potentially meritorious claim in Texas

2026An evicted appellant may still pursue an appeal, however, if he advances “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the property.” Strange, 2024 WL 1862860 , at *4; see also Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 .

2026Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006) (holding appeal was not moot because appellant failed to file supersedeas or voluntarily vacated premises; appeal was moot because appellant failed to assert “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the [property]”).

2022However, an appeal from a forcible detainer judgment becomes moot if the defendant is no longer in possession of the property, unless he holds and asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.” Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 ; Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768 .

2019However, if a defendant in a forcible detainer action is no longer in possession of the premises, then an appeal from the judgment of possession is moot “unless the defendant asserts ‘a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the [premises].’” Id. (quoting Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 ).

2022A forcible detainer proceeding is moot “if the defendant is no longer in possession of the property, unless she holds and asserts ‘a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.’” Briones v. Brazos Bend Villa Apartments, 438 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall v. Hous.

2016While failure to supersede a forcible entry and detainer judgment does not definitively moot the ensuing appeal, the *866 appeal “becomes moot if the defendant is no longer in possession of the property, unless [he] holds and asserts ‘a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.” Briones, 438 S.W.3d at 812 (citing Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 ); Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at 768 .

2026Id. at 787 (citing Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001)).

2026See id.

2025Id.

2014However, in Kennedy, this court found tenant’s appeal was not moot (despite expiration of the lease) where the landlord failed to present evidence of good cause for termination arising after the forcible detainer was filed. 203 S.W.3d at 497 . 9 Although not raised by BHA, we further note that Geters’ failure to supersede the judgment and resultant loss of possession of the property likewise does not moot her appeal because she retains a potentially meritorious claim of right to actual, current possession.

2024Compare Kennedy v. Andover Place Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (potentially meritorious claim for current possession asserted, so appeal was not moot), and Geters v. Baytown Housing Authority, 430 S.W.3d 578 , 582– 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (same) with Briones v. Brazos Bend Villa Apartments, 438 S.W.3d 808 , 812–13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (no potentially meritorious claim for current possession asserted, so appeal was moot).

2024Auth., 430 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (briefly reviewing merits of appellant’s arguments on appeal to determine whether she “maintain[ed] an arguable basis for asserting a right to possession”).

2024Appeals from forcible detainer actions ordinarily become moot “when the appellant ceases to have actual possession of the property, unless the appellant has a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession.” Olley v. HVM, L.L.C., 449 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

2023See Olley, 449 S.W.3d at 575 .

2025See Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied (alterations omitted) (“A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on demand commits a forcible detainer if the person is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the time of foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant’s lease.”); see also Bankr.

2024See Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied (alterations omitted) (“A person who refuses to surrender possession of real property on deman commits a forcible detainer if the person is a tenant at will or by sufferance, including an occupant at the time of foreclosure of a lien superior to the tenant’s lease.”); see also Bankr.

2015I dissented to that dismissal on the basis that applicant had made a prima facie showing that his claims should have been remanded to the trial court for consideration, relying on the reasoning in my dissent in Ex parte Buck and suggesting that inadequate representation by habeas counsel in failing to raise a potentially meritorious claim should serve as a basis to overcome the bar on subsequent writs. 418 S.W.3d 98, 109 (Tex. Crim.

2015I dissented to that dismissal on the basis that applicant had made a prima facie showing that his claims should have been remanded to the trial court for consideration, relying on the reasoning in my dissent in Ex parte Buck and suggesting that inadequate representation by habeas counsel in failing to raise a potentially meritorious claim should serve as a basis to overcome the bar on subsequent writs. 418 S.W.3d 98, 109 (Tex. Crim.

2022Id.

2020See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 ; AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC, 419 S.W.3d at 529 . -4- 04-20-00124-CV longer in possession of the property and because he does not assert a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the premises, we conclude Stone’s appeal is moot.

2026See Curry, 472 S.W.3d at 349 ; Moore v. Moore, No. 04-24-00367-CV, 2025 WL 470392 , at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 12, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating an appellant “cannot prevail in any evidentiary challenge without first meeting his burden of presenting a sufficient record on appeal”); Landaverde v. Gutierrez, No. 01-19-00732-CV, 2020 WL 7251445 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Without a record it is impossible for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Landaverde’s remaining claims” in forcible- detainer action). 3 3

2025See id.; see, e.g., Abraham v. Victory Apartments, 578 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (recognizing that “an appellant presents an arguable basis for current, actual possession where the appellant’s lease contained an automatic-renewal provision and the appellant challenged the bases for the lease’s underlying termination”).

2024See In re AMRCO, Inc., 496 B.R. 442, 444 (Bankr.

2024See Dean v. Lafayette Place (Section One) Council of Co–Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“If an appellee is satisfied with the relief granted by the trial court, but merely wants to present additional, independent grounds for affirming the trial court’s judgment, no notice of appeal is required.

2019Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 ; see Guillen v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 494 S.W.3d 861 , 865–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

2016See Dafarty, 399 S.W.3d at 711 (concluding that while issue of possession became moot, “the entire case was not moot because [plaintiff’s] claims for damages and attorney’s fees continued to present live controversies”). 4 Accordingly, we dismiss as moot issues two, three, and four—all of which directly challenge the trial court’s determination on the right to possession of the property.2 However, because a live controversy potentially still exists with respect to Allen-Mercer’s challenge to the trial court’s award of damages and attorney’s fees, we will proceed to address these issues.