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15 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Janow v. Town of Ansoniagreen2 sentences2001See Janow v. Ansonia, 11 Conn. App. 1, 3-4 , 525 A.2d 966 (1987). 2001See Janow v. Ansonia, 11 Conn. App. 1, 3-4 , 525 A.2d 966 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners
green
2 sentences1994General Statutes 13a-149 requires that notice be given in order to bring a defective highway claim against a municipality. "[T]he plaintiff who fails within ninety days to provide the municipality with the statutorily required notice will be barred from any recovery." Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 , 198 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991). 1994General Statutes 13a-149 requires that notice be given in order to bring a defective highway claim against a municipality. "[T]he plaintiff who fails within ninety days to provide the municipality with the statutorily required notice will be barred from any recovery." Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179 , 198 , 592 A.2d 912 (1991). | 3 | 1994–1995 |
Marino v. Town of East Haven
green
2 sentences1997In order to properly bring a defective highway claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the notice and limitation requirements of General Statutes § 13a-149 which act as conditions precedent to the maintenance of an action thereunder. 1 Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577 , 579 , 182 A. 225 (1935). 1997In order to properly bring a defective highway claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the notice and limitation requirements of General Statutes § 13a-149 which act as conditions precedent to the maintenance of an action thereunder. 1 Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577 , 579 , 182 A. 225 (1935). | 2 | 1995–1997 |
Mastrolillo v. City of Danbury
green
2 sentences2003"Allegations of due care must be specifically pleaded in a defective highway claim brought against a municipality and cannot be presumed." Mastrolillo v. Danbury , 61 Conn. App. 693 , 699 , 767 A.2d 1232 (2001). "[T]he plaintiff's contributory negligence . . . present[s] a factual issue for the jury." Hemmings v. Weinstein , 151 Conn. 502 , 505 , 199 A.2d 687 (1964). 2003"Allegations of due care must be specifically pleaded in a defective highway claim brought against a municipality and cannot be presumed." Mastrolillo v. Danbury , 61 Conn. App. 693 , 699 , 767 A.2d 1232 (2001). "[T]he plaintiff's contributory negligence . . . present[s] a factual issue for the jury." Hemmings v. Weinstein , 151 Conn. 502 , 505 , 199 A.2d 687 (1964). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Trzcinski v. Richey
green
2 sentences2003"Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trzcinski v. Richey , 190 Conn. 285 , 295 , 460 A.2d 1269 (1983). 2003"Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Trzcinski v. Richey , 190 Conn. 285 , 295 , 460 A.2d 1269 (1983). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Hemmings v. Weinstein
green
2 sentences2003"Allegations of due care must be specifically pleaded in a defective highway claim brought against a municipality and cannot be presumed." Mastrolillo v. Danbury , 61 Conn. App. 693 , 699 , 767 A.2d 1232 (2001). "[T]he plaintiff's contributory negligence . . . present[s] a factual issue for the jury." Hemmings v. Weinstein , 151 Conn. 502 , 505 , 199 A.2d 687 (1964). 2003"Allegations of due care must be specifically pleaded in a defective highway claim brought against a municipality and cannot be presumed." Mastrolillo v. Danbury , 61 Conn. App. 693 , 699 , 767 A.2d 1232 (2001). "[T]he plaintiff's contributory negligence . . . present[s] a factual issue for the jury." Hemmings v. Weinstein , 151 Conn. 502 , 505 , 199 A.2d 687 (1964). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Gurliacci v. Mayer
green
2 sentences1999Gurliacci v. Mayer , 218 Conn. 531 , 547-49 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991). 1999Gurliacci v. Mayer , 218 Conn. 531 , 547-49 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Older v. Town of Old Lyme
green
1 sentence1998Older v. Old Lyme , 124 Conn. 283 (1938). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bresnan v. Frankel
green
2 sentences1997As a condition precedent to a cause of action pursuant to § 13a-149 , "if [it] is not met, no cause of action exists." Bresnan v. Frankel, 224 Conn. 23 , 26 , 615 A.2d 1040 (1992). 1997As a condition precedent to a cause of action pursuant to § 13a-149 , "if [it] is not met, no cause of action exists." Bresnan v. Frankel, 224 Conn. 23 , 26 , 615 A.2d 1040 (1992). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Shine v. Powers
green
1 sentence1995Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577 , 579 (1935); Shine v. Powers, 37 Conn. Sup. 710 , 711 (App. Sess. 1981). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Szachon v. Town of Windsor
green
2 sentences1995The court held CT Page 435 that in order to prevail on a defective highway claim, the plaintiff must prove "that the defect must have been the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed, which means that the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence." See Memorandum of Decision dated January 20, 1994 (Lewis, J.), quoting Szachon v. Windsor , 29 Conn. App. 791 , 797 , 618 A.2d 74 (1992). 1995The court held CT Page 435 that in order to prevail on a defective highway claim, the plaintiff must prove "that the defect must have been the sole proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed, which means that the plaintiff must prove freedom from contributory negligence." See Memorandum of Decision dated January 20, 1994 (Lewis, J.), quoting Szachon v. Windsor , 29 Conn. App. 791 , 797 , 618 A.2d 74 (1992). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Charter Oak Council, Boy Scouts v. New Hartford
green
1 sentence1994Similarly, in O'Neil v. Burns , 2 CSCR 3 , 4 (November 12, CT Page 8536 1986, Reynolds, J.), the court held that "where . . . there are no third parties who may have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, an allegation that the plaintiff was exercising due care is tantamount to an allegation that the alleged defect was the sole proximate cause of the accident." Conversely, where there are no third parties, as in the present case, an allegation that the defect was the sole proximate cause of the injury is tantamount to an allegation that the plaintiff was exercising due care, because an alleg | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Stumpo v. De Ponte
green
1 sentence1992In Moffett v. Burns, 3 CSCR 636 (July 12, 1988, Pickett, J.), aff'd 18 Conn. App. 82 , 559 A.2d 1190 (1989), cert. denied 212 Conn. 806 , 561 A.2d 947 (1989), the defendant challenged, through the use of a motion to strike, the statutory notice provided by the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes 13a-144 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commissioner of Health Services v. Kadish
green
1 sentence1992In Moffett v. Burns, 3 CSCR 636 (July 12, 1988, Pickett, J.), aff'd 18 Conn. App. 82 , 559 A.2d 1190 (1989), cert. denied 212 Conn. 806 , 561 A.2d 947 (1989), the defendant challenged, through the use of a motion to strike, the statutory notice provided by the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes 13a-144 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Lamberti v. City of Stamford
green
2 sentences1992In Lamberti v. Stamford, 131 Conn. 396 , 401 , 40 A.2d 190 (1944), the last day to give notice of a defective highway claim to the municipal clerk fell on Christmas day. 1992In Lamberti v. Stamford, 131 Conn. 396 , 401 , 40 A.2d 190 (1944), the last day to give notice of a defective highway claim to the municipal clerk fell on Christmas day. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Moffett v. Burns
green
1 sentence1992In Moffett v. Burns, 3 CSCR 636 (July 12, 1988, Pickett, J.), aff'd 18 Conn. App. 82 , 559 A.2d 1190 (1989), cert. denied 212 Conn. 806 , 561 A.2d 947 (1989), the defendant challenged, through the use of a motion to strike, the statutory notice provided by the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes 13a-144 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Ozmun v. Burns
green
2 sentences1992General Statutes 13a-144 states that a defective highway claim cannot be brought "unless notice of such injury and a general description of the same and of the cause thereof. and of the time and place of its occurrence has, been given writing . . . to the commissioner." General Statutes 13a-144 created a cause of action `wholly unauthorized by the common law.' . . . . `In view of the fact that Section [ 13a-144 ] is in derogation of the common law and that during its successive reenactments a savings clause has not been inserted, the statute must be strictly construed.' (Citations omitted) Ozm 1992General Statutes 13a-144 states that a defective highway claim cannot be brought "unless notice of such injury and a general description of the same and of the cause thereof. and of the time and place of its occurrence has, been given writing . . . to the commissioner." General Statutes 13a-144 created a cause of action `wholly unauthorized by the common law.' . . . . `In view of the fact that Section [ 13a-144 ] is in derogation of the common law and that during its successive reenactments a savings clause has not been inserted, the statute must be strictly construed.' (Citations omitted) Ozm | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Connecticut State Oil Co. v. Carbone
green
2 sentences1992In a reply memorandum, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's motion in opposition is a speaking motion under Connecticut State Oil Co. v. Carbone, 36 Conn. Sup. 181 , 182-83 , 415 A.2d 771 (1979). 1992In a reply memorandum, the defendant claims that the plaintiff's motion in opposition is a speaking motion under Connecticut State Oil Co. v. Carbone, 36 Conn. Sup. 181 , 182-83 , 415 A.2d 771 (1979). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.