that it holds that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, Christoff's cause of action necessarily accrued when Nestlé first "published" the label under the rule we announced in Shively v. Bozanich, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1230 . 2009Disposition The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed to the extent that it holds that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, Christoffs cause of action necessarily accrued when Nestlé first “published” the label under the rule we announced in Shively v. Bozanich, supra, 31 Cal.4th 1230 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2008Bill No. 1420 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) The 1988 amendment to section 425.13 made clear a claim for punitive damages against a health care provider is subject to section 425.13 only “if the injury that is the basis for the claim was caused by conduct that was directly related to the rendition of professional services.” (Central Pathology, at p. 192.) Based on the language and legislative history of section 425.13, the Supreme Court in Central Pathology, supra, 3 Cal.4th 181 , concluded the essential inquiry in determining whether section 425.13 applies is not the label of the claim, but th | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority that Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ], which construed the preemption provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, is controlling or particularly helpful in construing FIFRA’s preemption provision. 2000Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority that Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504 [ 112 S.Ct. 2608 , 120 L.Ed.2d 407 ], which construed the preemption provision of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, is controlling or particularly helpful in construing FIFRA’s preemption provision. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
In Re TD
green
2 sentences1993Code, § 451, subd. (f); People v. Silva (1924) 67 Cal.App. 351, 357-358 [ 227 P. 976 ]; In Interest of T.D. (1983) 115 Ill.App.3d 872 [ 71 Ill.Dec. 20 , 450 N.E.2d 455 ].) The court therefore properly admitted the label under that exception. 1993Code, § 451, subd. (f); People v. Silva (1924) 67 Cal.App. 351, 357-358 [ 227 P. 976 ]; In Interest of T.D. (1983) 115 Ill.App.3d 872 [ 71 Ill.Dec. 20 , 450 N.E.2d 455 ].) The court therefore properly admitted the label under that exception. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. T.D.
green
1 sentence1993Code, § 451, subd. (f); People v. Silva (1924) 67 Cal.App. 351, 357-358 [ 227 P. 976 ]; In Interest of T.D. (1983) 115 Ill.App.3d 872 [ 71 Ill.Dec. 20 , 450 N.E.2d 455 ].) The court therefore properly admitted the label under that exception. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.