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15 California opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pitmongreen2 sentences2011To the contrary, in Leal we quoted with approval Pitmon’s remark that section 288(b) punished “ ‘the obtaining of a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of the child’s will.’ ” (Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1009, italics added, quoting Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 49 .) As explained earlier, the court in Pitmon , consistent with that understanding, applied its definition to determine that the duress used was not only of an objectively sufficient magnitude, but actually had the effect of coercing the victim into participating: the court concluded that the defendant’s threats 2004No similar purpose appears from inclusion of ‘duress’ in subdivision (b) of section 288, a statute designed in part to punish the obtaining of a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of the child’s will. [Citation.]” (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 49 .) We agree that duress as a defense to a criminal charge carries a different meaning than “duress” as used in section 288, subdivision (b)(1). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Sotogreen2 sentences2026The elements of this crime are that a defendant willfully touched any part of the body of a child under 14 years of age, while using force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the child or someone else, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or the child. (§ 288, subds. (a), (b)(1); see CALCRIM No. 1111.) To establish “force” for purposes of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), “the prosecution must prove that the defendant used physical force substantially different from or substantia 2013(Id. at p. 15; see also People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 51 , overruled on other grounds as stated in Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 248, fn. 12 [finding the evidence sufficient to establish duress, even though the victim testified the defendant did not use force, violence, or threats when the victim “was eight years old, an age at which adults are commonly viewed as authority figures. | 2 | 2 |
In Re Asenciogreen1 sentence2026The elements of this crime are that a defendant willfully touched any part of the body of a child under 14 years of age, while using force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to the child or someone else, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or the child. (§ 288, subds. (a), (b)(1); see CALCRIM No. 1111.) To establish “force” for purposes of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), “the prosecution must prove that the defendant used physical force substantially different from or substantia | 1 | 1 |
People v. Willsgreen1 sentence2014(Former § 1203.066, subd. (a)(7); (People v. Wills (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 728, 736 (Wills).) The defendant could overcome that presumption if the trial court made “all” of the findings specified in former section 1203.066, subdivision (c). | 1 | 1 |
T.P. v. T.W.green2 sentences2014We deem this argument forfeited, “since it is not stated under a separate heading, is not *1498 sufficiently developed, and is unsupported by citation to authority. [Citations.]” (T.P. v. T.W. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1440, fn. 12 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 ],) 9 We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12). 2014We deem this argument forfeited, “since it is not stated under a separate heading, is not *1498 sufficiently developed, and is unsupported by citation to authority. [Citations.]” (T.P. v. T.W. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1440, fn. 12 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 ],) 9 We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi 2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lealgreen1 sentence2011To the contrary, in Leal we quoted with approval Pitmon’s remark that section 288(b) punished “ ‘the obtaining of a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of the child’s will.’ ” (Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1009, italics added, quoting Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 49 .) As explained earlier, the court in Pitmon , consistent with that understanding, applied its definition to determine that the duress used was not only of an objectively sufficient magnitude, but actually had the effect of coercing the victim into participating: the court concluded that the defendant’s threats | 1 | 1 |
California Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Districtgreen2 sentences2004In order to define “duress” for purposes of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), the court in Pitmon recognized that “courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language used” (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 , citing California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 621 P.2d 856 ]), and consulted Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which currently includes the following definition of duress: “restraint or check by force . . . stringent compulsion by threat of dang 2004In order to define “duress” for purposes of section 288, subdivision (b)(1), the court in Pitmon recognized that “courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language used” (People v. Pitmon, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50 , citing California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal. 3d 692, 698 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 817 , 621 P.2d 856 ]), and consulted Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, which currently includes the following definition of duress: “restraint or check by force . . . stringent compulsion by threat of dang | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1995(See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 , 16 A.L.R.4th 1255 ].) The evidence was conflicting concerning whether appellant actually touched Kerlett’s bare buttocks. 1995(See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 431 , 606 P.2d 738 , 16 A.L.R.4th 1255 ].) The evidence was conflicting concerning whether appellant actually touched Kerlett’s bare buttocks. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cicero
green
2 sentences2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi 1986The court noted that before the 1981 amendment of subdivision (b), which deleted the element of being “against the will of the victim” from the statute (Stats. 1981, ch. 1064, § 1, p. 4093), “both logic and fairness compelled] the conclusion that ‘force’ in subdivision (b) must reasonably be given the same established meaning it has achieved in the law of rape: ‘force’ should be defined as a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will and not exclusively as a means of causing physical harm to the child.” (Cicero, supra, at pp. 475-476 .) The court t | 2 | 1986–2013 |
Hatch v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2024(Id. at pp. 182-183.) This court in Hatch, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 188 and other courts have declined to follow La Fontaine on this point. 2024(Id. at pp. 182-183.) This court in Hatch, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 188 and other courts have declined to follow La Fontaine on this point. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Goodliffe
green
1 sentence2022The list also includes at least one nonforcible form of several other offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation and sexual penetration accomplished “against the victim’s will by threatening to use the 25 Wandrey cites People v. Goodliffe (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 723 as “noting that Section 667.6[, subdivision] (e) distinguishes between ‘a forcible lewd act on a child as defined by section 288, subdivision (b)’ and a ‘nonforcible molestation[]’ of the same victim.” The distinction he quotes was actually spelled out in People v. Maharaj, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at page 649 , which explained | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Maharaj
green
1 sentence2022The list also includes at least one nonforcible form of several other offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation and sexual penetration accomplished “against the victim’s will by threatening to use the 25 Wandrey cites People v. Goodliffe (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 723 as “noting that Section 667.6[, subdivision] (e) distinguishes between ‘a forcible lewd act on a child as defined by section 288, subdivision (b)’ and a ‘nonforcible molestation[]’ of the same victim.” The distinction he quotes was actually spelled out in People v. Maharaj, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at page 649 , which explained | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Whitham
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Whitman (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1290 .) Accordingly, attempt to commit a lewd act is a lesser included offense of the completed offense. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Van Ngo
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Ngo (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 126, 156 .) Committing a lewd act in violation of section 288 is a specific intent crime. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2015We are thus compelled to reverse defendant’s conviction and eight-year term for the lesser offense of committing a lewd act in violation of section 288, subdivision (a), based on the People’s election of “hand over mouth,” because there is insufficient 15. evidence that he performed that specific act with the intent “ ‘to arouse ... the lust, the passion or the sexual desire of the perpetrator .…’ [Citation.]” (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 444 .) II. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Reyes
green
1 sentence2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Alvarez
green
1 sentence2013"The federal and state prohibitions against ex post facto laws apply to any statute that punishes as a crime an act previously committed which was not a crime when done or . . . inflicts greater punishment than the applicable law when the crime was committed." (People v. Alvarez (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1178 .) In its current version, the One Strike law requires a person convicted of committing a lewd act in violation of section 288, subdivision (a) to be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life when, among other things, "[t]he defendant has been convicted in the prese | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Schulz
green
1 sentence2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Veale
green
2 sentences2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi 2013(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 46 , quoting Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 .) Force is “a method of obtaining a child’s participation in a lewd act in violation of a child’s will . . . .” (Cicero, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 476 .) “[T]hreats need not be express, but may be inferred from conduct. [Citation.] Silent threats, of course, generate 12 fear.” (People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811 .) The victim’s age and size are relevant to a determination of whether the victim’s participation has been obtained by duress. “‘“Where the defendant is a family member and the vi | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2010However, Turner involved the Three Strikes law, which constitutes an alternate sentencing scheme. . . . [f] On the other hand, annoying or molesting a child with a prior conviction of a lewd act in violation of section 288 is a felony punishable by a term of two, four or six years in state prison. (§ 647.6, subd. (c)(2).) Because the maximum term prescribed by statute for a violation of section 647.6, subdivision (c)(2), is six years, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.” (People v. McSherry, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 603 , citation omitted.) 7 In People v. Johnson (2006) 1 2010However, Turner involved the Three Strikes law, which constitutes an alternate sentencing scheme. . . . [f] On the other hand, annoying or molesting a child with a prior conviction of a lewd act in violation of section 288 is a felony punishable by a term of two, four or six years in state prison. (§ 647.6, subd. (c)(2).) Because the maximum term prescribed by statute for a violation of section 647.6, subdivision (c)(2), is six years, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.” (People v. McSherry, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 603 , citation omitted.) 7 In People v. Johnson (2006) 1 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. McSherry
neutral
1 sentence2010However, Turner involved the Three Strikes law, which constitutes an alternate sentencing scheme. . . . [f] On the other hand, annoying or molesting a child with a prior conviction of a lewd act in violation of section 288 is a felony punishable by a term of two, four or six years in state prison. (§ 647.6, subd. (c)(2).) Because the maximum term prescribed by statute for a violation of section 647.6, subdivision (c)(2), is six years, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.” (People v. McSherry, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 603 , citation omitted.) 7 In People v. Johnson (2006) 1 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Turner
green
2 sentences2006(People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1591 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ]; § 802, subd. (a).) 4 Because the information in this case was filed more than one year after the charged incident, McSherry concludes the conviction must be reversed. 2006(People v. Turner (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1591 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ]; § 802, subd. (a).) 4 Because the information in this case was filed more than one year after the charged incident, McSherry concludes the conviction must be reversed. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.