8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Larry McCall Cross-Appellant v. Gayle Franzen, Cross-Appelleesgreen2 sentences2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the “quid pro quo” of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). 2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the "quid pro quo" of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). | 5 | 5 |
Milton Lecompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc.green2 sentences2003We relied on various federal authorities, noting their characterization of the terms and conditions imposed pursuant to the rule as the quid pro quo of allowing the plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again, see McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1183-86 (7th Cir.1985), and as allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his action from the court "without prejudice to future litigation." LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir.1976). 2003We relied on various federal authorities, noting their characterization of the terms and conditions imposed pursuant to the rule as the quid pro quo of allowing the plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judi-cata from bringing the same suit again, see McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1183-86 (7th Cir.1985), and as allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his action from the court "without prejudice to future litigation." LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir.1976). | 3 | 3 |
Nannette B. Davis v. Usx Corporationgreen2 sentences2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the “quid pro quo” of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). 2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the "quid pro quo" of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). | 2 | 2 |
Nicolaos Ikospentakis v. Thalassic Steamship Agency and Kyriakos Zervosgreen2 sentences2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the “quid pro quo” of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). 2004Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.1990) (primary purpose of entrusting dismissal to the supervision of the trial court is to protect defendant from unfair treatment); Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir.1987) (district court must focus primarily on protecting the interests of the defendant); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions are the "quid pro quo" of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again). | 2 | 2 |
Goodman Associates, LLC v. WP Mountain Properties, LLCgreen1 sentence2023See Sebastian, ¶ 18, 366 P.3d at 606 (holding that 10 even if we “disagree with the trial court’s disposition of a motion, [we] must respect the decision unless the movant proves that the trial court’s judgment was ‘manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.’” (quoting Goodman Assocs., 222 P.3d at 314 )). ¶16 Turning to the second Buckmiller factor, we note that Encompass set forth a potentially meritorious defense based on its reference to the report by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment regarding Mr. McMichael’s death, which cited no deficiencies in the treatment an | 1 | 1 |
Sebastian v. Douglas Countygreen1 sentence2023See Sebastian, ¶ 18, 366 P.3d at 606 (holding that 10 even if we “disagree with the trial court’s disposition of a motion, [we] must respect the decision unless the movant proves that the trial court’s judgment was ‘manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.’” (quoting Goodman Assocs., 222 P.3d at 314 )). ¶16 Turning to the second Buckmiller factor, we note that Encompass set forth a potentially meritorious defense based on its reference to the report by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment regarding Mr. McMichael’s death, which cited no deficiencies in the treatment an | 1 | 1 |
Lawrence L. Simmons v. Howard L. Beyer and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, W. Cary Edwardsgreen1 sentence2007See Simmons v. Beyer, supra, 44 F.3d at 1170 (defendant suffered "actual prejudice" as a result of appellate delay "because his Batson claim is unreviewable on the reconstructed record"). *188 We therefore conclude that McGiotten is entitled to a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
Gaf Corporation v. Transamerica Insurance Company. Gaf Corporation v. Transamerica Insurance Companygreen1 sentence1994Tillery, 692 P.2d at 1084 ; accord McCall-Bey v. Pranzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions imposed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) are the “quid pro quo” of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again); GAP Corp., 665 F.2d at 369 (“[n]o matter how conscientious and diligent [plaintiff] may have been, [defendant] suffered some costs by defending this action ... and [defendant] is entitled to such reimbursement of those costs as the court may order”); LeCompte, 528 F.2d a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Water Development, Inc. v. City of Alamosa
green
2 sentences2003We characterized rule 41(a)(2), rather than punishment for the plaintiff, as providing "a means for preserving a potentially meritorious claim for another day or another forum provided that conditions of dismissal [could] be devised to protect the defendants from prejudice." AWDI, 874 P.2d at 380 . 2003We characterized rule 41(a)(2), rather than punishment for the plaintiff, as providing "a means for preserving a potentially meritorious claim for another day or another forum provided that conditions of dismissal [could] be devised to protect the defendants from prejudice." AWDI, 874 P.2d at 8380 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023In assessing whether equitable considerations warrant setting aside default judgments, we have instructed trial courts to “take into account the promptness of the moving party in filing the rule 60(b) motion, the fact of any detrimental reliance by the opposing party on the order or judgment of dismissal, and any prejudice to the opposing party if the motion were to be granted.” Buckmiller, 727 P.2d at 1116 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tillery v. District Court ex rel. Fifth Judicial District
green
2 sentences1994Tillery, 692 P.2d at 1084 ; accord McCall-Bey v. Pranzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir.1985) (terms and conditions imposed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) are the “quid pro quo” of allowing plaintiff to dismiss a potentially meritorious claim without being prevented by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing the same suit again); GAP Corp., 665 F.2d at 369 (“[n]o matter how conscientious and diligent [plaintiff] may have been, [defendant] suffered some costs by defending this action ... and [defendant] is entitled to such reimbursement of those costs as the court may order”); LeCompte, 528 F.2d a 1994According to Tillery , a plaintiffs Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice “generally should be granted,” Till-ery, 692 P.2d at 1085 , but the court must first determine that any harm to the defendant may be avoided by imposing terms and conditions of dismissal. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Braeseke
green
2 sentences1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). 1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In re Griffin
green
1 sentence1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Monongahela Power Co. v. United States
green
1 sentence1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Amadeo v. Russeau
green
1 sentence1984People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.3d 264 , 618 P.2d 149 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 , 101 S.Ct. 1750 , 68 L.Ed.2d 232 (1981). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.