nondelegation doctrine in California

2019"When faced with a statute reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, of which at least one raises constitutional questions, we should construe it in a manner that avoids any doubt about its validity." ( Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384 , 394, 211 Cal.Rptr. 758 , 696 P.2d 150 .) Nor does the Legislature's 2018 amendment to section 12531 alter our conclusion this provision was intended to effectuate the terms of the National Mortgage Settlement, including the former Attorney General's instructions.

2019"When faced with a statute reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, of which at least one raises constitutional questions, we should construe it in a manner that avoids any doubt about its validity." ( Association for Retarded Citizens v. Department of Developmental Services (1985) 38 Cal.3d 384 , 394, 211 Cal.Rptr. 758 , 696 P.2d 150 .) Nor does the Legislature's 2018 amendment to section 12531 alter our conclusion this provision was intended to effectuate the terms of the National Mortgage Settlement, including the former Attorney General's instructions.

2026Wright expressly holds that the development of these factors by the Judicial Council, and thus reliance on these factors by the court, does not involve an unconstitutional delegation of power. ( Wright, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 711–714.) Accordingly, defendant’s contentions regarding the nondelegation doctrine are without merit.

2025Rule 4.421 Exceeds the Legislative Delegation in Section 1170.3 As noted above, the Legislature authorized the Judicial Council to “adopt[] rules providing criteria for the consideration of the trial judge at the time of sentencing regarding the court’s decision” to, inter alia, grant or deny probation or mandatory supervision, impose upper or lower prison terms, impose enhancements, or impose concurrent or consecutive sentences. (§ 1170.3, subd. (a)(1)–(7).) The Council’s overarching mandate under section 1170.3, set forth in the preamble to this grant of rulemaking authority, is to adopt rul

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2025(See Hampton & Co. v. United States (1928) 276 U.S. 394, 409 ; Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U.S. 649, 692 .) A frequently cited federal nondelegation case, in close parallel to Wright under California law, addresses and rejects a nondelegation challenge to the federal sentencing guidelines.

2025(Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1255 ; Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 847–848.) I read the majority opinion to say that the concept of a “reasonable relationship” to the crime or the defendant is so expansive as to offer an inadequate safeguard against arbitrariness under the nondelegation doctrine—in essence, it offers no more content than a directive to exercise the delegated authority “reasonably”—but there appears to be little case law on point.

2025(Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1255 ; Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 847–848.) I read the majority opinion to say that the concept of a “reasonable relationship” to the crime or the defendant is so expansive as to offer an inadequate safeguard against arbitrariness under the nondelegation doctrine—in essence, it offers no more content than a directive to exercise the delegated authority “reasonably”—but there appears to be little case law on point.

2025(See Hampton & Co. v. United States (1928) 276 U.S. 394, 409 ; Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U.S. 649, 692 .) A frequently cited federal nondelegation case, in close parallel to Wright under California law, addresses and rejects a nondelegation challenge to the federal sentencing guidelines.

2025(Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1255 ; Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 847–848.) I read the majority opinion to say that the concept of a “reasonable relationship” to the crime or the defendant is so expansive as to offer an inadequate safeguard against arbitrariness under the nondelegation doctrine—in essence, it offers no more content than a directive to exercise the delegated authority “reasonably”—but there appears to be little case law on point.

2025(Black I, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1255 ; Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 847–848.) I read the majority opinion to say that the concept of a “reasonable relationship” to the crime or the defendant is so expansive as to offer an inadequate safeguard against arbitrariness under the nondelegation doctrine—in essence, it offers no more content than a directive to exercise the delegated authority “reasonably”—but there appears to be little case law on point.

2025(See Chavez Zepeda, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 [“the prohibition against vague laws ‘rests on the twin constitutional pillars of due process and separation of powers’ ”] [quoting United States v. Davis (2019) 588 U.S. 445, 451 ].) Although we had no occasion to decide the validity of the residual clause in Chavez Zepeda, we noted that the Arizona high court invalidated on due process grounds the use of “catch-all aggravator[s]” to exceed the presumptive term when no enumerated aggravating factor was found consistently with Apprendi.

2023Because we see no ambiguity in the statute, we likewise reject the suggestion by Chavez Zepeda’s amici that we should adopt Chavez Zepeda’s construction under the rule of lenity, which “ ‘ “generally requires that ‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972 , 989.) A. Section 1170 Refers to Rule 4.421’s Aggravating Factors “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislat

2023Because we see no ambiguity in the statute, we likewise reject the suggestion by Chavez Zepeda’s amici that we should adopt Chavez Zepeda’s construction under the rule of lenity, which “ ‘ “generally requires that ‘ambiguity in a criminal statute should be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 972 , 989.) A. Section 1170 Refers to Rule 4.421’s Aggravating Factors “As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislat

2023He contends that our interpretation of the statute should be guided by the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which provides that “a statute should not be construed to violate the Constitution ‘ “ ‘if any other possible construction remains available.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, 804 .) Arguing that it would raise serious separation-of-powers concerns if section 1170(b)(2) referred to the factors in rule 4.421, Chavez Zepeda points out that “the Legislature has enacted dozens of statutory aggravating factors, some tied to individual offenses, and some with much wider appli

2017In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 , we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after considering " 'all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the employer and the employee, including the City's financial condition.' " ( Id. at p. 622, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 .) We held that so *1150 long as "the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation

2017In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 , we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after considering " 'all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the employer and the employee, including the City's financial condition.' " ( Id. at p. 622, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 .) We held that so *1150 long as "the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation

2017Ass'n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 42 , 47 ; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245 , 252-254, 386 A.2d 1290 ; Harney v. Russo (1969) 435 Pa. 183 , 189, 255 A.2d 560 .) Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide "a well-settled list of factors" that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 , we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after considering " 'all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the employer and the employee, including the City's financial condition.' " ( Id. at p. 622, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 .) We held that so *1150 long as "the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation

2017Ass'n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 42 , 47 ; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245 , 252-254, 386 A.2d 1290 ; Harney v. Russo (1969) 435 Pa. 183 , 189, 255 A.2d 560 .) Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide "a well-settled list of factors" that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).

2017Ass'n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 42 , 47 ; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245 , 252-254, 386 A.2d 1290 ; Harney v. Russo (1969) 435 Pa. 183 , 189, 255 A.2d 560 .) Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide "a well-settled list of factors" that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017(See Brown , supra , 29 Cal.3d at p. 201 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 487 , 624 P.2d 1215 .) We observed that the statutes "do not involve fundamental policy determinations, but rather relate to the working details of the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees covered by the act." ( Ibid. ) The Legislature "may declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize" mediators "to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases" without violating the nondelegation doctrine. ( Birkenfeld , supra , 17 Cal.3d at p. 167 , 130 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 550 P.2d 1001 .) *

2017In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 , we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after considering " 'all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the employer and the employee, including the City's financial condition.' " ( Id. at p. 622, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 .) We held that so *1150 long as "the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation

2017In Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608 , 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 , we rejected a nondelegation challenge to a Vallejo city charter provision that permitted an arbitral board to resolve disputed terms of employment after considering " 'all factors relevant to the issues from the standpoint of both the employer and the employee, including the City's financial condition.' " ( Id. at p. 622, 116 Cal.Rptr. 507 , 526 P.2d 971 .) We held that so *1150 long as "the arbitrators do not proceed beyond the provisions of the Vallejo charter, there is no unlawful delegation

2017Ass'n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 42 , 47 ; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245 , 252-254, 386 A.2d 1290 ; Harney v. Russo (1969) 435 Pa. 183 , 189, 255 A.2d 560 .) Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide "a well-settled list of factors" that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).

2017Ass'n of Fire Fighters (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 42 , 47 ; Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Authority (1978) 76 N.J. 245 , 252-254, 386 A.2d 1290 ; Harney v. Russo (1969) 435 Pa. 183 , 189, 255 A.2d 560 .) Other compulsory arbitration statutes provide "a well-settled list of factors" that closely resembles that set forth in section 1164, subdivision (e).

2000The "purpose and policy" underlying this constitutional prohibition, we observed, was cogently stated by Justice Cardozo in In re Richardson (1928) 247 N.Y. 401 [ 160 N.E. 655 ]. "`The policy is to conserve the time of the judges for the performance of their work, and to save them from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties.' In other words, it is intended to exclude judicial officers from such extrajudicial activities as may tend to militate against the free, disinterested and impartial exercise of their judicial functions." (

2000The "purpose and policy" underlying this constitutional prohibition, we observed, was cogently stated by Justice Cardozo in In re Richardson (1928) 247 N.Y. 401 [ 160 N.E. 655 ]. "`The policy is to conserve the time of the judges for the performance of their work, and to save them from the entanglements, at times the partisan suspicions, so often the result of other and conflicting duties.' In other words, it is intended to exclude judicial officers from such extrajudicial activities as may tend to militate against the free, disinterested and impartial exercise of their judicial functions." (