legally viable claim in District of Columbia

2011Our task, then, is to determine whether OneWest Bank stated the elements of a legally viable claim against the estate and whether the allegations of its complaint, which we must accept as true, were sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Chamberlain, 931 A.2d at 1023 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

2011“However, [fjactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....”; and “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint fails to allege the elements of a legally viable claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2023And the complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim.” Id.

2014“Furthermore, dismissal under *1060 Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint fails to allege the elements of a legally viable claim.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Potomac Dev.

2016“To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C. 2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

2016“To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

2016“To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

2016“To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

2023Failure to State a Claim “The only issue on review of a dismissal [based on failure to state a claim] is the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Scott v. FedChoice Fed. Credit Union, 274 A.3d 318 , 322 (D.C. 2022) (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 228-29 ). “‘To pass muster,’ a complaint must ‘allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Falconi-Sachs, 142 A.3d at 554 (quoting Tingling-Clemmons, 133 A.3d at 245 ). 1.

2013See Grayson, 15 A.3d at 250-51 (not addressing this question specifically, but rejecting a CPPA complaint on the grounds that it "fails to allege the elements of a legally viable claim” despite a request for statutory damages and an allegation of a violation of District law). .

2014Co. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543 (D.C.2011).

2013Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1073 (D.C.2008) (quoting D.C.Code § 28-3901(e) (2001)).

2011“In the District of Columbia, legal title to real property ... passes not directly to the heirs or devisees, as at common law, but rather to the personal representative of the decedent’s estate.” Douglas v. Lyles, 841 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.2004) (quoting D.C.Code § 20-105 (2001)).

2011As discussed supra, the Council's 2000 amendments to the CPPA did not abrogate these requirements. [80] Since we conclude that Mr. Breakman does not have standing, we take no position on Judge Ruiz's analysis of whether Mr. Breakman's complaint states a legally viable claim. [81] See, e.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 . [82] See, e.g., Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 563 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [83] E.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; accord Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 578 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [84] See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, supra, 806 A.2d at 1207 . [85] Not only

2011As discussed supra, the Council's 2000 amendments to the CPPA did not abrogate these requirements. [80] Since we conclude that Mr. Breakman does not have standing, we take no position on Judge Ruiz's analysis of whether Mr. Breakman's complaint states a legally viable claim. [81] See, e.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 . [82] See, e.g., Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 563 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [83] E.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; accord Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 578 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [84] See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, supra, 806 A.2d at 1207 . [85] Not only

2011As discussed supra, the Council's 2000 amendments to the CPPA did not abrogate these requirements. [80] Since we conclude that Mr. Breakman does not have standing, we take no position on Judge Ruiz's analysis of whether Mr. Breakman's complaint states a legally viable claim. [81] See, e.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 . [82] See, e.g., Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 563 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [83] E.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; accord Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 578 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [84] See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, supra, 806 A.2d at 1207 . [85] Not only

2011As discussed supra, the Council's 2000 amendments to the CPPA did not abrogate these requirements. [80] Since we conclude that Mr. Breakman does not have standing, we take no position on Judge Ruiz's analysis of whether Mr. Breakman's complaint states a legally viable claim. [81] See, e.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 . [82] See, e.g., Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 563 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [83] E.g., Warth, supra, 422 U.S. at 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ; accord Lujan, supra, 504 U.S. at 578 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [84] See, e.g., Friends of Tilden Park, supra, 806 A.2d at 1207 . [85] Not only

2011See Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450 , 456 (3d Cir.2003).

2007See Jordan Keys & Jessamy, 870 A.2d at 62 (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim; “We agree with the trial judge that Jordan Keys’ amended complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader, does not allege the elements of an implied-in-fact contract.”); Taylor v. FDIC, 328 U.S.App.D.C. 52, 60 , 132 F.3d 753, 761 (1997) (“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when, taking the material allegations of the complaint as admitted, and construing them in plaintiffs’ favor, the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to allege all the material elements of their cause of act

2007See Jordan Keys & Jessamy, 870 A.2d at 62 (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim; “We agree with the trial judge that Jordan Keys’ amended complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader, does not allege the elements of an implied-in-fact contract.”); Taylor v. FDIC, 328 U.S.App.D.C. 52, 60 , 132 F.3d 753, 761 (1997) (“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when, taking the material allegations of the complaint as admitted, and construing them in plaintiffs’ favor, the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to allege all the material elements of their cause of act

2007See Jordan Keys & Jessamy, 870 A.2d at 62 (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim; “We agree with the trial judge that Jordan Keys’ amended complaint, viewed in the light most favorable to the pleader, does not allege the elements of an implied-in-fact contract.”); Taylor v. FDIC, 328 U.S.App.D.C. 52, 60 , 132 F.3d 753, 761 (1997) (“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when, taking the material allegations of the complaint as admitted, and construing them in plaintiffs’ favor, the court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to allege all the material elements of their cause of act

1976See Berman v. Group Health Association, Inc., supra; Dillard v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra. In support of their second contention that the trial court erred in not setting aside the summary judgment and permitting an amendment of the pleadings, appellants argue that each of the defenses they planned to raise in the amended pleading would have constituted a genuine issue of material fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment.