potentially meritorious defense in California

2025Defendant cites People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 , People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460 , and People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851 to impliedly contend that not arguing a potentially meritorious defense at trial is IAC.

2015In mitigation, the defense also submitted 13 letters from friends, teachers, employers, and relatives attesting to Ontiveros’s good and peaceful character. 10 or failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates,” and establishes “that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.” (Id. at p. 584; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 .) And it may be appropriate even where a potentially meritorious defense was not actually withdrawn.

2014(Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d at p. 872 .) In doing so, the court in Dennis explained: “Where a defendant contends that a verdict was the result of ineffective assistance, he bears the burden of proving the claim. [Citation.] To meet this burden the defendant must prove two things: (1) that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate, and (2) that counsel’s errors or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense or that it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have occurred in the absence of counsel’s failin

2004A defendant may move to be granted a new trial where error of the trial court or misconduct of counsel deprived him of a fair trial. (§ 1181; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582-583 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 .) In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance withdrew a potentially meritorious defense or otherwise prejudiced his case to the extent that the result of the verdict is unreliable. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 870 , 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ;

1995The defendant is entitled to “reasonably effective assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ].) To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant bears the burden of showing (1) counsel’s representation fell below that expected of a reasonably competent attorney and (2) the incompetence resulted in withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.

1995The defendant is entitled to “reasonably effective assistance.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ].) To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant bears the burden of showing (1) counsel’s representation fell below that expected of a reasonably competent attorney and (2) the incompetence resulted in withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.

1988Because the critical portion of Jones's testimony supported defendant's alibi (that he was not at the Crumbs' apartment when they were murdered), we do not agree that counsel's failure to impeach Jones resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense ( Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425 ), or that a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted had Jones been impeached. ( Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584 .) Indeed, because Jones's testimony was favorable to defendant, it appears counsel's decision to avoid impeaching Jones with a prior inconsistent statement w

1988(See People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 160 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ].) (27) When the basis for the petition is the failure of counsel to afford the quality of representation guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, the petitioner must not only prove that counsel inexcusably failed to make particular investigations or objections, or failed to introduce particular items of evidence, but must also demonstrate that the omissions resulted in the denial of or inadequate presentation of a potentially meritorious defense. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Ca

1987Defendant must establish that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in a withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense. ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412 , 425: People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d 264, 289 ; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [ 189 Cal. Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) (8b) Knight attempts to turn a negative finding into a positive assertion: because the court said there was no evidence of inadequate funding, there must have been evidence which counsel neglected to put before the court.

1984(People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 , 2 A.L.R.4th 1 ]; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 289 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 ].) In addition, appellant must establish either that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense, or that it is reasonably probable that a determination more favorable to him would have resulted absent counsel’s failings.

2025Defendant cites People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 , People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460 , and People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851 to impliedly contend that not arguing a potentially meritorious defense at trial is IAC.

1984In addition, after reviewing the record as a whole, and resolving some reasonable doubts in defendant's favor, we conclude that counsel's incompetence deprived defendant of a potentially meritorious defense. (5) In People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 851, 865 [ 153 Cal. Rptr. 695 ], the Court of Appeal stressed that "defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel if, by reason of counsel's failure to perform the obligations imposed upon him, defendant is deprived of an adjudication of a crucial or potentially meritorious defense." (Cited with approval in In re Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3

2015(Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 107 ; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242 , overruled on another point in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835 .) “In order to demonstrate that the alleged incompetency of his trial counsel in not objecting to the identification evidence denied him a potentially meritorious defense, the defendant must present a convincing argument that the pretrial identification procedure ‘resulted in such unfairness that it infringed his right to due process of law.’ [Citations.] Our task is thus to assess the facts and circumstances of the identifica

1984(See People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597 [ 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 ].) In the second step of the process, the trial court will have decided whether, on the facts which it has found, the defendant was deprived of his right to adequate assistance of counsel, that is, whether the defendant has shown that “. . . trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of *725 reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates . . . [and] that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense ...” (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 4

1984In addition, appellant must establish that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense." (P. 425.) (3) Thereafter, in the context of a contention that counsel had withdrawn a *541 defense, we observed "It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe that the defense was potentially meritorious, and that petitioner was denied an adjudication on the matter because of his counsel's inadequate factual and legal preparation." ( In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 434 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ].) (4) Although the referee's findings of fact,

1984In addition, appellant must establish that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense." (P. 425.) (3) Thereafter, in the context of a contention that counsel had withdrawn a *541 defense, we observed "It is sufficient for the present purpose to observe that the defense was potentially meritorious, and that petitioner was denied an adjudication on the matter because of his counsel's inadequate factual and legal preparation." ( In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 434 [ 179 Cal. Rptr. 223 , 637 P.2d 690 ].) (4) Although the referee's findings of fact,

1993In addition, [he] must establish that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.” ’ (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) “Ordinarily, matters involving trial tactics are not subject to judicial hindsight and the courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel.... ‘It is not sufficient to allege merely that the attorney’s tactics were poor, or that the case might have been handled more effectively. [Citations.] [][] Rather, the defendant must affirmatively show that the omissions of defense

1993In addition, [he] must establish that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.” ’ (People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 ].) “Ordinarily, matters involving trial tactics are not subject to judicial hindsight and the courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel.... ‘It is not sufficient to allege merely that the attorney’s tactics were poor, or that the case might have been handled more effectively. [Citations.] [][] Rather, the defendant must affirmatively show that the omissions of defense

1990(People v. Najera (1972) 8 Cal.3d 504, 516-517 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 503 P.2d 1353 ].) “It is not sufficient to allege merely that the attorney’s tactics were poor, or that the case might have been handled more effectively. [Citations.] [^[] Rather, the defendant must affirmatively show that the omissions of defense counsel involved a critical issue, and that the omissions cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics.” (People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 709 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 608 , 464 P.2d 64 ]; In re Julius B. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 395, 402 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 341 ].) *1

1990(People v. Najera (1972) 8 Cal.3d 504, 516-517 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 503 P.2d 1353 ].) “It is not sufficient to allege merely that the attorney’s tactics were poor, or that the case might have been handled more effectively. [Citations.] [^[] Rather, the defendant must affirmatively show that the omissions of defense counsel involved a critical issue, and that the omissions cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics.” (People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 709 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 608 , 464 P.2d 64 ]; In re Julius B. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 395, 402 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 341 ].) *1

2015(People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 .) As explained above, there is no substantial evidence that self-defense was a potentially meritorious defense.

1992(E.g., Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686 . . . ; Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 423-424.) Specifically, it entitles him to ‘the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent, conscientious advocate.’ [Citations.]” ( 43 Cal.3d at p. 215 .) A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that the attorney’s deficient representation resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense.

2026A “prosecutor is entitled to comment on the credibility of witnesses based on the evidence adduced at trial.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 529 ) “[H]arsh and colorful 10 Because we conclude appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the alleged misconduct, we also reject his related claim that counsel’s failure amounted to the “withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense … requiring per se reversal of the judgment.” (People v. Diggs (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 958, 971 .) 21. attacks on the credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible” so long as they are reas

2014(People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [to prove a claim of inadequate trial assistance, defendant “must establish that counsel’s acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense”], overruled on other grounds in People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 ; People v. Diggs (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 958, 968-969 [same].) Defendant claims his neighbor would have testified about defendant’s cocaine use the week before the shooting.

1980In addition, appellant must establish that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense." ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ].) Pope continues, "Once an appellant has met these burdens, the appellate court must look to see if the record contains any explanation for the challenged aspect of representation." If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the judgment will be affirmed on appeal "unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed t

1980In addition, appellant must establish that counsel's acts or omissions resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense." ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [ 152 Cal. Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ].) Pope continues, "Once an appellant has met these burdens, the appellate court must look to see if the record contains any explanation for the challenged aspect of representation." If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the judgment will be affirmed on appeal "unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed t

2025Defendant cites People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412 , People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460 , and People v. Farley (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 851 to impliedly contend that not arguing a potentially meritorious defense at trial is IAC.

1993Thus, we initially held that in order for a litigant to obtain relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, “ ‘[i]t must appear that counsel’s lack of diligence or competence reduced the trial to a “farce or a sham.” ’ [Citations.]” (Pope, supra, at p. 421, quoting People v. Ibarra (1963) 60 Cal.2d 460, 464 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 863 , 386 P.2d 487 ].) The “farce or sham” standard gave way to the modern view, based on the Sixth Amendment, that in order to gain relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, a litigant “must show that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably

2022As the Supreme Court reinforced in 5 Effective April 25, 2019, rule 8.392(b)(3) of the California Rules of Court provides that a request to the Court of Appeal for a certificate of appealability “must identify the petitioner’s claim or claims for relief and explain how the requirements of Penal Code section 1509(d) have been met.” (Italics added.) Because the requirements for complying with sections 1509 and 1509.1 were unclear before the Supreme Court decided Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th 720 , we will consider all of petitioner’s arguments pertaining to successiveness, whether raised in the exha

2021(See Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 781 [“Counsel is not expected to conduct an unfocused investigation grounded on mere speculation or hunch, without any basis in triggering fact.”].) If habeas corpus counsel preparing an initial petition before Proposition 66 was aware of a potentially meritorious claim of fundamental miscarriage of justice, counsel had an obligation to investigate and present that claim; he or she could not reasonably refrain from presenting it because it might fall within Clark’s substantive exception and be permissibly presented in a future successive petition.

2016Relying upon People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660 (Harvey) and People v. Ramirez (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1501 (Ramirez), appellant argues his counsel’s failure to develop the known witnesses’ testimony withheld a potentially meritorious defense from appellant prior to his plea.

2002"The entry of a plea must be a `"voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." [Citations.]' ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 56 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 .)" ( In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1133 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 265 .) We have held that a plea of guilty is not knowingly and intelligently made when a defendant does not have knowledge of a potentially meritorious defense prior to entering the plea. ( People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 668-671 , 198 Cal.Rptr. 858 ( Harvey ); see also In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal.

2002"The entry of a plea must be a `"voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." [Citations.]' ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 56 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 .)" ( In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1133 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 265 .) We have held that a plea of guilty is not knowingly and intelligently made when a defendant does not have knowledge of a potentially meritorious defense prior to entering the plea. ( People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 668-671 , 198 Cal.Rptr. 858 ( Harvey ); see also In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal.

2002"The entry of a plea must be a `"voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." [Citations.]' ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 474 U.S. 52, 56 , 106 S.Ct. 366 , 88 L.Ed.2d 203 .)" ( In re Vargas (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1133 , 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 265 .) We have held that a plea of guilty is not knowingly and intelligently made when a defendant does not have knowledge of a potentially meritorious defense prior to entering the plea. ( People v. Harvey (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 660, 668-671 , 198 Cal.Rptr. 858 ( Harvey ); see also In re Williams (1969) 1 Cal.

1988Counsel's Factual Investigation: Competency (6a) We observed in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 164 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ], that "where diminished capacity appears to be the sole potentially meritorious defense, and counsel has in fact elected to present such a defense at trial, counsel must be expected to take those reasonable measures to investigate the factual framework underlying the defense preliminary to the exercise of an informed choice among the available tactical options, if any." (Italics in original.) Even if counsel has legitimate tactical reasons for intro

1988Counsel's Factual Investigation: Competency (6a) We observed in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 164 [ 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 , 599 P.2d 587 ], that "where diminished capacity appears to be the sole potentially meritorious defense, and counsel has in fact elected to present such a defense at trial, counsel must be expected to take those reasonable measures to investigate the factual framework underlying the defense preliminary to the exercise of an informed choice among the available tactical options, if any." (Italics in original.) Even if counsel has legitimate tactical reasons for intro

1988Defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate that as a result of the allegedly improper commitment on an information including these special circumstances he was denied a fair trial or suffered prejudice. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ].) Nor does counsel's failure to make the motion demonstrate that defendant was denied a potentially meritorious defense or otherwise denied the caliber of representation to which he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.

1988Defendant makes no attempt to demonstrate that as a result of the allegedly improper commitment on an information including these special circumstances he was denied a fair trial or suffered prejudice. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [ 165 Cal. Rptr. 851 , 612 P.2d 941 ].) Nor does counsel's failure to make the motion demonstrate that defendant was denied a potentially meritorious defense or otherwise denied the caliber of representation to which he was entitled under the Sixth Amendment or article I, section 15 of the California Constitution.

2025First, when a public entity wants to condemn property, it must give the property owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. (§ 1245.235, subds. (a), (c).) And when a property owner-defendant answers an eminent domain complaint, the answer must “state the specific ground upon which the objection is taken and, if the objection is taken by answer, the specific facts upon which the objection is based.” (§ 1250.350.) These statutes are consistent with the principle that public entities “are entitled to know at the outset whether the construction of a project will be placed at risk by a potentiall

2025First, when a public entity wants to condemn property, it must give the property owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. (§ 1245.235, subds. (a), (c).) And when a property owner-defendant answers an eminent domain complaint, the answer must “state the specific ground upon which the objection is taken and, if the objection is taken by answer, the specific facts upon which the objection is based.” (§ 1250.350.) These statutes are consistent with the principle that public entities “are entitled to know at the outset whether the construction of a project will be placed at risk by a potentiall

2004A defendant may move to be granted a new trial where error of the trial court or misconduct of counsel deprived him of a fair trial. (§ 1181; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582-583 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 .) In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance withdrew a potentially meritorious defense or otherwise prejudiced his case to the extent that the result of the verdict is unreliable. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 870 , 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ;

2004A defendant may move to be granted a new trial where error of the trial court or misconduct of counsel deprived him of a fair trial. (§ 1181; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 582-583 , 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 .) In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel's deficient performance withdrew a potentially meritorious defense or otherwise prejudiced his case to the extent that the result of the verdict is unreliable. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 870 , 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857 , 978 P.2d 15 ;

2024The statute requires that such a proposed response accompany the request for relief: “Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, . . . .” (§ 473(b), italics added.) There are twin rationale for section 473(b)’s proposed pleading requirement: (1) “to screen out those applications for relief that do not assert a potentially meritorious defense” (County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 832, 837 (Johnson)); and (2) “to avoid further delays by compelling the de

2014Under the statute, an application for discretionary relief must “be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein . . ., and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding 2 was taken.” (§ 473, subd. (b).) The purpose of these requirements is “to screen out those applications for relief that do not assert a potentially meritorious defense.” (County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 832, 837 .) Cullison did not submit a proposed amendment to her complaint.

2014Furthermore, James Gerard was on notice of the statute of frauds defense to his claim because the Gerard sons alleged it in their answer and McMaken raised it in her motion for summary judgment. “[‘I]t would be unfair to ground a ruling on the inadequacy of the pleadings if the pleadings, read in the light of the facts adduced in the summary judgment proceeding, give notice to the plaintiffs of a potentially meritorious defense.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384-385 ; Thornton v. Victor Meat Co. (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 452, 461 .) 19 As to the merits of McMaken’

1995Under these circumstances, it would have been unfair for the trial court to have determined the affirmative defenses were not pleaded with “sufficient particularity,” if the pleadings, read in light of the facts of this government tort liability case, gave notice to Hata of a potentially meritorious defense. *1805 (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384-385 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 508 ].) “If [Hata] had openly challenged the adequacy of [County’s] pleading in the trial court, and [County] tendered a potentially meritorious . . . defense, it is likely that [it] would have bee

1988(See People v. Shaw (1984) 35 Cal.3d 535 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 788 , 674 P.2d 759 ]; People v. Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 212 , 671 P.2d 363 ]; In re Saunders, supra, 2 Cal.3d 1033 .) In People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142 , defendant's counsel presented what this court described as an "undeveloped theory of diminished capacity," by offering evidence that on the day of a capital murder the defendant had ingested mind-altering drugs.

1988(See People v. Shaw (1984) 35 Cal.3d 535 [ 198 Cal. Rptr. 788 , 674 P.2d 759 ]; People v. Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926 [ 196 Cal. Rptr. 212 , 671 P.2d 363 ]; In re Saunders, supra, 2 Cal.3d 1033 .) In People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142 , defendant's counsel presented what this court described as an "undeveloped theory of diminished capacity," by offering evidence that on the day of a capital murder the defendant had ingested mind-altering drugs.

1983We considered the merits of his claim and noted that such an omission, if unreasonable, would "automatically satisfy" the "potentially meritorious defense" requirement of Pope . ( Id. at p. 855, fn. 4.) In People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 Cal.3d 814 , 828, footnote 6 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 608 P.2d 689 ], we "assumed" for purposes of analysis that counsel's failure to object to other-crimes evidence deprived the defendant of a potentially meritorious defense.

1983We considered the merits of his claim and noted that such an omission, if unreasonable, would "automatically satisfy" the "potentially meritorious defense" requirement of Pope . ( Id. at p. 855, fn. 4.) In People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 Cal.3d 814 , 828, footnote 6 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 608 P.2d 689 ], we "assumed" for purposes of analysis that counsel's failure to object to other-crimes evidence deprived the defendant of a potentially meritorious defense.