Clewis factual-sufficiency standard in Texas

2015The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 , 902 – 03, 912 (Tex. Crim.

2015The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that there is "no meaningful distinction between the former Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard" and that the Jackson standard "is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902-03, 912 (Tex. Crim.

2015Stated another way, the question under the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in a " neutral light," the jury's verdict is either " clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" or " against the great weight and preponderance of the [conflicting] evidence." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15 ; see also Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (reviewing court views the evidence in a neutral light and sets aside the jury's verdict " if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust" ). [13] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.

2015Stated another way, the question under the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in a " neutral light," the jury's verdict is either " clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" or " against the great weight and preponderance of the [conflicting] evidence." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15 ; see also Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (reviewing court views the evidence in a neutral light and sets aside the jury's verdict " if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust" ). [13] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.

2015Stated another way, the question under the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in a " neutral light," the jury's verdict is either " clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" or " against the great weight and preponderance of the [conflicting] evidence." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15 ; see also Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (reviewing court views the evidence in a neutral light and sets aside the jury's verdict " if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust" ). [13] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.

2015It is significant that Clewis purported to treat the evidentiary-weight standard described in Tibbs as a component of the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard that views the evidence in a " neutral light." See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 149 (Clinton, J., concurring) (" The reviewing court no longer ‘ views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution; ’ rather it must consider and weigh the evidence to determine whether the jury's resolution of conflicting testimony was manifestly unjust" (citing Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 42 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 )).[15] This Court's decision in Johnson also reco

2001When conducting a Clewis factual sufficiency analysis, we ask “whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury verdict.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (citing Mata v. State, 939 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.App. — Waco 1997, no pet.) (Vance, J., concurring)); Perkins, 19 S.W.3d at 856 .

2001When conducting a Clewis factual sufficiency analysis, we ask "whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury verdict." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (citing Mata v. State, 939 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, no pet.) (Vance, J., concurring)); Perkins, 19 S.W.3d at 856 .

2015It is fair to characterize the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard as: Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [11] Compare this to the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard which may fairly be characterized as: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[12] Viewing the evidence " in the light most favorable to the verdict" under a legal-sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is

2015It is fair to characterize the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard as: Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [11] Compare this to the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard which may fairly be characterized as: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[12] Viewing the evidence " in the light most favorable to the verdict" under a legal-sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is

2015It is fair to characterize the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard as: Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [11] Compare this to the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard which may fairly be characterized as: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.[12] Viewing the evidence " in the light most favorable to the verdict" under a legal-sufficiency standard means that the reviewing court is

2015Stated another way, the question under the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard is whether, after viewing all of the evidence in a " neutral light," the jury's verdict is either " clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" or " against the great weight and preponderance of the [conflicting] evidence." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15 ; see also Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129 (reviewing court views the evidence in a neutral light and sets aside the jury's verdict " if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust" ). [13] See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.

2015We decline to question over 150 years of criminal and civil jurisprudence in this State and construe constitutional and statutory mandates to review ‘ questions of fact’ to also require direct-appeal courts to sit as ‘ thirteenth jurors' in criminal cases." ) (emphasis supplied). [26] Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). [27] Id.; Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 , 334 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (Price, J., concurring). [28] Ex parte Lewis, supra. [29] E.g., Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). [30] It is sometimes argued that factual sufficiency revi

2010We decline to question over 150 years of criminal and civil jurisprudence in this State and construe constitutional and statutory mandates to review `questions of fact' to also require direct-appeal courts to sit as `thirteenth jurors' in criminal cases.") (emphasis supplied). [26] Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). [27] Id.; Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 , 334 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (Price, J., concurring). [28] Ex parte Lewis, supra . [29] E.g., Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). [30] It is sometimes argued that factual sufficiency revie

2015We decline to question over 150 years of criminal and civil jurisprudence in this State and construe constitutional and statutory mandates to review ‘ questions of fact’ to also require direct-appeal courts to sit as ‘ thirteenth jurors' in criminal cases." ) (emphasis supplied). [26] Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). [27] Id.; Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 , 334 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (Price, J., concurring). [28] Ex parte Lewis, supra. [29] E.g., Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). [30] It is sometimes argued that factual sufficiency revi

2010We decline to question over 150 years of criminal and civil jurisprudence in this State and construe constitutional and statutory mandates to review `questions of fact' to also require direct-appeal courts to sit as `thirteenth jurors' in criminal cases.") (emphasis supplied). [26] Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 338 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). [27] Id.; Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 , 334 n. 11 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (Price, J., concurring). [28] Ex parte Lewis, supra . [29] E.g., Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 571-72 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). [30] It is sometimes argued that factual sufficiency revie

2011App. 2010) (holding that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the “only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt”); see Guzman v. State , No. 02-10-00148-CR, 2010 WL 4138557 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2010, pet. filed and withdrawn) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling Guzman’s factual sufficiency challenge to the trial court’s revocation order because this standard has historically been held inapplicable

2010Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref=d); Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, pet. ref=d).

2010Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref=d); Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, pet. ref=d).

2001Also consistent with Clewis and Meraz , the courts of appeals have declined to apply the Clewis factual sufficiency analysis when reviewing issues which involved discretion, such as in deciding to revoke community supervision as in Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.App.—Waco 1996, pet’n ref’d), or in the assessment of punishment as in Kanouse v. State, 958 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet’n), and in Flores v. State, supra. In his brief, appellant equates the review of the determination of fact issues with the review of the assessment of punishment and contends that the same sta

2022Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd) (“Because the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove a section 2.03 defense by establishing its case beyond a reasonable doubt, we review both legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury’s rejection of such a defense under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.”).

2015All other cases to the contrary, including Clewis, are overruled.” Brooks v. State, 323 SW3d 893, 894 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010); See also Writh v. State, 361 S.W.3d 694 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) reaffirming the reversal of Clewis and it’s progeny; and Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624-5 , (Tex. Crim.

2012App. 2007) (distinguishing sufficiency review from review under accomplice-witness rule); Cantelon v. State, 85 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (“A challenge of insufficient corroboration is not the same as a challenge of insufficient evidence to support the verdict as a whole.”). 4 A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The court of criminal appeals has held that there is “no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual- sufficiency standard” and that the Jackson standard “is the only standard that a reviewing cour

2011Ann. art. 42.12, ' 5(b); see Antwine v. State , 268 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). [3] To the extent relevant, we note that the Clewis factual sufficiency standard was overruled by Brooks v. State . 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 2010) (holding that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the ―only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt‖); see Guzman v. State, No. 02-10-00148- CR, 2010 WL 4138557 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 21, 2010, pet. filed and withdrawn) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling Guzman‘s factual sufficiency challenge to the trial court‘s revocation order because this standard has historically been held inapplicable

2010See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 134-36 (discussing “factfinder deference and right to trial by jury”); see also Roberts v. State, 221 S.W.3d 659 , 661-62 n.7 (Tex.Cr.App. 2007) (in order to safeguard Texas’ constitutional right to trial by jury, the Texas Supreme Court imposed several requirements upon the reviewing court when it reverses on factual-sufficiency grounds such as requiring the reviewing court to exercise its factual-sufficiency jurisdiction with “deferential standards of review”).

2010There is, therefore, no meaningful distinction between the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and the Clewis factual-sufficiency standard, and these two standards have become indistinguishable. 19 A dissenting opinion in Lancon stated that the majority opinion “seems to say that from now on, the level of deference due a jury’s decision will be total deference when the decision is based on an evaluation of credibility.” See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 708 (Johnson, J., dissenting).

2010Pierce v. State, 113 S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref=d); Cochran v. State, 78 S.W.3d 20, 27 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); Becker v. State, 33 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Brumbalow v. State, 933 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, pet. ref=d).

2001When conducting a Clewis factual sufficiency analysis, we ask “whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury verdict.” Johnson, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (citing Mata v. State, 939 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.App. — Waco 1997, no pet.) (Vance, J., concurring)); Perkins, 19 S.W.3d at 856 .

2001When conducting a Clewis factual sufficiency analysis, we ask "whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury verdict." Johnson, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (citing Mata v. State, 939 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex.App.-Waco 1997, no pet.) (Vance, J., concurring)); Perkins, 19 S.W.3d at 856 .

1997Although originally part of the doctrine that required circumstantial evidence to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to convict a defendant, see Sullivan v. State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), the principles that “it is not necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt,” and “it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances,” have taken a life of their own and come to represent the general meaning of circumstantial evidence.