state double jeopardy clause in California

1997Henderson , which we reaffirmed in Collins , held that, when a defendant successfully challenges his conviction, the state double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition of a greater sentence following retrial, thus preventing an “unreasonabl[e] impairment]” of “[a] defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; see also People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 424 P.2d 932 ].) Our reference in

1997Henderson , which we reaffirmed in Collins , held that, when a defendant successfully challenges his conviction, the state double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition of a greater sentence following retrial, thus preventing an “unreasonabl[e] impairment]” of “[a] defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; see also People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 424 P.2d 932 ].) Our reference in

1996Though not mentioned by appellant, we recognize Cardenas v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 273 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 363 P.2d 889 ] declined to adopt a United States Supreme Court decision which interpreted the federal *1641 Constitution in a manner which would conflict with established California law holding the state double jeopardy clause barred a retrial following a mistrial granted over the defendant’s objection.

1996Though not mentioned by appellant, we recognize Cardenas v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 273 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 567 , 363 P.2d 889 ] declined to adopt a United States Supreme Court decision which interpreted the federal *1641 Constitution in a manner which would conflict with established California law holding the state double jeopardy clause barred a retrial following a mistrial granted over the defendant’s objection.

1997Henderson , which we reaffirmed in Collins , held that, when a defendant successfully challenges his conviction, the state double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition of a greater sentence following retrial, thus preventing an “unreasonabl[e] impairment]” of “[a] defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; see also People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 424 P.2d 932 ].) Our reference in

1997The rule, which we already discussed, protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal (see People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 459 ; People v. Ali, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 281; People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497) is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause.

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2000Third, the lead opinion in Monge expressly recognized and impliedly reaffirmed that "[t]he rule ... protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal [citations] is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause. [Citation.]" ( Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 844 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , citing Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ; see People v. Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 850 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 968 P.2d 465 (dis. opn. of Bro

2000Third, the lead opinion in Monge expressly recognized and impliedly reaffirmed that "[t]he rule ... protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal [citations] is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause. [Citation.]" ( Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 844 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , citing Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ; see People v. Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 850 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 968 P.2d 465 (dis. opn. of Bro

1997Henderson , which we reaffirmed in Collins , held that, when a defendant successfully challenges his conviction, the state double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition of a greater sentence following retrial, thus preventing an “unreasonabl[e] impairment]” of “[a] defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; see also People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 424 P.2d 932 ].) Our reference in

1997Henderson , which we reaffirmed in Collins , held that, when a defendant successfully challenges his conviction, the state double jeopardy clause prohibits imposition of a greater sentence following retrial, thus preventing an “unreasonabl[e] impairment]” of “[a] defendant’s right of appeal from an erroneous judgment.” (People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 497 ; see also People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216 ; People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 459 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 618 , 462 P.2d 370 ]; People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal.2d 277, 281 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 424 P.2d 932 ].) Our reference in

2020(Id. at 3 Henderson “is one instance where . . . the state double jeopardy clause [has been interpreted] more broadly than the federal clause.” (People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826, 844 .) The imposition of a more severe sentence following reversal and retrial does not violate the federal double jeopardy clause.

2000Third, the lead opinion in Monge expressly recognized and impliedly reaffirmed that "[t]he rule ... protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal [citations] is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause. [Citation.]" ( Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 844 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , citing Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ; see People v. Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 850 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 968 P.2d 465 (dis. opn. of Bro

2000Third, the lead opinion in Monge expressly recognized and impliedly reaffirmed that "[t]he rule ... protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal [citations] is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause. [Citation.]" ( Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 844 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , citing Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ; see People v. Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 850 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 968 P.2d 465 (dis. opn. of Bro

2000Third, the lead opinion in Monge expressly recognized and impliedly reaffirmed that "[t]he rule ... protecting defendants from receiving a greater sentence if reconvicted after a successful appeal [citations] is one instance where we have interpreted the state double jeopardy clause more broadly than the federal clause. [Citation.]" ( Monge, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 844 , 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 , citing Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 495-497, 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ; see People v. Hernandez, supra, 19 Cal.4th 835, 850 , 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 968 P.2d 465 (dis. opn. of Bro

2013Any motion to dismiss the case under the state double jeopardy clause would also have failed because that clause bars retrial following the grant of a defense mistrial motion in two circumstances not applicable here: “(1) when the prosecution intentionally commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, and also (2) when the 22 prosecution, believing in view of events that unfold during an ongoing trial that the defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial in the absence of misconduct, intentionally and knowingly commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal–

2013(Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667 ; Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 665, 682.) The California Constitution bars retrial in an additional circumstance: ―when the prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) that a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, knowingly and intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal.‖ (Batts, at pp. 665-666.) ―In the latter circumstance, . . . retrial is barred under the state double jeopardy clause only if a court, reviewing all of the circumstances as of the time of the misconduct, finds not

2015(Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667, 679 (Kennedy); Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 665, 682.) The California Constitution bars retrial in an additional circumstance: “when the prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) that a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, knowingly and intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal.” (Batts, at p. 666.) In that circumstance, “retrial is barred under the state double jeopardy clause only if a court, reviewing all of the circumstances as of the time of the misconduct, finds not onl

2013(Oregon v. Kennedy (1982) 456 U.S. 667 ; Batts, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 665, 682.) The California Constitution bars retrial in an additional circumstance: ―when the prosecution, believing (in view of events that occurred during trial) that a defendant is likely to secure an acquittal at that trial, knowingly and intentionally commits misconduct in order to thwart such an acquittal.‖ (Batts, at pp. 665-666.) ―In the latter circumstance, . . . retrial is barred under the state double jeopardy clause only if a court, reviewing all of the circumstances as of the time of the misconduct, finds not

2019(See Stone, at p. 516, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 [referencing "the double jeopardy clause" without differentiation].) We conclude the Stone rule survives as an interpretation of California's double jeopardy clause. "[T]he California Constitution is a document of independent force and effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defendants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court." ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289 , 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 , 914 P.2d 832 ( Fields ).) The state double jeopardy clause w

2019(See Stone, at p. 516, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 [referencing "the double jeopardy clause" without differentiation].) We conclude the Stone rule survives as an interpretation of California's double jeopardy clause. "[T]he California Constitution is a document of independent force and effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defendants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court." ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289 , 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 , 914 P.2d 832 ( Fields ).) The state double jeopardy clause w

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019(See Stone, at p. 516, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 [referencing "the double jeopardy clause" without differentiation].) We conclude the Stone rule survives as an interpretation of California's double jeopardy clause. "[T]he California Constitution is a document of independent force and effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defendants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court." ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289 , 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 , 914 P.2d 832 ( Fields ).) The state double jeopardy clause w

2019(See Stone, at p. 516, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647 , 646 P.2d 809 [referencing "the double jeopardy clause" without differentiation].) We conclude the Stone rule survives as an interpretation of California's double jeopardy clause. "[T]he California Constitution is a document of independent force and effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defendants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court." ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289 , 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 , 914 P.2d 832 ( Fields ).) The state double jeopardy clause w

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2019For example, People v. Batts , supra , 30 Cal.4th 660 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 concluded that double jeopardy principles not only barred a retrial after a prosecutor commits misconduct for the purpose of triggering a mistrial, the federal standard, but also if a prosecutor commits misconduct to thwart a reasonable prospect of acquittal. ( Id . at pp. 665-666, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 67 , 68 P.3d 357 .) People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482 , 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 held that a defendant could not receive a more severe punishment on retrial after a successful appeal, a limitation no

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003(State v. Kennedy (1983) 295 Or. 260 [ 666 P.2d 1316, 1326 ] (Kennedy II); Pool v. Superior Court (1984) 139 Ariz. 98 [ 677 P.2d 261 , 271-272] (Pool); Com. v. Smith (1992) 532 Pa. 177 [ 615 A.2d 321, 325 ] (Smith); State v. Breit (1996) 122 N.M. 655 [ 930 P.2d 792, 803 ] {Breit); Bauder v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) 921 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Bauder); State v. Rogan (1999) 91 Hawaii 405 [ 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 ] (Rogan).) These broader tests, however, have been subject to criticism as well.

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

2003Because the state double jeopardy clause is implicated when a prosecutor, believing that a particular jury is likely to return an acquittal, intentionally commits misconduct in order to improperly prejudice the jury and obtain a conviction—and because the majority's narrow test in Kennedy fails to protect that aspect of a defendant's double jeopardy interests—we conclude that the federal test, standing alone, is insufficient to protect interests that our state Constitution's double jeopardy clause is intended to safeguard. *90 2 Competing tests designed to more fully protect double jeopardy in

1998(Id. at p. 497.) “The Henderson holding was not confined to invalidation of a death sentence after reversal of a judgment imposing a life sentence; it was applied to any case in which a more severe sentence is sought to be imposed on a retrial.” (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) § 316, p. 365; People v. Superior Court (Harris) (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1332, 1336 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 563 ],) 6 Recently, in People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 482 , noting “. . . w

1998(Id. at p. 497.) “The Henderson holding was not confined to invalidation of a death sentence after reversal of a judgment imposing a life sentence; it was applied to any case in which a more severe sentence is sought to be imposed on a retrial.” (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) § 316, p. 365; People v. Superior Court (Harris) (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1332, 1336 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 563 ],) 6 Recently, in People v. Monge (1997) 16 Cal.4th 826 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 , 941 P.2d 1121 ], the Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 482 , noting “. . . w

1997(Cf. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 719-721 [89 S.Ct. at pp. 2077-2079] [finding no violation of the federal double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances].) A second instance is the rule prohibiting retrial after the trial court has declared a mistrial without the defendant's consent. ( Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 715-718 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; Cardenas v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 273, 275-276 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 363 P.2d 889 ]; cf. Gori v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 364, 365 [ 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1524 , 6 L.Ed.2d 901 ] [finding no violation of the

1997(Cf. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. at pp. 719-721 [89 S.Ct. at pp. 2077-2079] [finding no violation of the federal double jeopardy clause under similar circumstances].) A second instance is the rule prohibiting retrial after the trial court has declared a mistrial without the defendant's consent. ( Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 715-718 [ 87 Cal. Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; Cardenas v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 273, 275-276 [ 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 , 363 P.2d 889 ]; cf. Gori v. United States (1961) 367 U.S. 364, 365 [ 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1524 , 6 L.Ed.2d 901 ] [finding no violation of the

1997(See People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 914, fn. 4 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 884 P.2d 81 ] [stating the policy underlying Henderson as a reason for barring retrial of enhancements].) 2 Because we based our decision in Marks on an interpretation of the California Constitution that is not relevant here, Marks has no bearing upon our interpretation of the federal Constitution.

1997(See People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 914, fn. 4 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 , 884 P.2d 81 ] [stating the policy underlying Henderson as a reason for barring retrial of enhancements].) 2 Because we based our decision in Marks on an interpretation of the California Constitution that is not relevant here, Marks has no bearing upon our interpretation of the federal Constitution.