15 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vernongreen2 sentences2017See People v. Vernon, 276 Ill. 2017See People v. Vernon, 276 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Ramseygreen2 sentences2014See Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d at 433 . 2014See Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d at 433 . | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2023This failure was “fatal” to defendant’s claims regarding Cannon, and this failure alone amounted to unreasonable assistance of counsel. ¶ 24 Moreover, considering the requirements of the Act our supreme court has recognized that postconviction counsel “has an obligation to attempt to contact those witnesses who might provide information needed to support a potentially meritorious claim raised in the post-conviction petition.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 248 (1993). 2023“In the ordinary case, a trial court ruling upon a motion to dismiss a post-conviction petition which is not supported by affidavits or other documents may reasonably presume that post-conviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the post-conviction claims, but was unable to do so.” Id. at 241 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. Hodgesgreen1 sentence2025Supra ¶ 16; see Dobbey, 2011 IL App (1st) 091518, ¶ 37 ; see also Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11-12 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dobbeygreen1 sentence2025Supra ¶ 16; see Dobbey, 2011 IL App (1st) 091518, ¶ 37 ; see also Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 11-12 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pitsonbargergreen2 sentences2025People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (2002). 2025People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunigangreen1 sentence2024With respect to defendant’s claim that the sentencing enhancement violates the proportionate penalties clause, the supreme court has consistently held that the legislature’s “power to define crimes and fix punishments” is “undoubted.” People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984) (finding a mandatory, natural-life sentencing provision did not violate the proportionate penalties clause); see People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525 (2005); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 245 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Taylorgreen1 sentence2024With respect to defendant’s claim that the sentencing enhancement violates the proportionate penalties clause, the supreme court has consistently held that the legislature’s “power to define crimes and fix punishments” is “undoubted.” People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984) (finding a mandatory, natural-life sentencing provision did not violate the proportionate penalties clause); see People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525 (2005); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 245 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sharpegreen1 sentence2024With respect to defendant’s claim that the sentencing enhancement violates the proportionate penalties clause, the supreme court has consistently held that the legislature’s “power to define crimes and fix punishments” is “undoubted.” People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984) (finding a mandatory, natural-life sentencing provision did not violate the proportionate penalties clause); see People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 525 (2005); People v. Dunigan, 165 Ill. 2d 235, 245 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Greer
green
1 sentence2024He argues that counsel “knew [his] pro se claims had no merit,” as (1) an argument for sentencing as a Class 1 felon due to sudden and intense passion would have failed where he fired at Whithers intentionally, rather than negligently or accidentally; (2) the arrest report reveals that he was arrested pursuant to a juvenile warrant, not an investigative alert; and (3) the issue regarding the constitutionality of the firearm enhancement was forfeited, as it could have been raised on direct appeal, and his 31-year sentence did not constitute a de facto life sentence. -9- No. 1-23-0921 ¶ 31 Defen | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. McFadden
green
1 sentence2024Defendant argued in his second petition that his “conviction” for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon was void pursuant to the supreme court’s decisions in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 , and McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Aguilar
green
1 sentence2024Defendant argued in his second petition that his “conviction” for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon was void pursuant to the supreme court’s decisions in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 , and McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Kuehner
green
1 sentence2024He argues that counsel “knew [his] pro se claims had no merit,” as (1) an argument for sentencing as a Class 1 felon due to sudden and intense passion would have failed where he fired at Whithers intentionally, rather than negligently or accidentally; (2) the arrest report reveals that he was arrested pursuant to a juvenile warrant, not an investigative alert; and (3) the issue regarding the constitutionality of the firearm enhancement was forfeited, as it could have been raised on direct appeal, and his 31-year sentence did not constitute a de facto life sentence. -9- No. 1-23-0921 ¶ 31 Defen | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Pendleton
green
1 sentence2020Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . ¶ 19 We now examine in detail the defendant’s first contention on appeal: that postconviction counsel failed to provide the defendant with the reasonable level of assistance of counsel required by the Act, because he failed to make necessary amendments to her petition, failed to include available support, and failed “to re-frame a potentially meritorious claim.” Specifically, the defendant contends postconviction counsel failed to: (1) amend the petition “to allege prejudice when attacking a guilty plea even after the State noted the error,” (2) attach to the pe | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Newberry
green
1 sentence2019Id. at 316-17 . ¶ 76 There were no conflicting test results in this case. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Kane
green
2 sentences2014We concluded that the trial court had improperly relied on matters outside of the four corners of defendant’s petition and remanded the cause so that defendant could “be given the opportunity to proceed further on the petition.” Id. 2014App. 3d 132 , as recognizing that defendant’s pro se petition “raised a potentially meritorious claim” and as “unconvinced after the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss that [defendant’s] claims were frivolous.” Because of this, according to defendant, “the circuit court should have done everything that it could to ensure that [defendant] had a meaningful evidentiary hearing.” ¶ 24 In Kane, this court noted that, while defendant’s “allegations of perjury and prejudice might appear strained, we cannot say that they could never be proved.” Id. at 140 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Amman Food & Liquor, Inc. v. Heritage Insurance
green
2 sentences2013Imposing a permanent disability upon a corporation that was not in compliance with the Corporation Act on the date it filed suit could utterly defeat a potentially meritorious claim and provide a windfall to “a -13- defendant who has no special claim to favor.” Id. 2013The court noted that such a punitive approach would not harmonize with the principles that underlie statutes of limitation: “The purpose of a statute of limitation is to protect a potential defendant from a stale claim, one filed after the facts have been forgotten or rendered unavailable. [Citations.] Such statutes are not to be used as a technical device to avoid liability where a defendant has received timely notice of an impending complaint and has been in no way prejudiced by the passage of time [citations].” Id. at 149-50 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1999Counsel has no obligation, however, to engage in a generalized fishing expedition in search of support for claims raised in a petition." (Emphasis in original.) Johnson, 154 Ill.2d at 247-48 , 182 Ill.Dec. 1 , 609 N.E.2d 304 . 1999Counsel has no obligation, however, to engage in a generalized fishing expedition in search of support for claims raised in a petition." (Emphasis in original.) Johnson, 154 Ill.2d at 247-48 , 182 Ill.Dec. 1 , 609 N.E.2d 304 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.