Tunkl factors in California

2025Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662, 670 .) “Tunkl’s public interest analysis focuses upon the overall transaction—with special emphasis upon the importance of the underlying service or program, and the relative bargaining relationship of the parties—in order to determine whether an agreement releasing future liability for ordinary negligence is unenforceable.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 762 .) Put differently, Tunkl’s analysis of whether a release affects the public interest is focused, in important part, on the position the releasee is placed in.

2013(See, e.g., Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733 , 737 [health club]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 (Randas) [swimming]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1467 [bicycling].) On the other hand, exculpatory clauses have been found unenforceable based on the Tunkl factors in the following illustrative cases cited by Shawa, none of which 7 involved services as essential to the public as medical care: Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662 , 670–676 (finding child

2025Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662, 670 .) “Tunkl’s public interest analysis focuses upon the overall transaction—with special emphasis upon the importance of the underlying service or program, and the relative bargaining relationship of the parties—in order to determine whether an agreement releasing future liability for ordinary negligence is unenforceable.” (Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 762 .) Put differently, Tunkl’s analysis of whether a release affects the public interest is focused, in important part, on the position the releasee is placed in.

2025(See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512 , 517–519 [applying the Tunkl factors to a release for negligence in a residential lease]; Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 479–480 (Westlake Community Hospital) [release in hospital bylaws].) In City of Santa Barbara, we addressed gross negligence and held that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777 .) This case implicates section 1668’s prohibi

2025Yet notwithstanding section 1714, courts have recognized that parties have the freedom to contract a release of ordinary negligence in certain circumstances (see, e.g., Lewis Operating Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 940, 946 ), and indeed the entire Tunkl framework would have been unnecessary if section 1714 had the sweeping effect the City fears. 20 WHITEHEAD v. CITY OF OAKLAND Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

2025Yet notwithstanding section 1714, courts have recognized that parties have the freedom to contract a release of ordinary negligence in certain circumstances (see, e.g., Lewis Operating Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 940, 946 ), and indeed the entire Tunkl framework would have been unnecessary if section 1714 had the sweeping effect the City fears. 20 WHITEHEAD v. CITY OF OAKLAND Opinion of the Court by Evans, J.

2025(See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512 , 517–519 [applying the Tunkl factors to a release for negligence in a residential lease]; Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 479–480 (Westlake Community Hospital) [release in hospital bylaws].) In City of Santa Barbara, we addressed gross negligence and held that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777 .) This case implicates section 1668’s prohibi

2025(See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512 , 517–519 [applying the Tunkl factors to a release for negligence in a residential lease]; Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 479–480 (Westlake Community Hospital) [release in hospital bylaws].) In City of Santa Barbara, we addressed gross negligence and held that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777 .) This case implicates section 1668’s prohibi

2013(See, e.g., Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733 , 737 [health club]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 (Randas) [swimming]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1467 [bicycling].) On the other hand, exculpatory clauses have been found unenforceable based on the Tunkl factors in the following illustrative cases cited by Shawa, none of which 7 involved services as essential to the public as medical care: Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662 , 670–676 (finding child

2013(See, e.g., Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733 , 737 [health club]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 (Randas) [swimming]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1467 [bicycling].) On the other hand, exculpatory clauses have been found unenforceable based on the Tunkl factors in the following illustrative cases cited by Shawa, none of which 7 involved services as essential to the public as medical care: Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662 , 670–676 (finding child

2025(See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512 , 517–519 [applying the Tunkl factors to a release for negligence in a residential lease]; Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 479–480 (Westlake Community Hospital) [release in hospital bylaws].) In City of Santa Barbara, we addressed gross negligence and held that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777 .) This case implicates section 1668’s prohibi

2025(See Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512 , 517–519 [applying the Tunkl factors to a release for negligence in a residential lease]; Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 , 479–480 (Westlake Community Hospital) [release in hospital bylaws].) In City of Santa Barbara, we addressed gross negligence and held that “public policy generally precludes enforcement of an agreement that would remove an obligation to adhere to even a minimal standard of care.” (City of Santa Barbara, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 777 .) This case implicates section 1668’s prohibi

2025Fitness International, LLC, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084–1085 [applying the Tunkl factors and upholding the release as to a common law negligence cause of action, but deeming the release unenforceable as to a cause of action based on negligent violations of the Health & Saf.

2025Fitness International, LLC, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084–1085 [applying the Tunkl factors and upholding the release as to a common law negligence cause of action, but deeming the release unenforceable as to a cause of action based on negligent violations of the Health & Saf.

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2018(See Street Racers, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 934 [upholding release in case claiming lack of competent medical attention/rescue equipment]; see also Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1259 [fall from chairlift during ski lesson]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 161-162 [swim class]; 16 Paralift, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [skydiving]; Saenz, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 764 [commercial river rafting]; Madison, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 593, 597-599 [scuba diving]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.A

2016(See California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22 .) Further, because significant Tunkl factors are not implicated here, we agree with the trial court that the release of liability was valid and enforceable. 5 First, IHS did not conduct "business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation." (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 98 .) IHS was primarily a nonprofit group providing spiritual support and a home for those recovering from substance abuse problems.

2013The parties agree this is the most important of the Tunkl factors because it goes to the ―essence of the Tunkl policy [which] is that individuals should not be compelled by practical necessity to agree to limitations of liability.‖ (McCarn v. Pacific Bell Directory (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 173, 182 .) The third Tunkl factor also applies—the party seeking exculpation from negligence ―holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.‖ (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 99 , fn. omitted.)

2013The parties agree this is the most important of the Tunkl factors because it goes to the ―essence of the Tunkl policy [which] is that individuals should not be compelled by practical necessity to agree to limitations of liability.‖ (McCarn v. Pacific Bell Directory (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 173, 182 .) The third Tunkl factor also applies—the party seeking exculpation from negligence ―holds himself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.‖ (Tunkl, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 99 , fn. omitted.)

2013(See, e.g., Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733 , 737 [health club]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 (Randas) [swimming]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1467 [bicycling].) On the other hand, exculpatory clauses have been found unenforceable based on the Tunkl factors in the following illustrative cases cited by Shawa, none of which 7 involved services as essential to the public as medical care: Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662 , 670–676 (finding child

2013(See, e.g., Lund v. Bally’s Aerobic Plus, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 733 , 737 [health club]; Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 162 (Randas) [swimming]; Okura v. United States Cycling Federation (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1462, 1467 [bicycling].) On the other hand, exculpatory clauses have been found unenforceable based on the Tunkl factors in the following illustrative cases cited by Shawa, none of which 7 involved services as essential to the public as medical care: Gavin W. v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 662 , 670–676 (finding child

2007We adopt the rule followed by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, together with its public-policy-based rationale. [55] See, for example, Hojnowski, supra, 375 N.J.Super. 568 , 868 A.2d 1087 , in which the New Jersey appellate court, adhering to the majority rule, declined to enforce a skateboard park's release of liability for negligence, signed by a parent on behalf of a minor.

2007We adopt the rule followed by the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, together with its public-policy-based rationale. [55] See, for example, Hojnowski, supra, 375 N.J.Super. 568 , 868 A.2d 1087 , in which the New Jersey appellate court, adhering to the majority rule, declined to enforce a skateboard park's release of liability for negligence, signed by a parent on behalf of a minor.